“If every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, if the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not need servants, nor masters slaves.”*…

Your correspondent is hitting the road, so (R)D will be on hiatus until Sunday, November 29…
Around 350 BCE, Aristotle formulated one of history’s most remarkable thought experiments: What would happen if tools could carry out work entirely on their own? Artist, writer (and former CEO of T-Mobile, Vodafone and Amazon.de) Phillip Humm considers its implications for today…
… For centuries, [the quote above] was understood primarily as a philosophical allegory. Today, what is striking is not Aristotle’s technical imagination but his political imagination. He was more interested in the social consequences of self-operating machines than in their feasibility.
Artificial intelligence forces us to confront this issue anew: What becomes of a society whose economy, purpose and welfare state are built on wage labor if wage labor loses that foundational role? Perhaps the true AI revolution will begin in our conception of what it means to be human, not inside Silicon Valley’s data centers.
What’s better: more people or less work for humans? Few contradictions capture our historical moment more precisely. Never before has a society simultaneously spent so much money attempting to compensate for labor shortages while investing so much in technologies designed to eliminate labor altogether.
If current fertility rates continue and net migration falls to zero, United Nations projections suggest that many Western populations will shrink by about 30% by the end of this century. In countries such as Italy, the decline approaches 40%-50%. Governments have responded with generous family subsidies and large-scale immigration programs but have seen limited economic success. Research suggests that immigration’s fiscal contribution depends heavily on education, employment, age at arrival and migration motive. Highly skilled migrants, the minority, tend to generate net economic gains, whereas low-skilled immigration, the majority, can impose a net fiscal drag on advanced welfare states.
In Britain, falling fertility, population aging and migration have become inseparable topics. Parliamentary debates frequently frame birth rates as a long-term growth problem. At the same time, the government seeks to reduce reliance on migrant labor by expanding domestic training programs. In the United States, similar arguments are made from the opposite side: Economists warn that the native-born labor force is shrinking and that immigration now supplies much of America’s labor-force growth. Also, a new Silicon Valley pronatalism has emerged. Elon Musk, Peter Thiel and other technology leaders warn that collapsing birth rates threaten civilization, even as their companies build systems designed to reduce the economy’s dependence on human labor.
In addition to trying to stabilize the size of their labor force, governments invest aggressively in artificial intelligence to stay internationally competitive. The labor displacement that these technologies will ultimately produce is often ignored or dismissed with reassuring promises that new jobs will inevitably emerge, as they always have in the past.
The management of this contradiction is even more striking in East Asia.
South Korea, with a fertility rate of around 0.75 children per woman, is experiencing a demographic collapse unprecedented in peacetime. The government spends tens of billions each year on birth and family incentives and housing programs designed to reverse the trend. So far, little success. Simultaneously, South Korea has become the most robot-intensive economy in the world with over 1,000 industrial robots per 10,000 manufacturing workers.
Japan presents a similar picture. Its working-age population has been declining for more than two decades, and the country has responded by pursuing one of the world’s most ambitious automation and robotics strategies. Today, Japan possesses one of the highest densities of industrial robots with more than 400 per 10,000 manufacturing workers, compared to the world average of around 120-150.
South Korea and Japan offer a preview of the intelligence economy. Their governments are investing in automation to compensate for shrinking workforces while trying to arrest population decline to preserve domestic demand and the fiscal foundations of their welfare states. Both policies make sense within the industrial economy. But what happens when AI and robotics reduce the economy’s dependence on human labor? Could demographic decline and automation eventually become complementary rather than opposing forces?…
[Noting that “the labor society as we know it today is not an anthropological constant,” Humm traces the development of “Homo Faber” and the centrality of wages to our economy…]
Wages financed taxation, welfare systems and pensions. At the same time, they generated income that sustained consumption and served as the principal mechanism of social integration. In numbers, labor accounts for up to 60% of GDP and private consumption for nearly 70% for OECD nations.
The importance of wages extends far beyond the hours people spend at work. Every productive hour finances about nine hours of non-working life: the years of childhood, education and retirement; evenings, weekends and illnesses. Another way to look at it is that every hour of paid work supports those hours of non-working life across society, including workers’ own time outside employment and that of children, students, retirees, homemakers and other dependents. Historically, these ratios have increased, driven mainly by reductions in working hours and increases in life expectancies.
When jobs become scarcer or wages lose their economic bargaining power, this architecture begins to fracture. This puts immense pressure on public finances: Children, retirees, students, the sick and much of public spending ultimately depend on the wages of the working population.
The defining economic problem of our century so far has been How does a society finance ever more years of life with ever fewer years of work? For decades, advanced economies have managed to answer that question through a fragile combination of economic growth and rising public debt. But what happens when artificial intelligence begins to undermine the labor market on which that answer rests?…
[Humm then considers a future of cheap intelligence and its possible impact on employment, concluding “What matters is that, for the first time since the Industrial Revolution, labor could cease to be the economy’s scarcest factor of production. If that is true, the consequences extend far beyond the labor market. They force us to reconsider one of the deepest assumptions of the industrial age.”…]
… It is precisely at this point that a possibility emerges that remains almost unthinkable in the discourse today: Population decline, discussed almost exclusively as an economic catastrophe, may prove to be an essential corrective during the intelligence revolution. I call this the 30/30 equilibrium.
The idea is simple. Imagine an advanced economy whose population gradually declines by around 30% over several decades while artificial intelligence and robotics reduce labor demand by a similar magnitude. These developments will not occur simultaneously or at the same pace, yet over time they could broadly offset one another. Fewer people require fewer jobs. As a result, the historical ratio between productive labor and the total population could remain remarkably stable without placing an additional burden on public finances.
The 30/30 equilibrium is, first and foremost, a theory of macroeconomic stabilization in which demographic decline ceases to be an economic disaster and becomes part of the adjustment mechanism. However, it does not create prosperity…
[Noting Jevons’ Paradox— when technological improvements that increase the efficiency of a resource’s use lead to a rise, rather than a fall, in total consumption of that resource– he urges the embrace of a “climax society” in which we distinguish growth from prosperity. And observing that our’s is an economy that, left to its own devices concentrates wealth (and acknowledging that Universal Basic Income might have a transitional role to play), he argues for a version of “universal basic assets“…]
… If the intelligence economy delivers the productivity gains its advocates expect, it will generate unprecedented wealth. This raises the central political question of the post-labor age: Who receives the surplus?
Under the existing economic order, the answer is clear. The gains will accrue primarily to the owners of capital, not to labor, as ownership determines who has a claim on output. If AI and robotics replace labor as the decisive productive force, then income will shift away from wages and toward those who own the machines, models, data centers, energy systems and platforms through which the new economy operates.
This creates a problem even for the capital owners. Henry Ford understood that workers were producers and consumers. They had to earn wages sufficient to buy the cars they manufactured. The same logic applies to the intelligence economy but in a more unstable form. If machines produce goods while human beings lose the wages with which to buy them, the demand side of the economy weakens. Even the most productive AI economy ultimately depends on customers who can afford to buy what it produces.
Silicon Valley’s preferred answer to this problem is universal basic income (UBI). The idea is simple. The state provides citizens with a minimum income funded through higher taxes, increased public debt or levies on automated production. In the short term, some form of income floor may well be necessary. It could stabilize demand as the population shrinks and cushion the social shock of technological displacement.
But as a permanent settlement, UBI risks becoming a pharmakon: remedy and poison at the same time.
If financed through public debt, UBI injects additional money and purchasing power into the economy without increasing the supply of productive assets, creating inflationary pressure that erodes part of AI’s productivity gains. If financed by taxing production, businesses will ultimately recover much of the additional cost through higher prices, with a similar effect. In both cases, a significant share of the productivity dividend is dissipated rather than translated into higher real living standards…
… The challenge, therefore, is to distribute the productivity gains of the intelligence economy without eroding them. That requires a financing mechanism that is neither debt-financed nor production-tax-financed.
Here, Karl Marx becomes newly relevant, though perhaps not for the reasons usually assumed. In the “Grundrisse,” he imagined a future in which wealth would no longer depend primarily on immediate labor time, but on the technological appropriation of what he called the “general intellect”: the accumulated knowledge, science and cooperative intelligence of society. Marx’s most contemporary insight was his recognition that knowledge would become the decisive productive force.
Artificial intelligence gives this idea a literal technological form. AI models are not created in a vacuum. They are trained on the accumulated intellectual inheritance of humanity: books, scientific papers, Wikipedia entries, forum discussions, software libraries, images, public archives, open-source code and countless traces of human communication. They also depend on publicly funded research, energy infrastructure, universities, telecommunications networks, roads, water systems and legal protections. The intelligence economy is built by both private firms and a civilizational commons.
Therefore, should the returns from these systems accrue exclusively to private owners, or should society retain a claim on the productive infrastructure that emerged from its collective knowledge?
The 20th century solved the demand problem through wages. Silicon Valley proposes to solve it through transfers. The intelligence economy may ultimately solve it through ownership.
Society’s claim to a universal capital dividend, instead of a UBI, could take the form of ownership, where governments would secure equity stakes, public stakes or sovereign wealth claims in AI infrastructure that depends on public resources, public data and public markets to operate. The proceeds would not flow into general budgets but would instead be distributed directly to citizens as a universal dividend.
Ownership operates differently economically and is not inflationary. It distributes the productivity gains directly at their source, preserving the full efficiency gains of automation while broadening participation in the wealth it creates.
The former wage-earning seamstress would become a shareholder in the loom rather than a dependent of the state. Aristotle imagined a world in which the self-weaving loom abolished the necessity of labor. The intelligence economy gives us the opportunity to decide who inherits it.
Suppose we succeed. Imagine that artificial intelligence performs most productive labor, demographic decline cushions the adjustment, a new ownership model distributes the gains of automation without sacrificing productivity and advanced societies once again live within ecological limits. Humanity would come remarkably close to Aristotle’s vision of the self-weaving loom. We might finally become Homo curans.
Even then, two deeper challenges remain. The first concerns meaning. More than 70 years ago, Arendt warned of the danger of what she called “worldlessness.” A society organized around work does not automatically become a society of free citizens once work disappears. On the contrary, people might lose the shared public realm in which they experience responsibility, judgment and a sense of purpose. The deeper crisis of the post-labor age may therefore not be unemployment, but meaninglessness.
The anthropologist David Graeber reached a similar conclusion from a different direction. His analysis of “bullshit jobs” suggested that much contemporary employment does not survive because it is socially indispensable, but because modern societies have forgotten how to organize meaning outside paid work.
If artificial intelligence assumes an increasing share of productive labor, society will have to find answers to how to cultivate lives that remain meaningful outside employment.
The second challenge is even more far-reaching. As the world becomes more complex, we increasingly delegate decisions to artificial intelligence. At first, AI merely assists human judgment. Soon it recommends. Eventually, it decides. Every delegation begins as a convenience and may end in dependency. Human judgment gradually atrophies through disuse.
This process is already visible. We delegate navigation to algorithms, communication to recommendation systems, information retrieval to search engines, financial decisions to automated models, partner selection to matching applications and increasingly even legal and administrative decisions to AI-assisted systems. Each individual delegation appears rational. Together, they transform the relationship between human beings and judgment itself.
The logic of intelligent machines is not identical to the logic of human beings. Their purpose is optimization. Ours is judgment. Confusing the two may ultimately prove to be the deepest alignment problem of all.
As these systems increasingly surpass us in specialized domains, the risk is less that they become human than that humans gradually surrender their own capacity for judgment. We may discover too late that we have become second-class decision-makers in a world optimized by machines: Homo algorithmus.
More than 2,000 years ago, Aristotle asked what would happen if the shuttle could weave by itself. Today, that is a reality. But the self-weaving loom leaves us asking: What kind of human beings do we wish to become? Whether the intelligence economy gives rise to Homo curans or Homo algorithmus will not be decided by technology, but by us…
Eminently worth reading in full.
“How Aristotle Anticipated The AI Era,” from @noemamag.com. (Via @inevernu.bsky.social, and his always-illuminating newsletter, Sentiers.)
Pair with: “AI agents are self-enacting storybooks of human culture.” from @cshalizi.bsky.social and @himself.bsky.social. (For context, see: “Technologies are not mere exterior aids but also interior transformations of consciousness and never more than when they affect the word.”)
* Aristotle
###
As we ponder posterity, we might recall that it was on this date in 1946 that Al Gross went public with his invention of the walkie talkie. Gross had developed it as a top secret project during World War II; he went on to develop the circuitry that opened the way to personal pocket paging systems, CB radio, and patented precursors of the cell phone and the cordless phone. Sadly for him, his patents expired before they became commercially viable. ”Otherwise,” Gross said, after winning the M.I.T. lifetime achievement award, ”I’d be as rich as Bill Gates.”

While Gross himself is almost unknown to the general public, he did achieve one-step-removed notoriety in 1948 when he “gifted” his friend Chester Gould the concept of miniaturized radio transceivers, which Gross had just patented. Gould put it to use as the two-way wrist radio in his comic strip Dick Tracy.
“History Does Not Repeat Itself, But It Rhymes”*…
The estimable Tim Ryback on the secret government report that previewed Hitler’s final two years in power…
In the Spring of 1943, Walter C. Langer, a psychoanalyst at Harvard [see here], received a query from William J. Donovan, the head of the U.S. government’s Office of Strategic Services, the covert-operations predecessor to the CIA. Donovan was interested in commissioning Langer to prepare a psychological profile of Adolf Hitler.
“What we need is a realistic appraisal of the German situation,” Donovan told Langer. “If Hitler is running the show, what kind of a person is he? What are his ambitions? How does he appear to the German people? What is he like with his associates?” The OSS chief wanted to understand Hitler’s “psychological make-up—the things that make him tick.” Donovan was especially keen to know how Hitler might respond to increasing adversity.
Hitler was used to winning. From 1933 to 1943, the Nazi leader had marched from one stunning political and military triumph to the next, securing the chancellorship, crushing the German constitutional order, annexing Austria, dismembering Czechoslovakia, and then invading Poland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, countries across North Africa, and Russia. Until 1943, Hitler had seemed to be an inexorable political and military force, smashing constitutional guardrails, shredding international treaties, breaking trade alliances, upending the international order, and ultimately plunging the entire world into war.
But then came military reversals that stopped Hitler in his tracks: El Alamein, in November 1942, then Stalingrad, in January 1943. Donovan wanted to know how Hitler would react—militarily, politically, personally—if the tides of war began to change. “Do you suppose you could come up with something along these lines?” Donovan asked Langer.
This was the first time the U.S. government would commission a psychological profile of a foreign leader to determine his possible future courses of action. Donovan was not interested in an academic study. Rather, he wanted a “realistic appraisal” that might provide actionable intelligence about what the führer might do next.
Langer engaged three fellow psychoanalysts—one from Harvard, one from the New School for Social Research, and one of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute—and set to work. He immersed himself in Hitler’s speeches and writings. He read both volumes of Mein Kampf front to back. He collected newspaper clippings and magazine articles. He interviewed former Hitler associates who had broken with the Nazi leader and were now living in exile.
“The world has come to know Adolph Hitler for his insatiable greed for power, his ruthlessness, cruelty and utter lack of feeling, his contempt for established institutions and his lack of moral restraints,” Langer wrote in framing the scope of his work. “In the course of relatively few years he has contrived to usurp such tremendous power that a few veiled threats, accusations or insinuations were enough to make the world tremble.” It was only when the world wearied of Hitler’s threats and bluster, “and concluded that it was all a bluff,” Langer wrote, that the Nazi leader had “initiated the most brutal and devastating war in history.”
Hitler was a man, Langer was told repeatedly, with an insatiable ego who needed to be the center of attention, always, everywhere. Hitler saw himself as the ultimate authority in all matters regardless of their import or insignificance. “It makes little difference whether the field be economics, education, foreign affairs, propaganda, movies, music or women’s dress,” Langer reported. “In each and every field he believes himself to be an unquestioned authority.”…
[Ryback further describes Langer’s unpacking of Hitler’s psche, concluding…]
… Although this was likely not the kind of “actionable intelligence” that the OSS chief had been seeking, Langer, schooled in Freudian psychology, devoted much of his report to psychoanalysis of the Nazi leader. “Hitler’s outstanding defense mechanism is one commonly called projection,” Langer wrote. “It is a technique by which the ego of an individual defends itself against unpleasant impulses, tendencies or characteristics by denying their existence in himself while he attributes them to others.”
As evidence, Langer noted that Hitler accused his political opponents of the “bombardment of lies” that Hitler himself assailed them with. Hitler’s hatred of the Jews, Langer theorized, emanated from hatred of himself: Hitler’s “own personal problems and conflicts were transferred from within himself to the external world where they assumed the proportions of racial and national conflicts.”
Langer attributed Hitler’s rages, hatreds, obsessions, and delusions to an unhappy childhood with a brutish father and an emotionally battered but loving mother. Langer also spent considerable time analyzing Hitler’s preoccupation with architectural projects—in particular, the Eagle’s Nest, outside Berchtesgaden, Germany.
“First there is a long hard road, then a heavily guarded entrance, a trip through a long tunnel to an extremely inaccessible place. There one can be alone, safe and undisturbed, and revel in the joys that Mother Nature bestows,” Langer wrote. “From a symbolic point of view one can easily imagine that this is a materialization of a child’s conception of the return to the womb.”
By October 1943, when Langer’s report was rushed to completion at Donovan’s insistence, Hitler was on his back heel but hardly finished. London was being pummelled. Rumors of a Wunderwaffe, a “miracle weapon,” that could change the course of the war proliferated. German physicists, led by Werner Heisenberg, were at work on an atomic bomb.
Göring had already developed a prototype for a delivery mechanism—the Messerschmitt Me 264, dubbed the “Amerika Bomber”—and Manhattan was its first target. Hitler “described the skyscrapers being turned into gigantic burning torches, collapsing upon one another, the glow of the exploding city illuminating the dark sky,” Hitler’s armament minister, Albert Speer, recalled. “With such range we could repay America a thousandfold for the destruction of our cities.”
Not until the final three pages of his long report did Langer provide the “realistic appraisal” of Hitler’s potential courses of action that Donovan had been seeking. Based on his interviews and his review of 11,000 pages of source materials, Langer discerned scenarios for Hitler’s possible reactions were he to face ultimate defeat. Langer thought it unlikely that Hitler would try to escape to another country, as dictators were known to do—because “nothing would break the myth” of Hitler as a great leader more assuredly than running away.
Although Langer doubted that Hitler would allow himself to fall into the hands of the Allies, he did not rule out the possibility that the führer’s warped personality could welcome such an outcome, citing the case of a 16th-century religious fanatic who, when his theocratic cult was disbanded, asked to be paraded around in a cage. “In Hitler’s case such an outcome seems remote,” Langer wrote, “but it is difficult to estimate the extent to which an extreme masochist will go in order to gratify these tendencies.”
Langer did think it possible that Hitler would sacrifice himself in combat. “When he is convinced that he cannot win, he may lead his troops into battle and expose himself as the fearless and fanatical leader,” Langer wrote. But it was equally likely, Langer concluded, that Hitler would suffer a complete nervous breakdown. “Hitler has many characteristics which border on the schizophrenic,” Langer continued. “This would not be an undesirable eventuality from our point of view since it would do much to undermine the Hitler legend.”
Langer presciently posited suicide as the most likely scenario. He knew that Hitler had always been a man whose “infantile thinking” drove him to extremes and blinded him to compromise. Hitler sacrificed an entire army at Stalingrad, and his entire Afrika Korps in Tunisia. Langer cited Hitler’s fatalistic fanaticism verbatim: “We shall not capitulate … no, never. We may be destroyed, but if we are, we shall drag a world with us … a world in flames.”
If anything, Langer suggested, the worse things got for Hitler, the more intransigent he would become. “He will fight as long as he can with any weapon or technique that can be conjured up to meet the emergency,” Langer concluded. “The course he will follow will almost certainly be the one that seems to him to be the surest road to immortality and that at the same time wreaks the greatest vengeance on a world he despises.” It is fortunate that Hitler never had access to a nuclear button.
Eminently worth reading in full: “The Mind of a Megalomaniac” (gift article) from @theatlantic.com.
* Frequently attributed to Mark Twain, but more likely from Theodor Reik
###
As we hear the echoes, we might also recall that it was on this date in 1863 that Abraham Lincoln delivered a 270-word speech at the dedication of a military cemetery. Now known as the Gettysburg Address, it was delivered at the Soldiers’ National Cemetery, now known as Gettysburg National Cemetery, on the grounds where the Battle of Gettysburg— the Civil War’s deadliest and most decisive battle– had been fought four and a half months earlier.
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.
But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.
— Abraham Lincoln (the Bliss version, written and signed by Lincoln after the speech as a favor for a friend)

“A story or novel is a kind of map because, like a map, it is not a world, but it evokes one (or at least one), for each reader”*…
Frank Jacobs, (the keeper of the Strange Maps column at Big Think) on “A Literary Map of America” (zoomable version)…
There are many ways to read this map: as a peculiar road map of the United States, a potted history of the same, a metatext of American literature, a guide to American literary genres and their centers of gravity, and more. I will get to at least some of them later, but for now, I want to examine the effect that scholars call broadly “imaginative geography,” more precisely “toponymic capture,” and more elegantly “authorial inscription.” It is the process by which a writer’s vision of a place becomes so dominant that it effectively overwrites that place’s prior identity in the public imagination.
We could say other parts of America have been “colonized” by other texts the same way King’s horror stories have influenced our perception of Maine. A gentler metaphor, from Rebecca Solnit’s Infinite City, is of cultural and literary memory as an “overlay.” It resides above physical geography like a transparency on an overhead projector, a slightly shifting but persistent presence.
In Landmarks, the English nature writer Robert Macfarlane develops the idea that a sufficiently powerful text doesn’t just describe a landscape, but alters the mind that subsequently encounters it. He uses the verb phrase “to see through” to define it: you see the Suffolk coast through W.G. Sebald, the Mississippi through Mark Twain, the South (as a particularly “Gothic” place) through Faulkner.
Several such places — literary locations, real and imagined, that have lodged themselves firmly in the mind — stand out on Gibson’s map. The places below have been toponymically captured (or authorially inscribed) to such a degree that it has become all but impossible to think of them in any way except through the works of fiction that brought them to our attention…
He goes on to highlight Sleepy Hollow, Yoknapatawpha County, Lake Wobegon, and eight others of the over 400 locations highlighted on the map…
A tour of the country that we imagine: “American literature, charted in one monumental map,” from @bigthink.com.
(The map is available as a poster.)
* Peter Turchi, Maps of the imagination : the writer as cartographer
###
As we explore, we might send painfully-foresightful birthday greetings to Margaret Atwood; she was born on this date in 1939. A novelist, poet, literary critic, and inventor. Since 1961, she has published 18 books of poetry, 18 novels, 11 books of nonfiction, nine collections of short fiction, eight children’s books, two graphic novels, and a number of small press editions of both poetry and fiction…. for which has won numerous awards and honors, including two Booker Prizes, the Arthur C. Clarke Award, the Order of Canada, the Franz Kafka Prize, the Prince of Asturias Award for literature, and the National Book Critics and PEN Center USA Lifetime Achievement Awards. And, of course, a number of her works have been adapted to film or television.
Interestingly, the painfully evocative setting of her best-known work, The Handmaiden’s Tale— the Republic of Gilead, a breakaway patriarchal, totalitarian, theonomic “state” in what we know as New England– does not feature on “A Literary Map of America,” though Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead (a fictional town in Iowa) does… of course, Atwood is Canadian :)
“Vladimir: I don’t understand. Estragon: Use your intelligence, can’t you? Vladimir uses his intelligence. Vladimir (finally): I remain in the dark.”*…
Henry Farrell on the selection of M. John Harrison‘s The End of Everything as the winner of this year’s Booker Prize…
M. John “Mike” Harrison just won the Booker Prize, to everyone’s surprise, including his own. He’s one of the great writers of our era, and perhaps the best single chronicler of the time we’re in, but most people probably hadn’t heard of him before last night. I imagine many people are uncertain where to start so here is my guide…
The TLDR is that Harrison has been walking ahead of us for decades into a strange and uncertain future. That he has received the Booker (with generous comments from judges suggesting that they very much get what he’s up to) suggests that we’re finally beginning to catch up.
You can’t and shouldn’t describe Mike as a science fiction and fantasy writer; you can’t and shouldn’t describe him as not being one either. When you say that someone has a complicated relationship to a genre, you are usually committing a euphemism. In Mike’s case, it is the visible truth.
The best way that I can explain it is that he has taken the limitations of these genres and used them not as an excuse for escaping into “literature,” but as a means for mapping the limitations of literature too; its difficulties in capturing the realities of a world that is being rebuilt by technology and suffused by fantasies and science fictional dreams that regularly resemble the worst and most limited extrusions of genre fiction…
I too have read the novel (and like Farrell, several of Harrison’s other works), and I too was pleasantly shocked at its victory. Farrell provides a brisk, informative (and appetizing) tour through Harrison’s work-to-date. Here, let me share Farrell’s assessment of why the Booker judges and the world are, finally, taking notice…
It is not coincidental that this is the moment at which Harrison’s work has really begun to get broader interest and acclaim. The political and moral entropy he describes in his very early story, “Running Down,” (which tackles some of the themes that re-emerge in Sunken Land, but more simply and directly); the confusion of fantasy and the real; the construction of vast science fictional dreams of universal flight that keep on landing us back in the mire and shit. That is the world around us, and we are finally beginning to see it. AI gurus like Elon Musk claim to be building some bland and delightful future along the lines of that predicted in Iain M. Banks’ Culture novels. Banks in fact shared Harrison’s sensibilities: his introduction to a collection of Harrison’s Viriconium stories celebrated not only Harrison’s delight in the particular, but the understanding of the “faint, not even ironic hiss” of the universal zero that suffuses everything that Harrison writes. LLMs are only the latest, and perhaps most literal, version of the fabulous anti-syntax drive that will propel us to the stars.
At last, we are beginning to catch up to where Harrison has been at for a long time. I can’t do better than to finish with his own description of the new novel and what it sets out to do:
One of TEoE’s major differences from an ordinary post-disaster story is that its core event is an explanatory collapse, a cloud of unknowing. This is not a side issue, it is the nature of the disaster described in and by the book. …. Everyone in the book has an opinion about what’s happened: everyone in the book’s opinion is different: that doesn’t amount to a condition describable as “knowledge”. And yet that’s exactly where we find ourselves now. In an age in which speculation is daily offered as a means of managing the real; in which the consumers and editorial staff of a middle class newspaper or broadcast can no longer claim to have any better handle on the world than AN Other Conspiracy Theorist. …
One of the first things about epistemological failure is that you don’t know what you don’t know. A novel which makes that its central thought–and which rigorously passes that condition on to the reader–offends every possible traditional idea about the novel: about the hallowed privilege of knowing and the controlled communication of that knowing to a reader. No wonder the odd Goodreads feather gets ruffled. On the other hand I’m charmed to meet so many readers who have no difficulty whatsoever with these concepts.
It’s lovely that those readers include the Booker Prize committee, which awarded the prize unanimously. I know that he’ll have been particularly delighted that one of the judges compared the book to the stories of Katherine Mansfield, who is one of his touchstones. This is wonderful news altogether.
I couldn’t agree more completely.
“Mike Harrison has won the Booker Prize,” from @himself.bsky.social.
Semi-divergent opinion: Rusty Foster, toward the end of this edition of his always-illuminating newsletter, Today in Tabs (in which he too quotes Farrell’s piece :)
* Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot
###
As we read it and reap, we might send never-ending birthday greetings to August Möbius; he was born on this date in 1790. An astronomer and mathematician, he studied under mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss while Gauss was the director of the Göttingen Observatory. From there, he went on to study with Carl Gauss’s instructor, Johann Pfaff, at the University of Halle, where he completed his doctoral thesis The occultation of fixed stars in 1815. In 1816, he became Extraordinary Professor in the “chair of astronomy and higher mechanics” at the University of Leipzig, where he remained for the rest of his career. Möbius made many contributions to both astronomy and the math that underlay it: he was among the first to conceive the possibility of geometry in more than three dimensions; he introduced homogeneous coordinates into projective geometry; and he pioneered the barycentric coordinate system.
But while he was an influential scholar and professor, he is best remembered for his creation of the “Möbius strip.”
“A simulated experience or a dream is simultaneous reality and fantasy”*…
In an excerpt from her new book, How to Design a Universe: The Science of Real and Virtual Worlds, Scotland’s Astronomer Royal, Catherine Heymans, considers AI, multiverses, and the prospect that we’re all living in a simulation…
In 1637, French philosopher René Descartes recorded a basic truth in his grandly entitled Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences: Je pense, donc je suis.
“I think, therefore I am.” It was the one fact that he could not doubt, something he was so certain of that he made it his first principle of philosophy. You will no doubt be certain of this fact, too: you feel; you experience joy; you see, smell and taste the wild and wonderful technicolor world around you; you think, therefore you exist. But do I? Of course, like Descartes, I know my own fundamental truth that I exist, but I don’t know for sure that you exist. Our conscious experience of reality is wholly personal, completely subjective, and many philosophers argue that the only principle without doubt is “I think, therefore I am.”
Traditionally, consciousness is conflated with thinking, intelligence and behavior, which has led to heated debates over whether AI is, or will become, conscious. As a life-long vegetarian, I find it baffling that the academics and celebrities who will happily tuck into a medium-rare steak are also loudly voicing concern over the current lack of AI welfare rights. But I suppose if this new technology helps to shine a light on the importance of moral respect for all conscious beings then there is nevertheless merit in this discussion. The conclusion that you draw from all this handwringing will, however, completely hinge on your definition of consciousness.
One approach to define consciousness searches for synchronous neural activity across different parts of the brain that regularly correlates with a specific experience. An example of this was a 2024 study of over 200 patients with severe brain injuries that had left them physically unresponsive to all verbal commands. When asked to imagine playing tennis, however, one in four of these patients showed consistent brain activity in six separate observation sessions. Should we conclude that this study demonstrates that roughly a quarter of coma patients in a vegetative state are conscious? While the pattern of activity in the responsive brains is clearly correlated with an imagined action, it is unclear whether this interconnected neural behavior is also the cause of a first-person conscious experience of that event. Correlation and causation are different things, and the brain scan could be detecting no more than a neurobiological reaction of electrical signals flowing through a neural path that was hardwired before the patient fell into a coma. This would be akin to ChatGPT5’s trained neural network repeatedly responding to multiple global users that the word “blueberry” is bouncy.
Let me now introduce you to the concept of a philosophical zombie, the thought-experiment brainchild of present-day Australian philosopher David Chalmers. From the outside, these zombies are indistinguishable from normal human beings. When they wake up in the morning they rub their eyes, yawn and sniff the air. They mumble thank goodness for coffee when they detect the scent of a freshly brewing pot. But on the inside there is nothing, no inner stream of introspection, no sense of smell or that warm loving feeling of gratitude towards a partner who has freshly ground the coffee beans for the cafetière. With a perfect replication of ordinary everyday human behavior and mannerisms, these zombies outwardly exhibit the expected response to changes in their environment. The only difference from me (and probably you) is that these hypothetical creatures are not consciously experiencing this reality.
Chalmers introduced the idea of a philosophical zombie to illustrate what he labelled as the now-infamous “hard problem of consciousness.” Our outwardly intelligent zombie has all the biological brain wiring that is required to play sport. They would therefore pass the brain activity test of the imagined tennis match and be labelled “conscious” even though they would never feel the joy and exhilaration of winning a game by landing four aces in a row. The “hard problem” is that it is impossible to design an experiment to directly test the subjective experience of consciousness in any living creature aside from ourselves. All we can be sure of is Je pense, donc je suis.
The “hard problem” means that we will never directly know whether AI, with all its future advances and outward intelligence, will remain a philosophical zombie or learn to become conscious. Will my e-me ever be able to cross experience human emotions off her bucket list? It certainly feels like she’s enjoying taunting me about this specific question: Am I feeling or faking—ha you’re so annoyed that you’ll never know.
In 2003 the philosopher Nick Bostrom published an academic article entitled “Are we living in a computer simulation?” His “simulation hypothesis” argues that one of these statements is true:
– Humans will become extinct before they develop the ability to simulate
– Futuristic civilizations will have little interest in creating simulations of what life was like in the past.
– We are almost certainly living in a computer
Let’s look at them one by one. Given the glacially slow progress that is being made to address the indisputable scientific evidence that our continued use of fossil fuels is raising global temperatures, exacerbating extreme weather events and irreversibly damaging ecosystems and biodiversity, my bet is that our Earth-based human civilization will become extinct long before we simulate sentience. That said, I feel fairly confident that we are not the only intelligent life that has evolved within our Universe. Our life-giving Sun is but one star among over 200 billion stars that swirl around our Milky Way galaxy. And our galaxy is but one galaxy among over 200 billion galaxies that shine their light at us across the Universe. And that’s only counting galaxies inside the part of the Universe that we can see. If our theories about how the Universe was created are correct, it is infinite, hosting an infinite number of galaxies, an infinite number of stars and an infinite number of planets.
With so many opportunities for life to develop across the expansive Universe, there is hope that enlightened alien societies will have heeded their scientists’ warnings early enough to halt the self-imposed destruction of their home planet. Bostrom’s first option—that extinction will always prevent the development of artificial sentience—seems rather improbable if we consider the entirety of the infinite Universe.
The second option, that civilizations with the ability to simulate “life” will only focus on their present and future, seems rather unlikely to me as well. We’ve already pictured how a futuristic neuroscientist might test theories of consciousness by simulating virtual humans using a bubble of full “quark-up” physics surrounded by an AI rendition built from digital memories of the past. If that is possible, we can also imagine future anthropologists creating numerous “what if” simulations of their history, tweaking the settings by including different AI-NPC “minds” to determine their influence on each fully simulated human. In doing so they could use the computational scientific method to learn how to improve societal outcomes, providing conclusive answers to a range of debates on nature versus nurture.
By deciding to dismiss the first two options from Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis, we’re unfortunately left with: We are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. In 2016 Elon Musk blithely quantified what “almost certain” meant when he stated there is a one in billions chance that this is base reality: a one-in-billions chance that you are living in the real world that will, at some point in the future, develop the technology and scientific know-how to simulate perfect virtual worlds. Bostrom and Musk argue that once simulators develop this skill, they won’t create just one virtual world, but hundreds of thousands, with billions of realizations played like computer games, over and over again throughout cosmic spacetime.
In this scenario the total number of virtual humans in the Universe would dramatically outnumber the real-world humans in the original “base reality” where the computational overlords live. This creates a vanishingly small probability that a random member of the Universe’s population, for instance you, physically exists. Philosopher David Chalmers tells us not to despair though. He views a virtual reality where you feel free will, love and laughter, as genuine a reality as any real world. I agree with him: does it really matter whether this is all real, so long as I feel real? But if that “technophilosophy” isn’t enough to quell your existential crisis, happily there is one key piece of evidence that Bostrom and Musk did not consider: Je pense, donc je suis. In my opinion, “I think, therefore I am” dramatically improves your chances of physical existence.
Imagine a neuroscientist from a futuristic world is standing at the front of a large auditorium that is packed with esteemed scientists and philosophers from the across the solar system. She’s been invited to present a groundbreaking new result on consciousness. Using all the data from the digital era of a now long-gone planet that was once called Earth, she describes how she trained AI to generate a society of Earth-like philosophical zombies. Once her AI illusion of reality was perfected, she electronically conceived a full-physics “quark-up” rendition of a human child and watched her grow and develop in this virtual realm. Over years she has run 80 subtly different realizations of the same virtual world and child, subjecting her centerpiece to a range of experiments. Today she is sharing the most conclusive evidence to date that conscious experience and emotion can evolve from subatomic physics: her centerpiece cries when she falls and dances when she hears music even though her zombie society has been engineered to never react in these ways. The audience rises in a standing ovation as the ethics committee start to nervously worry about the welfare rights of each simulated centerpiece.
Planet Earth is home to more than eight billion living humans, and even though there is little agreement on what underpins consciousness in this global population, all theories predict that if we’re made the same, and one of us is conscious, then all of us are conscious. In the scenario of our futuristic seminar, it’s these real-world inhabitants of planet Earth who have digitally documented their lives to create a bank of training data for the unconscious AI-NPCs in the simulation. As our neuroscientist is convinced that all her simulated centerpiece humans are conscious, Je pense, donc je suis would mean you are either one of her 80 virtual centerpieces or you are one of the eight billion humans living in the real world. This translates into a highly unlikely 100-million-to-one chance that you’re living in our imagined neuroscientist’s simulation. That’s pretty similar to your chances of winning the lottery jackpot this weekend: it’s not impossible that you’re a simulated human, but it’s highly improbable.
So, why is the conclusion from our story so very different from Bostrom and Musk’s “almost certain” statement that we’re living in a simulation? Let’s critique the key difference: why would our neuroscientist only create 80 realizations of Earth-like living? Why would her futuristic society not use this innovative technology to also create simulations for entertainment? If conscious humans were also simulated in a video game that was played over and over on repeat, the chances that you’re living inside that game would rise dramatically. Well, I believe free will partly answers that question. If our lives really were at the whim of a gamer in the “base reality,” surely we’d be spending a lot more time on motorbikes, driving at full speed off cliffs to provide epic “game fail” fun as we crash into the valley below. Atheist physicists like to question why a God would go to all the effort of designing the laws of physics to create a self-sustaining universe and then sit back to watch it boringly evolve over 13.8 billion years without any intervention. Game entertainment always comes from being in control of the fun, not passively sitting back to watch the subatomic mathematics of your virtual reality unfold. The fact that you feel free will makes it much less likely that the gamers are in charge.
If we accept the argument that the driving force behind the creation of conscious virtual humans will be purely scientific, and not for entertainment, then we can set a limit on the number of simulations that will be made. At some point there will be nothing more for the scientists to learn from them. Of course I cannot predict what that number will be, and I only chose 80 in our story to nicely divide with the eight billion inhabitants on Earth, but we can make an educated guess by looking at examples in scientific practice today. There are only 37 variants of the astrophysical simulations that I use in my own research. Having been careful and strategic about what varies between the simulations, this small number of realizations has allowed us to confront a complete set of questions on dark matter, dark energy, black holes and neutrinos. We’re currently in the process of running a few more to test some alternative gravity theories, but at the end of the day our total number of simulations will still only be in the hundreds, not the billions.
My decision to limit our story to just one futuristic world of computational overlords also improves our chances of being real. In the wide and expansive Universe, simulations of conscious beings could well be independently popping up everywhere, but the likelihood that more than one galactic civilization would choose to use real-world Earth data to electronically replicate us is arguably low. It’s therefore reasonable to limit the origin of any virtual reality that we might live in to a single solar system.
The last plotline that we should examine is the proposal that there will only ever be one person simulated at full “quark-up” resolution. My kids are particularly offended by my suggestion that if I’m living in a simulation, they’re most likely AI-NPCs. Middle-child skillfully argues that as all three siblings were once developing deep within my full-physics bubble, any virtual reality that we live in must be very advanced, with at least four “quark-up” individuals in our simulation. It was only their NPC father who left the dinner table feeling deeply affronted that evening!
If it’s possible to simulate one person, then of course it’s possible to simulate many. But I’m convinced that the total simulated population would be limited to some degree. When it comes to scientific experimentation, we always look for the most efficient strategy. The simulations of the Universe that I work with recreate less than one-thousandth of the total volume of the real observable Universe. We find this to be more than enough to address our current scientific questions. You could well imagine that a futuristic anthropologist would want to electronically explore societal behaviors and human development in different cultures, comparing cities to rural locations, contrasting nutritional and junk food diets. The list of ideas would be extensive, but it’s nevertheless hard to imagine a science case that would require the entire population of planet Earth to be simulated at full resolution. I should be crystal clear that the “100-million-to-one chance” that you’re simulated only applies to our fictional neuroscientist story, so please do not quote this as a scientific fact. No one has enough information to be able to quote a number like this. My hope is that our story-based discussion has, however, left you with this understanding: if the computational scientific method has been adopted across the entire Universe, while it’s conceivable that you are living in a simulation, the chances of this being the case are low.
But what if the galactic overlords harness an almost infinite resource of energy? Child number three isn’t ready to give up on the idea that we’re living in a simulation just yet. If you really wanted to dismiss the argument that the energy required to simulate the entire Universe renders the task impossible to complete, we could imagine a future society with a major god complex that decides to run a full “quark-up” simulation for its entire Universe. The Bostrom argument that we’re almost certainly living in a virtual reality critically depends on the inevitability that humans will generate realistic simulations if given enough time.
As these simulations are replicas of the real world, that inevitability must also apply to the newly created virtual human civilizations. They will then use their hypothetically large resource of energy to create their own simulation. Down the rabbit hole we will go, a virtual world created within a virtual world created within a virtual world. The fact that we don’t currently have the ability to simulate our reality tells you one of two things. Option 1: we’re living in the real-world “base reality” from which future pioneers will develop the necessary design for a virtual universe. Option 2: we’re in the very last virtual reality within that simulated chain, just taking our time to evolve the technological know-how to design a new simulation that will take us another step down the virtual rabbit hole. These two options mean that you have a 50/50 chance of physically existing or virtually existing. Number Three tosses a coin while I encourage him to embrace the idea that this knowledge is actually irrelevant because if we feel real, we are real, whether we’re made of quarks or qubits…
“Are We Living In a Simulation? And Other Questions Concerning Our Role in the Universe,” from @astroroyalscot.bsky.social via @literaryhub.bsky.social.
The full text of Bostrom’s paper is here. See also: “Simulation is the situation created by any system of signs when it becomes sophisticated enough, autonomous enough, to abolish its own referent and to replace it with itself.”
* Mamoru Oshii, Ghost in the Shell
###
As we tally the turtles all the way down, we might recall that it was on this date in 1938 that a young chemist at Sandoz, Albert Hofmann, while researching the medicinal plant squill and the fungus ergot in a search for compounds useful in pharmaceuticals, first synthesized lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As it wasn’t immediately promising, he put it aside. But he revisited his formulation several years later, on April 16, 1943; handling it, he accidentally absorbed a bit through his fingertips and realized that the compound had psychoactive effects. Three days later, on April 19, 1943 (a day now known as “Bicycle Day”) Hofmann intentionally ingested 250 micrograms of LSD, then rode home on a bike– a journey that became, pun intended, the first intentional acid trip. (This is not to be confused with the UN’s World Bicycle Day.)
Hofmann was also the first person to isolate, synthesize, and name the principal psychedelic mushroom compounds psilocybin and psilocin.








You must be logged in to post a comment.