Posts Tagged ‘Henry Farrell’
“For every complex problem, there’s a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong”*…
Last year, in explaining the Biden Administration’s emerging new economic policy, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan talked of a “small yard, high fence” approach to its trade with China. The idea: to place strict restrictions on a small number of technologies with significant military potential while maintaining normal economic exchange in other areas.
The estimable Henry Farrell argues that this approach to technology and China is working poorly (though, he suggests, it will work much worse if Trump wins and takes office in January). Self-reinforcing political feedback loops and self-reinforcing expectations are leading to breakdown.
The fundamental problem of managing geopolitics through manipulating technological trajectories is not readily solvable given existing means, Farrell suggests. We live in a much more complex world than existing state institutions are capable of handling. Therefore, he argues, we need to remake the state…
… Making the right choices in a complex policy environment requires an approach that is a world away from the application of brute force at scale. Your maps of the environment are going to be all wrong when you go in, and brute force is likely to have unexpected consequences. It isn’t just that you are going to make mistakes (you are), but your map of the actual problem you are trying to solve is likely to be utterly out of whack. As you try to catch up with China on EV, you discover that you don’t understand the market right. As you try to impose controls on military use of semiconductors, you find out that you don’t have the information you need to really actually understand how the semiconductor market works.
The problem – as Jen Pahlka’s book Recoding America explains at length – is that addressing such complex problems does not fit well with the way that the U.S. government works. When you are trying to impose order a vast sprawling bureaucracy, which is its own mid-sized global economy, and when your people don’t trust government much, you rely on rigid contracting systems, which define the problem in advance down to its finest details, even if that definition is out of whack with reality. You don’t build connections between the bureaucracy and outside actors, unless they run through cumbersome and rigidly pre-defined channels because it takes months or years to get approval for such connections. And you certainly don’t try to remake policy in realtime as your understanding of the situation changes. Pahlka’s book is cunningly disguised as an account of US software outsourcing practices. If it mentions either ‘national security’ or ‘economic security’ once, I don’t remember it. But it is arguably (along with Dan Davies’ similarly motivated The Unaccountability Machine) the most important book on these topics of the last twenty years. [Your correspondent heartily agrees.]…
… what do you do – is this. You start to think… about how to build economic security institutions that are designed from the ground up to manage complexity. If you want to take ‘small yard, high fence’ seriously as a policy approach, you need to build the apparatus to discover what lies inside, what lies outside, and what the barriers ought be. That apparatus – and its prescriptions – need to change over time both to match a better understanding of the policy environment, and changes in the environment itself.
And we don’t have the apparatus to actually implement small yard, high fence properly. Nor do we have it for pretty well every other plausible economic security policy you might imagine, short of a brute force decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies. And if you did that, you would need enormous capacity to manage the horrifically complex aftermath, if that aftermath could even be managed at all.
Clearly, it is far easier to make these arguments in the general than the particular. Saying that you need reforms is straightforward, but figuring out what they ought to be, let alone how to implement them in current political circumstances, is an altogether more difficult challenge. But it is where the debate needs to be going – and there is a role for technology in it. We are in a situation that rhymes in weird ways with the situation discovered by Vannevar Bush after World War II – recognizing that the needs of government had changed, that vastly better information and feedback systems were required to meet those needs, and that even if we didn’t exactly know what those systems were, we needed to start figuring them out, and quickly. That world had its pathologies. This one does too. But to prevent them becoming worse, we need better ways to manage them, and to ensure that the solutions are better than the problems that they are supposed to mitigate.
This is – obviously – a radical set of claims. But it’s one that is entailed by the diagnosis of the problem that I’ve presented. If we need to manage complex challenges – of which the U.S. China relationship is only one – we need a state that is capable of managing complexities. We don’t have one. And that remains a first order problem, regardless of however hawkish or dovish you are…
We need a new kind of state for the new geopolitics: “‘Small Yard, High Fence’: these four words conceal a mess,” from @himself.bsky.social (and @pahlkadot.bsky.social). Eminently worth reading in full.
* H.L. Mencken
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As we ruminate on restructuring, we might recall that it was on this date in 1954 (7 years after the transistor was developed at Bell Labs) that Texas Instruments introduced the Regency TR-1, the first commercially-manufactured transistor radio. Its performance was mediocre, but its small size and portability drove sales of over 150,000 units.
Further to Farrell’s and Pahlka’s points, it’s instructive to ponder what became of the transistor radio as a product category (and of the competitors in it) over the next few decades– and the altogether-unanticipated plethora of small, convenient, hand-held product categories it spawned: calculators, mobile phones, tablets… and whatever comes next…
“Never call an accountant a credit to his profession; a good accountant is a debit to his profession.”*…
The estimable Henry Farrell on accountancy as a lens on the hidden systems of the world…
When reading Cory Doctorow’s latest novel, The Bezzle [which your correspondent highly recommends], I kept on thinking about another recent book, Bruce Schneier’s A Hacker’s Mind: How the Powerful Bend Society’s Rules and How to Bend Them Back [ditto]. Cory’s book is fiction, and Bruce’s non-fiction, but they are clearly examples of the same broad genre (the ‘pre-apocalyptic systems thriller’?). Both are about hackers, but tell us to pay attention to other things than computers and traditional information systems. We need to go beneath the glossy surfaces of cyberpunk and look closely at the messy, complex systems of power beneath them. And these systems – like those described in the very early cyberpunk of William Gibson and others – are all about money and power.
What Bruce says:
In my story, hacking isn’t just something bored teenagers or rival governments do to computer systems … It isn’t countercultural misbehavior by the less powerful. A hacker is more likely to be working for a hedge fund, finding a loophole in financial regulations that lets her siphon extra profits out of the system. He’s more likely in a corporate office. Or an elected official. Hacking is integral to the job of every government lobbyist. It’s how social media systems keep us on our platform.
Bruce’s prime example of hacking is Peter Thiel using a Roth IRA to stash his Paypal shares and turn them into $5 billion, tax free.
This underscores his four key points. First, hacking isn’t just about computers. It’s about finding the loopholes; figuring out how to make complex system of rules do things that they aren’t supposed to. Second, it isn’t countercultural. Most of the hacking you might care about is done by boring seeming people in boring seeming clothes (I’m reminded of Sam Anthony’s anecdote about how the costume designer of the film Hackers visited with people at a 2600 conference for background research, but decided that they “were a bunch of boring nerds and went and took pictures of club kids on St. Marks instead”). Third, hacking tends to reinforce power symmetries rather than undermine them. The rich have far more resources to figure out how to gimmick the rules. Fourth, we should mostly identify ourselves not with the hackers but the hacked. Because that is who, in fact, we mostly are….
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… Still, there are things you can do to fight back. One of the major themes of The Bezzle is that prison is now a profit model. Tyler Cowen, the economist, used to talk a lot about “markets in everything.” I occasionally responded by pointing to “captive markets in everything.” And there isn’t any market that is more literally captive than prisoners. As for-profit corporations (and venal authorities) came to realize this, they started to systematically remake the rules and hack the gaps in the regulatory system to squeeze prisoners and their relatives for as much money as possible, charging extortionate amounts for mail, for phone calls, for books that could only be accessed through proprietary electronic tablets.
That’s changing, in part thanks to ingenious counter hacking. The Appeal published a piece last week on how Securus, “the nation’s largest prison and jail telecom corporation,” had to effectively default on nearly a billion dollars of debt. Part of the reason for the company’s travails is that activists have figured out how to use the system against it…
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… In other sectors, where companies doing sketchy things have publicly traded shares, activists have started getting motions passed at shareholder meetings, to challenge their policies. However, the companies have begun in turn to sue, using the legal system in unconventional ways to try to prevent these unconventional tactics. Again, as both Bruce and Cory suggest, the preponderance of hacking muscle is owned by the powerful, not those challenging them.
Even so, the more that ordinary people understand the complexities of the system, the more that they will be able to push back. Perhaps the most magnificent example of this is Max Schrems, an Austrian law student who successfully bollocksed-up the entire system of EU-US data transfers by spotting loopholes and incoherencies and weaponizing them in EU courts. Cory’s Martin Hench books seem to me to purpose-designed to inspire a thousand Max Schrems – people who are probably past their teenage years, have some grounding in the relevant professions, and really want to see things change.
And in this, the books return to some of the original ambitions of ‘cyberpunk,’ a somewhat ungainly and contested term that has come to emphasize the literary movement’s countercultural cool over its actual intentions…
One word that never appears in Neuromancer, and for good reason: “Internet.” When it was written, the Internet was just one among many information networks, and there was no reason to suspect that it would defeat and devour its rivals, subordinating them to its own logic. Before cyberspace and the Internet became entangled, Gibson’s term was a synecdoche for a much broader set of phenomena. What cyberspace actually referred to back then was more ‘capitalism’ than ‘computerized information.’
So, in a very important sense, The Bezzle returns to the original mission statement – understanding how the hacker mythos is entwined with capitalism. To actually understand hacking, we need to understand the complex systems of finance and how they work. If you really want to penetrate the system, you need to really grasp what money is and what it does. That, I think, is what Cory is trying to tell us. And so too Bruce. The nexus between accountancy and hacking is not a literary trick or artifice. It is an important fact about the world, which both fiction and non-fiction writers need to pay attention to…
Eminently worth reading in full: “Today’s hackers wear green eyeshades, not mirrorshades,” from @henryfarrell in his invaluable newsletter Programmable Mutter.
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As we ponder power, we might recall that on this date in 1927, a “counter-hacker” in a different domain, Mae West, was sentenced to jail for obscenity.
Her first starring role on Broadway was in a 1926 play entitled Sex, which she wrote, produced, and directed. Although conservative critics panned the show, ticket sales were strong. The production did not go over well with city officials, who had received complaints from some religious groups, and the theater was raided and West arrested along with the cast. She was taken to the Jefferson Market Court House (now Jefferson Market Library), where she was prosecuted on morals charges, and on April 19, 1927, was sentenced to 10 days for “corrupting the morals of youth.” Though West could have paid a fine and been let off, she chose the jail sentence for the publicity it would garner. While incarcerated on Welfare Island (now known as Roosevelt Island), she dined with the warden and his wife; she told reporters that she had worn her silk panties while serving time, in lieu of the “burlap” the other girls had to wear. West got great mileage from this jail stint. She served eight days with two days off for “good behavior”.
Wikipedia








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