Posts Tagged ‘industrial policy’
“The first to arrive is the first to succeed”*…
Is China “pulling up the ladder”? In his valuable newsletter, Ben Evans puts two recent news items on high-tech manufacturing into context…
… First, the FT argues that after the ‘China shock’ of cheap low-value manufacturing, there’s now a growing second China shock of high-value, high-tech manufacturing, where the same model of ferocious, Darwinian competition, backed by subsidies and cheap energy, produces a handful of very efficient and capable winners in each space, plus a lot of overcapacity, that then moves to exports. Second, Bloomberg says that Chinese export controls in those high-tech industries are crippling India’s attempt to build its own tech manufacturing base…
Gift article from the FT: “China shock 2.0: the flood of high-tech goods that will change the world“
Gift article from Bloomberg: “China’s Control Over Tech Is Threatening India’s Manufacturing Dreams“
* (先到先得) Chinese proverb
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As we dissect the dynamics of dominance, we might recall that it was on this date in 1981 that the computer mouse became a practical, operating part of the personal computing world, when Xerox released its 1010 (Star) personal computer. The trackball, a related pointing device, had been invented in 1946 by Ralph Benjamin as part of a post-World War II-era fire-control radar plotting system called the Comprehensive Display System (CDS). Then, in the 1960s, Doug Engelbart and Bill English developed the first mouse prototype. They christened the device the mouse as early models had a cord attached to the rear part of the hand-held unit; the cord looked like a tail and made the device resemble a common mouse. (According to Roger Bates, a hardware designer under English, another reason for choosing this name was because the cursor on the screen was also referred to as “CAT” at this time.) In 1968, Engelbart premiered the pointer at what has come to be known as “The Mother of All Demos.” There followed, through the 70’s, a pair of personal computers that used a mouse (the Xerox Alto and the Lilith); but while they served as proof-of-concept, they sold only in the hundreds of units over the next several years. It was the Star that effectively brought the mouse to market… soon to be followed by Steve Jobs’ Apple Lisa, which forshadowed the Mac and the user interface that we’ve all come to know.
Apropos the articles above, computer mice are still a $2 billion business. But while they were invented and originally largely manufactured in the U.S., they are (as of 2025) mostly manufactured in Asia (68%, the lion’s share– 54%– in China); only 8% are made in the U.S.
“Leadership of a world-economy is an experience of power which may blind the victor to the march of history”*…
Benjamin Braun and Cédric Durand on the citical tension between “factions of capital” in the second Trump administration…
Hegemonic decline, according to the historian Fernand Braudel [see here and here], has historically come with financialization. Amid declining profitability in production and trade, capital owners increasingly shift their assets into finance. This, according to Braudel, is a “sign of autumn,” when empires “transform into a society of rentier-investors on the look-out for anything that would guarantee a quiet and privileged life.”
This specter of Braudelian decline haunts key figures in the second Trump administration. “Tell me what all the former reserve currencies have in common,” Scott Bessent, now Treasury Secretary, mused during the campaign. “Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, UK … How did they lose reserve currency status?” The answer: “They got highly leveraged and could no longer support their military.” While Bessent, a former hedge fund manager, officially denies a program of dollar depreciation, speculators have been driving down the US exchange rate since Trump took office in January. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is the author of a 2019 report on “American investment in the 21st century,” in which he lambasts Wall Street for its shareholder value regime that “tilts business decision-making towards returning money quickly and predictably to investors rather than building long-term corporate capabilities.” His views on finance are shared by self-styled Republican “populists” such as Josh Hawley.
This residual hostility toward Wall Street has marked an ideological rupture in the first months of Trump’s second administration; on the one hand, the President’s “Liberation Day” tariffs have roiled financial markets; on the other, Wall Street has retaliated with financial panics, working to discipline the White House. Whether a coalition of self-styled MAGA populists and Trump’s electoral base—which expects rising living standards and secure jobs delivered via a tariff-led revival of US manufacturing and a deportation-led tightening of the labor market—is sustainable remains a central question of the second Trump administration. Fossil fuel firms and defense-oriented tech companies such as Palantir and Anduril find much to like in militarized nativism. But Trump’s trade policy clearly harms private finance and big tech, two sectors that have consistently supported Trump and expect to be rewarded. Attacking those sectors threatens to alienate the very factions of US capital that have heaved him back into office.
For these capital factions, US decline is relative and can—cue Japan—be managed in a gracious manner. As Giovanni Arrighi observed in 1994, finance has always intermediated, and thus benefited from, hegemonic transitions. Today, asset management titans profit both from re-balancing US portfolios away from the declining hegemon and from offering fast-growing capital pools from China and other rising Asian economies access to US assets. Big tech, meanwhile, aims at general control over knowledge and economic coordination. It has much to lose from geoeconomic fragmentation that could cut it off from access to data, reduce its network effects, increase the cost of its material infrastructure, and push non-aligned polities to pursue digital sovereignty.
In its efforts to revive the American Empire, the Trump administration will thus have to delicately balance the interests of both manufacturing-oriented nativists and capital factions whose interests span the globe. Navigating these competing agendas will pose an enormous challenge to the longevity of the Trumpian coalition—and the stability of the global financial system as a whole…
Eminently worth reading in full: “America’s Braudelian Autumn,” from @phenomenalworld.bsky.social.
* Fernand Braudel
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As we debate development, we might recall that it was on this day in 1940 that Government of Vichy France, the collaborationist ruling regime/government in Nazi-occupied France during World War II, was established.
Of contested legitimacy, it took shape in Bordeaux under Marshal Philippe Pétain as the successor to the French Third Republic and was finally settled in the town of Vichy. The government remained in Vichy for four years, but was escorted to Germany in September, 1944 after the Allied invasion of France. I t then operated as a government-in-exile until April 1945, when the Sigmaringen enclave was taken by Free French forces. Pétain was permitted to travel back to France (through Switzerland), by then under control of the Provisional French Republic, and subsequently put on trial for treason.
“Nanotechnology is an idea that most people simply didn’t believe”*…
Indeed, in the 1980s, even as nanotech pioneer Erik Drexler, a graduate student at MIT at the time, was doing the early work of defining and charting a course for the nascent field, MIT’s departments of electric engineering and computer science refused to approve his Ph.D. topic and plan of study (though ultimately the Media Lab did, and Erik earned his doctorate).
Today the reality– and centrality– of the field are only too apparent and have become the subject of trade and industrial policy… because while the U.S. led in the development of nanotech science, it lags in manufacturing and commercialization. In an excerpt from their book Industrial Policy for the United States: Winning the Competition for Good Jobs and High-Value Industries, Ian Fletcher and Marc Fasteau explain…
Nanotechnology is the manipulation of matter at scales from a fraction of a nanometer to a few hundred nanometers — sizes between individual atoms and small single-celled organisms — at which it has radically different properties. Nanotech is already significant in many industries. Integrated circuits are a form of nanotech. Other nanotech provides the light, strong composites in aircraft and space vehicles. Still other nanotech powers the solid-state lasers used to transmit information through the internet and the light-emitting diodes in LED light bulbs and flat-screen TVs. Nanotech also makes possible solar cells, the batteries in electric cars, and medical technologies such as vaccines. It is thus the unifying thread of many of today’s most advanced technologies. Unfortunately, America is falling behind.
In the future, nanotech-based quantum computing and communications will lead to more powerful computers, transforming national security and internet commerce by making currently secret communications insecure. Medical nanotechnologies will permit targeted interventions at the cellular level, providing new weapons against diseases, biological weapons, and defenses against them. China is known to be working on these.
Much of the science underpinning these advances was developed at firms and universities in the US. But the huge manufacturing industries built on it are mostly overseas. For example, the organic light-emitting diode (OLED) technology Kodak created didn’t save that firm from going bankrupt in 2012. But it did enable lucrative businesses for Korea’s Samsung, to whom Kodak licensed the technology, and LG, which bought Kodak’s entire OLED business in 2009. Today, American firms like Nanosys and Universal Display develop important nanotechnologies, but do not actually manufacture the end products and are thus relatively small.
How did the US get itself into this situation? A major government program, the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), has been funded since 2001, but Washington failed to appreciate the importance of having both a technology and a manufacturing strategy. The prevailing wisdom was that if the academic science was supported, mass manufacturing would follow automatically. By contrast, successful rival nations in nanotech have focused on making these technologies manufacturable at scale, employing every policy tool from R&D subsidies to cheap capital to tariffs. A 2020 National Academies review of the NNI urged that the US recognize that ‘the recent, focused, and in some cases novel commercialization approaches of other nations may be yielding better societal outcomes.’…
A little wonky, but both fascinating and important: “Nanotechnology,” via the invaluable Delanceyplace.com.
(Image above: source)
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As we get small, we might send miniscule birthday greetings to a man who whose work has contributed to the development of medical applications of nanotech: Bert Sakmann; he was born on this date in 1942. A cell physiologist, he shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (with Erwin Neher) in 1991 for their work on “the function of single ion channels in cells”– work made possible in part by their invention of the patch clamp.
“For every complex problem, there’s a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong”*…
Last year, in explaining the Biden Administration’s emerging new economic policy, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan talked of a “small yard, high fence” approach to its trade with China. The idea: to place strict restrictions on a small number of technologies with significant military potential while maintaining normal economic exchange in other areas.
The estimable Henry Farrell argues that this approach to technology and China is working poorly (though, he suggests, it will work much worse if Trump wins and takes office in January). Self-reinforcing political feedback loops and self-reinforcing expectations are leading to breakdown.
The fundamental problem of managing geopolitics through manipulating technological trajectories is not readily solvable given existing means, Farrell suggests. We live in a much more complex world than existing state institutions are capable of handling. Therefore, he argues, we need to remake the state…
… Making the right choices in a complex policy environment requires an approach that is a world away from the application of brute force at scale. Your maps of the environment are going to be all wrong when you go in, and brute force is likely to have unexpected consequences. It isn’t just that you are going to make mistakes (you are), but your map of the actual problem you are trying to solve is likely to be utterly out of whack. As you try to catch up with China on EV, you discover that you don’t understand the market right. As you try to impose controls on military use of semiconductors, you find out that you don’t have the information you need to really actually understand how the semiconductor market works.
The problem – as Jen Pahlka’s book Recoding America explains at length – is that addressing such complex problems does not fit well with the way that the U.S. government works. When you are trying to impose order a vast sprawling bureaucracy, which is its own mid-sized global economy, and when your people don’t trust government much, you rely on rigid contracting systems, which define the problem in advance down to its finest details, even if that definition is out of whack with reality. You don’t build connections between the bureaucracy and outside actors, unless they run through cumbersome and rigidly pre-defined channels because it takes months or years to get approval for such connections. And you certainly don’t try to remake policy in realtime as your understanding of the situation changes. Pahlka’s book is cunningly disguised as an account of US software outsourcing practices. If it mentions either ‘national security’ or ‘economic security’ once, I don’t remember it. But it is arguably (along with Dan Davies’ similarly motivated The Unaccountability Machine) the most important book on these topics of the last twenty years. [Your correspondent heartily agrees.]…
… what do you do – is this. You start to think… about how to build economic security institutions that are designed from the ground up to manage complexity. If you want to take ‘small yard, high fence’ seriously as a policy approach, you need to build the apparatus to discover what lies inside, what lies outside, and what the barriers ought be. That apparatus – and its prescriptions – need to change over time both to match a better understanding of the policy environment, and changes in the environment itself.
And we don’t have the apparatus to actually implement small yard, high fence properly. Nor do we have it for pretty well every other plausible economic security policy you might imagine, short of a brute force decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies. And if you did that, you would need enormous capacity to manage the horrifically complex aftermath, if that aftermath could even be managed at all.
Clearly, it is far easier to make these arguments in the general than the particular. Saying that you need reforms is straightforward, but figuring out what they ought to be, let alone how to implement them in current political circumstances, is an altogether more difficult challenge. But it is where the debate needs to be going – and there is a role for technology in it. We are in a situation that rhymes in weird ways with the situation discovered by Vannevar Bush after World War II – recognizing that the needs of government had changed, that vastly better information and feedback systems were required to meet those needs, and that even if we didn’t exactly know what those systems were, we needed to start figuring them out, and quickly. That world had its pathologies. This one does too. But to prevent them becoming worse, we need better ways to manage them, and to ensure that the solutions are better than the problems that they are supposed to mitigate.
This is – obviously – a radical set of claims. But it’s one that is entailed by the diagnosis of the problem that I’ve presented. If we need to manage complex challenges – of which the U.S. China relationship is only one – we need a state that is capable of managing complexities. We don’t have one. And that remains a first order problem, regardless of however hawkish or dovish you are…
We need a new kind of state for the new geopolitics: “‘Small Yard, High Fence’: these four words conceal a mess,” from @himself.bsky.social (and @pahlkadot.bsky.social). Eminently worth reading in full.
* H.L. Mencken
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As we ruminate on restructuring, we might recall that it was on this date in 1954 (7 years after the transistor was developed at Bell Labs) that Texas Instruments introduced the Regency TR-1, the first commercially-manufactured transistor radio. Its performance was mediocre, but its small size and portability drove sales of over 150,000 units.
Further to Farrell’s and Pahlka’s points, it’s instructive to ponder what became of the transistor radio as a product category (and of the competitors in it) over the next few decades– and the altogether-unanticipated plethora of small, convenient, hand-held product categories it spawned: calculators, mobile phones, tablets… and whatever comes next…
“The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation”*…
Industrial policy is on the rise around the world, as nations (and sometimes regions) create laws and policies that prioritize domestic competitiveness and economic benefit over free trade, using tools like investment, regulation, and tariffs. Increasingly these policies are being animated not only by economic, but also security concerns. (See, e.g., here and here.)
The traditional worry about policies like these is that they create barriers (thus tensions) between countries… which, at a time when the world desperately needs collaborative responses to global challenges like climate change, could be deeply problematic. But Nathan Gardels argues that industrial policy might be precisely what we need to set the stage for meaningful cooperation…
The remarkable story future historians will tell about the late 20th and early 21st century is how inviting a Communist Party-state to enter a global economy built on the capitalist principles of free trade and markets ended up transforming the neoliberal West into a bastion of protectionism and state-directed industrial policy of the same kind now condemned as unfairly advantaging China’s rise.
They will also note the further irony that the logic of opening to China in the 1970s — and of China’s opening to the West — had a national security premise of checkmating the Soviet Union. Half a century on, the Middle Kingdom is more closely aligned with Russia than in the later stages of the Cold War, primarily as a way to do the opposite: checkmate America’s continuing dominance of the very world order that enabled its rapid ascent.
Adding more complexity to this reversal of history are the related global challenges that have arisen in both East and West: decarbonization of fossil-fuel dependency to mitigate climate change while coping with the disruptions of the digital revolution and the advent of artificial intelligence.
These threads of deglobalization, climate and technological revolution have all converged in the competitive assertion of “industrial strategies” in which nation-building is integrally bound up with international security concerns. China is driven by the fear of not catching up, the United States by alarm at losing the upper hand and Europe by the angst of falling behind both and losing its strategic autonomy.
China’s industrial strategy is called “dual circulation,” essentially a policy of self-reliance and resilience in the face of newfound Western hostility. It is aimed at bolstering domestic consumption and production, including conquering the latest AI technologies with its own resources, while off-loading manufacturing overproduction abroad and expanding trading ties in the global South.
The U.S. strategy, as crafted by President Joe Biden, encompasses a broad array of protective tariffs and subsidies. The CHIPs Act and related policies seek to foster homegrown microchip production while denying frontier technologies to China and restructuring supply chains to friendly nations. The Inflation Reduction Act promotes extensive new investment in the green energy transition. Incongruously, at the same time, a tariff of 100% has been imposed on the import of Chinese electric vehicles. Further tariffs on component inputs, such as batteries sourced in China, are already on track.
Following the U.S, the European Union is also set to raise its own stiff tariff hikes on Chinese EVs as it pursues a European Green Deal to transition to renewables on its own terms. Europe also seeks to blunt the impact of the “buy American” restrictions of the IRA so that fleeing capital looking to exploit the subsidized U.S. market does not hollow out its own green industries before they can be firmly established.
Earlier this month, the former European central banker and one-time Italian prime minister, Mario Draghi, has gone the next step and plotted out a detailed, long-term “industrial strategy” to close the gap with the U.S. and China, which he calls “an existential challenge” to the European way of life.
“If Europe cannot become more productive,” Draghi writes in his report, “we will be forced to choose. We will not be able to become, at once, a leader in new technologies, a beacon of climate responsibility and an independent player on the world stage. We will not be able to finance our social model. We will have to scale back some, if not all, of our ambitions.”…
[Gardels unpacks both European and Australian industrial policy..]
… For all these divergent industrial strategies to succeed in the end depends largely on whether sustained nation-building investment outstrips the duration of protective measures that ought to be only a temporary respite from asymmetrical conditions while they are rebalanced.
To the extent these decoupled initiatives do succeed, they will, paradoxically, come to be regarded not as the antithesis of global cooperation, but as the precondition for it. Only when the power centers of China, the U.S. and Europe are assuredly in control of their own destiny will they be secure enough to open up and cooperate on the global issues that impact them all equally…
The case that divergent “industrial strategies” in the U.S., China, and Europe can create the security to open up: “The Precondition for Global Cooperation,” from @NoemaMag.
* Bertrand Russell
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As we reconfigure, we might spare a thought for a man who provided an important part the foundation on which opponents of industrial policy base their arguments: Pierre Le Pesant, sieur de Boisguilbert (or as he is more commonly known, simply Boisguilbert); he died on this date in 1714. A French Enlightenment law-maker and economist, he was the first of the great continental liberals– a proponent of laissez-faire and minimalist government and an early opponent of mercantilist “Colbertisme.” He is considered one of the fathers of the notion of an economic market.
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