“Technologies are not mere exterior aids but also interior transformations of consciousness and never more than when they affect the word”*…
It feels clear that we’re in the midst of a meaningful cultural/social transition… but what kind of transition? When did it begin? And what might it portend?
Increasingly, folks are turning to the works and thoughts of mid-twentieth century thinkers like Eric Havelock, Walter Ong (who drew on heavily on Havelock’s work), Marshall McLuhan, Joshua Meyrowitz, and others to suggest that we are in the midst of a shift from a literate culture (back) to an oral culture.
We’ve looked before at one (pessimistic) version this argument, and at one approach to understanding the mechanism of the shift. We return to the question today, with a fascinating conversation between Derek Thompson and Joe Weisenthal. Thomson sets the scene…
The world is full of theories of everything. The smartphone theory of everything argues that our personal devices are responsible for the rise of political polarization, anxiety, depression, and conspiracy theories—not to mention the decline of attention spans, intelligence, happiness, and general comity. The housing theory of everything pins inequality, climate change, obesity, and declining fertility on the West’s inability to build enough homes. If you treat TOEs as literal theories of everything, you will be disappointed to find that they all have holes. I prefer to think of them as exercises in thinking through the ways that single phenomena can have vast and unpredictable second-order effects.
Today’s article and interview are about my new favorite theory of everything. Let’s call it “the orality theory of everything.” This theory emerges from the work of mid-20th-century media theorists, especially Walter Ong and Marshall McLuhan. They argued that the invention of the alphabet and the rise of literacy were perhaps the most important events in human history. These developments shifted communications from an age of orality—in which all information was spoken and all learning was social—to an age of literacy, when writing could fix words in place, allowing people to write alone, read alone, and build abstract thoughts that would have been impossible to memorize. The age of orality was an age of social storytelling and flexible cultural memory. The age of literacy made possible a set of abstract systems of thought—calculus, physics, advanced biology, quantum mechanics—that are the basis of all modern technology. But that’s not all, Ong and his ilk said. Literacy literally restructured our consciousness, and the demise of literate culture—the decline of reading and the rise of social media—is again transforming what it feels like to be a thinking, living person.
The most enthusiastic modern proponent that I know of the orality theory of everything is Bloomberg’s Joe Wiesenthal, the co-host of the Odd Lots podcast… we discussed orality, literacy, and the implications for politics, storytelling, expertise, social relations, and much more…
Some highlights:
Derek Thompson: The return of orality: Why do you think it explains everything?
Joe Weisenthal: I don’t think it explains everything. I think it only explains 99% of everything.
I believe that human communication is becoming more oral. And by that I don’t just mean that people are talking more with their mouths, although I do think that is the case. It’s more that communication in general, whether in the spoken form or in the digital form, has the characteristics of conversation. And it truly harkens back to a time before really the written word or, certainly, mass literacy…
… Thompson: Thinking used to be something that had to be done socially. It was impossible to learn the Odyssey on your own. It was transmitted to you from a person. You would rehearse it with someone else. So the mode of information transfer was necessarily social. Books are written alone and books are typically read alone. And so this age of literacy gave rise to this privilege of solitude and interiority that I think is really, really important.
Walter Ong, our mutual hero, has a great quote that I want to throw to you and then get your reaction to, because it goes right to this point. He said:
Human beings in primary oral cultures do not study. They learn by apprenticeship, hunting with experienced hunters, for example, by discipleship, which is a kind of apprenticeship by listening, by repeating what they hear, by mastering proverbs and ways of combining and recombining them, but not study in the strict sense.
I’m very interested in a phenomenon that I call the antisocial century, the idea that for a variety of reasons, we are spending much more time alone. And that is having a bunch of second and third order effects. And it really is interesting to me as I was going deeper into this project, to think that it’s the age of literacy that in many ways allowed us to be alone as we learned and prize a certain kind of interiority.
Wiesenthal: Marshall McLuhan had this observation: The alphabet is the most detribalizing technology that’s ever existed. It speaks to this idea that prior to the written word, all knowledge was per se communal. It had to be in a group. If you have multiple texts in front of you, then you trust the one that feels most logical. But you don’t have that luxury when all knowledge is communal. Being part of the crowd has to be part of learning.
The ear and the eye are very different organs. You can close your eyes, which you can’t do with your ears. You can get perspective from your eye and establish perspective in a way you can’t do with your ears. So it’s like you go into a room and you can stand back at the corner so you can make sure that you can see everything going on in the room. The ear is very different. We’re at the center of everything constantly. You can’t close it. The ear continues to work while we’re sleeping. There’s an evolutionary purpose for the fact that we can still hear when we’re sleeping, because if there’s an intruder or a wild animal or something, it wakes us up and we can run.
So the ear, McLuhan said, is inherently a source of terror. It feels very digital. Even though we do look at the internet, there is this sense in which we can never remove ourselves from it. Even if we’re reading the internet, it almost feels more like we’re hearing it. There’s an immersiveness in contemporary digital discourse that I think is much more like hearing than it is about seeing. So I think there’s all kinds of different ways that we are sort of returning to this realm….
… Thompson: I want to apply your theories to some domains of modern life, starting with politics. You mentioned Donald Trump, and I went to look up Donald Trump’s nicknames, because I know that you’re very interested in his propensity for epithets, for nicknames. It’s nearly Homeric. And so fortunately for our purposes, Wikipedia keeps track of all of Donald Trump’s nicknames, so I didn’t have to remember them—speaking of outsourced memory. Here’s some of them. Steve Bannon was Sloppy Steve, Joe Biden was Sleepy Joe, Mike Bloomberg was Mini Mike, Jeb Bush, of course, Low Energy Jeb, Crooked Hillary, Lyin’ James Comey, Ron DeSanctimonious, DeSantis. I think that one might’ve gotten away from him.
Weisenthal: That was late Trump, he didn’t have his fastball anymore.
Thompson: This plays into this classic tradition of orality. Right? The wine-dark seas, swift-footed Achilles. And Walter Ong has a great passage where he writes about this, that I would love to get your reaction to:
”The cliches in political denunciations in many low-technology developing cultures, enemy of the people, capitalist warmongers, that strike high literates as mindless are residual formulary essentials of oral thought processes.”
Basically, it’s so interesting to think that Ong is saying that it is low-technology developing countries where these nicknames are prevalent. But you wake up today and thee richest country in the world is presided over by a now two-time president whose facility for nicknames is very famous. I wonder what significance do you put on this? Why is it important that a figure like Trump plays into these old-fashioned oral traditions?
Wiesenthal: It’s interesting when you say things like, “Oh, Trump has a sort of Homeric quality the way he speaks,” that repels a lot of people. Like, “What are you talking about? This is nothing like Homer.” But my theory, which I can’t prove. The original bards who composed Homer were probably Trump-like characters. So rather than seeing Trump as a Homeric character, what’s probably, what I’m almost certain is the case, is that the people who gathered around and told these ancient stories were probably Trump-like characters of their time. Colorful, very big characters, people who were loud, who could really get attention, who would captivate people when they talked. One of Ong’s observations in Orality and Literacy is about heavy and light characters in oral societies. Heavy characters, it’s like the Cerberus, like the three-headed dog, the Medusa, the Zeus. These just larger-than-life, frequently grotesque, visually grotesque characters.
I think if you look at the modern world, the modern world has elevated a lot of what I think Ong would call heavy characters. I certainly think Trump is a heavy character, with his makeup, and his hair, and his whole visual presentation. I think Elon is a heavy character. I think if you look at the visual way that a lot of sort of YouTube stars look with their ridiculous open-mouthed soy faces when on their YouTube screenshot. I think they sort of present themselves, not in a way that we would think of as conventionally good-looking. Right? Not in a way that’s conventionally attractive, but this sort of grotesque visual that just sticks in your head. And that that is clearly what works. We are in the time of the heavy character…
… Meyrowitz in 1985 was talking about electronic media before anyone really conceived of that idea. One of his observations is that everybody has a front stage and a backstage. We talk on this podcast in a certain way. But that is different than how we would talk at home with our family. Or you and I might talk differently when we hang up this podcast and we’re saying goodbye or something. This is a very normal thing, which is that you just talk differently in different environments and so forth.
What Meyrowitz anticipated in No Sense of Place is this idea that electronic media would cause us to come to be suspect of people who talk differently in one environment vs. another. If someone code-switched, if someone talked differently on the campaign trail than they did in their private life, that we would come to think, ”Oh, this person’s a phony.” He predicted that by allowing everyone to see all the facets of these characters, we would view them differently.
Thinking about a politician, something about Trump is that there’s very few examples of him ever talking differently than any other environment. People could be totally repelled by things that he said in public or private. But he’s not a hypocrite in the way that a lot of people use that word. He is the same in almost every environment. This is precisely what Meyrowitz would’ve anticipated, that we would gravitate toward people who when we saw their front stage and their backstage, where the concept of place was completely disintegrated from the idea of character, that we would come to view that consistency of character as a value.
Thompson: The name of Meyrowitz’s book is No Sense of Place. And I want to just slow down on that title, because it’s a pun. It’s not a very intuitive pun, but it’s a really, really smart pun. By No Sense of Place, Meyrowitz is saying that electronic media extends our consciousness outward, so we don’t really know where we are. I could be reading Twitter in Arlington, Virginia, but feel myself becoming emotional about Gaza or Ukraine, or Minneapolis, in a way that was impossible in the age before television or radio. This new age of communications media takes us out of where we are and puts us right in front of the faces of people that are thousands of miles away.
But he also means no sense of place in a hierarchical sense. He means that people will be able, with electronic media, to operate outside of their slot in the hierarchy: the poor will be able to scream at the billionaires; the disenfranchised will be able to scream at those who disenfranchise them. And this he said is going to create more social unrest. It’s going to create more, I think what he would agree now is something like populism. And this really interesting idea that electronic media not only unmoors us from where we are geographically, but that it also demolishes hierarchies, I think it was incredibly insightful, considering it was written 41 years ago.
But he goes one step further in a way that’s really surprising… He says this about our future relationship to expertise. And God only knows how many people have talked about what’s happened to expertise in the last few decades. Meyrowitz:
Our increasingly complex technological and social world has made us rely more and more heavily on expert information, but the general exposure of experts as fallible human beings has lessened our faith in them as people. The change in our image of leaders and experts leaves us with,” and this is exactly your point, “a distrust of power, but also with a seemingly powerless dependence on those in whom we have little trust…
And so much more (including their thoughts on AI): “The Obscure Media Theory That Explains ‘99% of Everything’,” from @dkthomp.bsky.social and @weisenthal.bsky.social. Or (if you’re more orally inclined) listen on Thompson’s Plain English podcast.
Via Patrick Tanguay in his always-illuminating newsletter.
* Walter J. Ong
###
As we contemplate culture, we might note that it was on this date in 2012 that Encyclopædia Britannica’s president, Jorge Cauz, announced that it would not produce any new print editions and that 2010’s 15th edition would be the last. The first (printed) edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica was published between 1768 and 1771 in Edinburgh as the “Encyclopedia Britannica, or, A Dictionary of Arts and Sciences compiled upon a New Plan.” Since 2012, the company has focused only on an online edition and other educational tools. It goes by simply “Britannica” now.
“What is really amazing, and frustrating, is mankind’s habit of refusing to see the obvious and inevitable until it is there, and then muttering about unforeseen catastrophes”*…
One of the effectively-secret ingredients in the world’s economic growth over the last couple of centuries has been insurance. The ability to insure against catastrophic loss has underwritten (pun intended) the trillions and trillions of dollars of loans that have funded the construction and acquisition that has enabled the growth of both commercial endeavor and the the accumulation of personal wealth (directly through home ownership and indirectly through equity ownership in those commercial endeavors or participation in pension schemes that own that equity).
But in a way that was enitrely predictable, climate change is rendering a growing portion of the world uninsurable. Gavin Evans ponders what that might mean…
The Florida peninsula looks like a sore thumb. It juts into the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic, where the water is getting warmer year on year, prompting fiercer hurricanes that can blow down houses like collapsing decks of cards. Climate scientists are convinced all hell will break loose sooner or later when a monster-sized, property-destroying storm makes a direct hit on Miami or Tampa-St Petersburg. Given three near-misses in the recent past, the experts view such a calamity as inevitable. It’s a huge risk for anyone living there – they stand to lose everything – but also for those bearing the financial side of this risk, the insurance companies. Some in the industry are seeing this as a portent for their future – an impending existential threat with profound implications for the economic system.
There are no easy solutions for people still paying off mortgages and those who want to buy property along the Florida coast, because the potential payout on the back of a mammoth storm is so high that the reinsurers (who insure the insurers against catastrophe) are refusing to underwrite their clients and, with no reinsurance, there’s no insurance; and with no insurance, no mortgages; and with no mortgages, no property market. Insurance protects investments against loss and is therefore a pillar of the economic system. If it goes, economies are destabilised.
Many panicked homeowners have rushed to make their houses less risky for insurance companies by reinforcing their roofs with hurricane clips, installing impact-resistant windows, doors and shutters, and strengthening their foundations. But it’s not just storms and higher, warmer seas that concern insurers. Rising temperatures mean that the frequency, range and ferocity of wildfires are also on the rise.
So far this year, 3,374 wildfires have burned an area of Florida totalling 231,172 acres (at the time of writing), and it is even worse in California where 7,855 blazes have killed at least 31 people, destroyed more than 17,000 houses and devoured 525,208 acres of land, at an estimated cost of more than $250 billion. Here, too, homeowners rushed to make their properties more palatable to cold-footed insurers – clearing their surroundings of anything flammable, covering yards with gravel, sheathing houses with fire-resistant stucco, and replacing wooden roofs with steel.
But, even for the most diligent, insurance companies have turned tail, dumping existing clients and abandoning fire-prone and storm-prone areas altogether. On the Californian fire front, 2024 was a turning point as several insurers ceased issuing new policies because of fire-associated risks, including the United States’ biggest property insurer, State Farm, which cancelled policies in parts of Los Angeles. It is all too easy to view this cynically, but it’s happening because property insurers have been reporting year-on-year losses from climate change-related payouts.
Insurance companies survive by making more money from covering risk than they lose from these risks, which is why they prefer clients less likely to claim (insofar as they can predict the risk involved) and require them to pay substantial excess to discourage claims. When payouts rise above the premium intake, insurance companies either hike up these premiums or withdraw. But when that risk is considered catastrophic, potentially affecting many thousands of clients, as with Floridian storms and Californian fires, it is the reinsurers who are the first to retreat because they will ultimately bear most of the cost.
Reinsurers aggregate payout patterns to establish the likelihood of having to make huge payouts from future natural catastrophes. They do this by gathering exposure data from existing insurers in a geographical area, and by examining catastrophe models (computer simulations that estimate potential losses from natural perils). When they put all this together with detailed analysis of conditions within the area, they come up with a figure for their total potential loss if a catastrophic event strikes.
This is why reinsurers focus so intensely on climate change. Take a glance at the websites of big ones like Swiss Re and Munich Re and you get a sense of how central this is to their calculations – a concern that has spread to property insurers who are starting to hire climate consultants. Even more than market volatility, climate is their biggest headache. ‘You won’t meet a single insurance or reinsurance CEO who doesn’t believe in climate change,’ the insurance investor and former Lombard Insurance CEO James Orford told me. ‘They see it in the numbers – a combination of more extreme, less predictable events, combined with big losses of sums insured. All the modelling suggests these are uninsurable risks.’…
[Evans recaps the history of insurance, starting in Genoa, in the mid-14th century, with the insuring of maritime expeditions; examines the current state of play; examines the efforts (and gauges the weaknesses) of state’s efforts to step up with coverage when insurers step away; then considers another role for states…]
If states do withdraw from insurance and reinsurance, some of the most lucrative areas of the US, Canada, Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia will be devastated: no mortgages and no banks, leading to more ghost towns and villages. ‘It ends with depopulation and abandonment,’ said Agarwala. ‘Climate change reduces the operating space for humanity.’ In the UK, rising sea levels and coastal erosion could literally reduce operating space, putting 200,000 British homes at risk by 2050. There’s no coastal-erosion insurance, which puts more burden on the state, mainly to pay for new defences, but also to help people move.
Governments can take action in other ways, by investing greater sums in risk-prevention and management. There are signs of this happening such as the ‘fire-hardening’ and storm-prevention efforts in Florida, and improved flood defences in the UK; meanwhile, the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility is being used in several countries to build and renovate operations centres to cope with wildfires, and to buy firefighting helicopters.
In future, it is likely that voters will demand that their state and national governments do far more, regardless of the cost. They will want tougher building codes, including limitations on building in risky areas; expensive fire-prevention and fire-fighting schemes; better flood and storm defences; improved early catastrophe management, involving relocating people from risky areas and, when disaster strikes, rapid life-saving interventions such as large-scale emergency evacuations. If the insurance industry is forced to retreat by the climate crisis, all of this infrastructural investment will require vast chunks of taxpayers’ money. It is hard to avoid the feeling that this is part of our destiny, and that the sore thumb of the Florida peninsula is pointing us to the future…
Whole regions of the world are now uninsurable, bringing radical uncertainty to the economy: “The insurance catastrophe,” from @aeon.co.
See also: “An Uninsurable Country” (a report form NRDC), “The Insurance Crisis Is So Desperate People Are Turning Socialist” (a gift article from Bloomberg), and “The Uninsurable Future: The Climate Threat to Property Insurance, and How to Stop It” (from Yale Law Review)
* Isaac Asimov
###
As we cover up, we might send highly-charged birthday greetings to a man who made foundational contributions both to the detection of climatic conditions and to a technology that may help allieviate climate change: John Frederic Daniell was born on this date in 1790. Named the first professor of chemistry at the newly founded King’s College London in 1831, he was an avid meteorologist. He invented the dew-point hygrometer known by his name and a register pyrometer; in 1830 he erected a water-barometer in the hall of the Royal Society.
But Daniell is better remembered as a chemist (and physicist), especially for his invention of the Daniell cell, an element of an electric battery much better than voltaic cells, the standard before him. Indeed, the Daniell cell is the historical basis for the contemporary definition of the volt (the unit of electromotive force in the International System of Units). All advances in battery technology since then were “from” the base that Daniell laid.
“Don’t look away. Look straight at everything. Look it all in the eye, good and bad.”*…
Frustrated by fragmented war news, Elie Habib built World Monitor, a platform that fuses global data– everything from military activity and intel hotspots to climate events and cyber threats– to track trouble as it unfolds. Lilian Wagdy reports…
Elie Habib doesn’t work in the defense or intelligence industries. Instead, he runs Anghami, one of the Middle East’s largest music streaming platforms. But as missiles began flying across the region, a side project he coded earlier this year suddenly became something bigger: an open-source dashboard people around the world were using to track the war in real time…
… The idea emerged as headlines began colliding in ways that felt impossible to follow. “The news became genuinely hard to parse,” he says. “Iran, Trump’s decisions, financial markets, critical minerals, tensions compounding from every direction simultaneously.”
Traditional media wasn’t solving the problem he had in mind. “I didn’t need a news aggregator,” he says. “I needed something that showed me how these events connect to each other in real time. The existing OSINT tools that did this cost governments and large enterprises tens of thousands of dollars annually.”…
… The platform processes a messy stream of global data, bypassing social media noise to pull facts directly from the source.
“The system ingests 100-plus data streams simultaneously,” Habib notes. The result is a constantly updating map of global tensions: conflict zones with escalation scores, military aircraft broadcasting positions through ADS-B transponders, ship movements tracked through AIS signals, nuclear installations, submarine cables, internet outages and satellite fire detections.
“Everything is normalized, geolocated and rendered on a WebGL globe capable of displaying thousands of markers without frame drops,” Habib says.
The underlying architecture wasn’t built from scratch. Much of it draws on the same principles used to process massive volumes of streaming data…
… Processing hundreds of live data streams during a military conflict raises a question: How do you verify information fast enough to keep the system moving?
Habib’s answer was to remove human editors entirely. “Zero editorializing,” he says. “No human editor makes a call.”
Instead, Habib says the platform relies on a strict source hierarchy. Wire services and official channels such as Reuters, AP, the Pentagon and the UN sit at the top tier. Major broadcasters including the BBC and Al Jazeera follow, along with specialist investigative outlets such as Bellingcat. In total, he says the system processes about 190 sources, assigning higher confidence scores to more reliable ones.
Software then scans incoming reports for major events and emerging patterns. If multiple credible sources report the same development within minutes, the system flags it as a breaking alert. But headlines alone are not enough.
Because online claims can be unreliable, the platform also looks for physical signals on the ground. It tracks disruptions such as internet blackouts, diverted military flights, halted cargo ships and satellite-detected fires. “A convergence algorithm then checks how many distinct signal types activate in the same geography simultaneously,” Habib says.
“One signal is noise. Three or four converging in the same location is the signal worth surfacing,” Habib says. If an internet outage coincides with diverted aircraft and a satellite heat signature in the same area, the map flags a potential escalation.
Habib acknowledges that removing humans from the loop carries risks. “The multi-tier source-credibility system and convergence algorithm [are a] substitute for editorial judgment,” he says. “Whether that creates blind spots in genuinely novel scenarios, an event with no historical baseline, is a real architectural question the system doesn’t fully resolve.”…
… Habib does not plan for the platform to become a business. “World Monitor started as a personal learning project,” he says. But the experiment quickly grew beyond that. Developers from around the world began contributing code and ideas, helping expand the system’s capabilities.
Now the project is shifting toward a broader goal. “The direction shifts from pure conflict tracking toward broader world signal understanding and acting on these signals,” Habib says.
Instead of simply mapping events after they happen, the platform is increasingly designed to detect patterns before they become headlines, Habib says. “The architecture is moving toward predicting where signals converge before events become news.”…
More at: “How a Music Streaming CEO Built an Open-Source Global Threat Map in His Spare Time,” from @lilianwagdy81.bsky.social and @wired.com. (JIC of paywall trouble, here is an archived link.)
Then, try out World Monitor yourself.
* Henry Miller
###
As we pay attention, we might recall that today is the anniversary of an event that would surely have made Wolrd Monitor’s map if that tool hasd been around back then: on the this date in 2011, Tōhoku earthquake (a 9.0–9.1 undersea megathrust earthquake occurred in the Pacific Ocean, 45 mi east of the Oshika Peninsula of the Tōhoku region— the most powerful earthquake ever recorded in Japan, and the fourth most powerful earthquake recorded in the world since modern seismography began in 1900.
The quake was followed by a tsunami that killed thousands and caused the devastation of whole cities. Together, they did damage estimated to have cost well into the tens of billions of US dollars. Famously, the quake and subsequent tsunami caused the shutdown of eleven nuclear reactors in power plants in the region. The Fukushima reactors were especially heavily damaged, and leaked radioactive waste water, leading to radiation levels outside the plant that were up to eight times normal levels.
“Sculpture is a parable in three dimensions”*…
… and now, as Kate Mothes reports, we can appreciate that remotely…
In the age of the internet, we’re fortunate to have virtual access to museum collections around the world, thanks to objects in the public domain and programs like The Metropolitan Museum of Art’s Open Access Initiative. Through a searchable digital catalogue, visitors to the museum’s website can see hundreds of thousands of objects, many images of which are available for download. And it’s not alone—other institutions like the Art Institute of Chicago, The National Gallery of Art, and The Cleveland Museum of Art, among others, make pieces in their collections accessible to all.
The thing is, digital images don’t always give us the full picture, so to speak. Even two-dimensional paintings and drawings have unique textures, structural details, and materials that we can only really appreciate in person. This won’t ever really change—nothing beats the real thing. But one caveat is that even in person, much of the work remains hidden. We can’t see the backs of oil paintings, for example, and edges are often hidden within frames. Thanks to The Met’s continued emphasis on imaging, we can now experience every detail in three-dimensional renderings of nearly 140 significant objects in its holdings…
More at: “The Met Introduces High-Definition 3D Scans of Dozens of Art Historical Objects,” from @thisiscolossal.com.
See more on the Met’s site.
###
As we dig depth, we might send artfully-formed birthday greetings to François Girardon; he was born on this date in 1628. A sculptor of the French Baroque, he best known for his statues and busts of Louis XIV and for his statuary in the gardens of the Palace of Versailles. Several of his busts are in the Met’s collection— and on the list, one may hope, for 3-D rendering.
“It’s a recession when your neighbor loses his job; it’s a depression when you lose yours.”*…
With last Friday’s announcement that nonfarm payrolls in February fell by 92,000 (compared with the earlier estimate of 50,000– the third time in five months that the economy lost jobs), unemployment is back in the news. But, as the redoubtable Nathan Yau illustrates in one of his typically-elegant interactive infographics (drawing on data from the January 2026 Current Population Survey via IPUMS), “unemployment” can have a variety of causes…
About eight million Americans reported being unemployed, based on the Current Population Survey from January 2026. Why they were unemployed varies across groups…
… For those in their younger years, it’s a lot more common to be entering the workforce as a new entrant or coming off a break after working previously as a re-entrant. Once people are in the middle of their work career, getting laid off is the most common reason for unemployment.
I expected that people who quit a previous job would be a more common reason, but the rate never goes over 20%. Maybe this rate is partially dampened by those who have a new job lined up and then quit, so they are never unemployed.
Education, which correlates with age, shows similar rates as you go up in levels. Although the rates for being laid off an a re-entrant are flipped between those with a Master’s degree and those with a doctorate or professional degree. The high rate for laid off for Master’s level workers is interesting. I suspect this is related to the type of occupations for this group…
Explore unemployment in the U.S: “Unemployment reasons, by age and education,” from @flowingdata.com.
* Harry S. Truman
###
As we rethink redundancy, we might recall that it was on this date in 1933 that Congress enacted the first piece of legislation in newly-installed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “100 Hundred Days” program. Following the crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression, real GDP had fallen 29%, unemployment had risen to 25%, and 7,000 banks (nearly a third of the banking system) had failed. A few days earlier, FDR had decreed a “banking holiday” (closing all U.S. banks) and called a special session of Congress. The first piece of Roosevelt’s program, passed by Congress on this date 93 years ago, addressed that lattermost issue: the Emergency Banking Act (which stabililized the banking system). Over the next two-and-a-half months, they passed 14 other pieces of landmark legislation:
- Cullen–Harrison Act (enacting the end of Prohibition, March 16), modifying the Volstead Act
- Economy Act (reducing federal salaries and pensions in order to reduce the deficit, March 20)
- Civilian Conservation Corps (a work relief program, March 31)
- Federal Emergency Relief Act (a job creation program [that became the Works Progress Administration] May 12)
- Agricultural Adjustment Act (relief for farmers, May 12)
- Emergency Farm Mortgage Act (oversight of llending to farmers, May 12)
- Tennessee Valley Authority (rural electrification [and job creation], May 18)
- Securities Act (securities trading regulation to prevent the sorts of excesses [and malfeasance] that triggered the Crash of 1929, May 27)
- abrogation of gold clauses in public and private contracts (elimination of the right of creditors tp demand payment in gold or gold equivalent, June 5)
- Homeowners Refinancing Act (home mortgage assistance, June 13)
- Glass-Steagall Act (banking reforms and the establishment of the FDIC, June 15)
- Farm Credit Act (loans for farmers, June 15)
- Emergency Railroad Transportation Act (protecting interstate commerce, June 15)
- National Industrial Recovery Act (authorizing the president to regulate industry for fair wages and prices to stimulate economic recovery, June 16)
And with these action, the tide began to turn. That said, here is no consensus among economists regarding the motive force for the U.S. economic recovery that continued through most of the Roosevelt years. The common view among most economists is that Roosevelt’s New Deal policies either caused or accelerated the recovery, although his policies were never aggressive enough to bring the economy completely out of recession. Indeed, John Maynard Keynes, while he approved of Roosevelt’s actions, didn’t think that the New Deal went far enough: “It is, it seems, politically impossible for a capitalistic democracy to organize expenditure on the scale necessary to make the grand experiments which would prove my case—except in war conditions.”
You must be logged in to post a comment.