(Roughly) Daily

Posts Tagged ‘economic policy

“You get what you measure”*…

CNBC article headline about the S&P 500 closing at a record high, highlighting a rally among tech giants, with live updates from journalists.

Matt Stoller takes the occasion of Trump’s selection of Kevin Warsh to head the Fed (“an orthodox Wall Street GOP pick, though he is married to the billionaire heiress of the Estee Lauder fortune and was named in the Epstein files. He’s perceived not as a Trump loyalist but as an avatar of capital”) to ponder why public satisfaction with the economy is so low (“if you judge solely by consumer sentiment, Trump’s first term was the third best economy Americans experienced since 1960. Trump’s second term is not only worse than his first, it is the worst economic management ever recorded by this indicator”).

Stoller argues that we’re mesuring the wrong things (or, in some cases, the right things in the wrong ways)…

… the models underpinning how policymakers think about the economy just don’t reflect the realities of modern commerce. The fundamental dynamic is that those models were constructed in an era where America was one discrete economy, with Wall Street and the public tied together by the housing finance system. But today, Americans increasingly live in tiered bubbles that have less and less to do with one another. Warsh will essentially be looking at the wrong indicators, pushing buttons that are mislabeled.

While corporate America is experiencing good times, much of the country is experiencing recessionary conditions. Let’s contrast consumer sentiment indicators with statistics showing an economic boom. Last week, the government came out with stats on real gross domestic product increasing at a scorching 4.4% in the third quarter of last year. There’s higher consumer spending, corporate investment, government spending, and a better trade balance. Inflation, according to the Consumer Price Index, is low at 2.6.% over the past year. And while official numbers aren’t out for the final three months of the year, the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast shows that it estimates growth at 4.2%. And there are other indicators showing prosperity, from low unemployment to high business formation, which was up about 8% last year, as well as record corporate profits…

… Behavioral economists and psychologists have all sorts of reasons to explain that people don’t really understand the economy particularly well. But in general, when the stats and the public mood conflict, I believe the public is usually correct. Often, there are some weird anomalies with the data used by policymakers. In 2023, I noticed that the consumer price index, the typical measure of inflation, didn’t account for borrowing costs, so the Fed hike cycle, which caused increases in credit card, mortgage, auto loan, payday loans, et al, just wasn’t incorporated. The public wasn’t mad at phantom inflation, they were mad at real inflation that the “experts” didn’t see.

I don’t think that’s the only miscalculation…

[Stoller goes on to explain the ways in which “consumer spending” doesn’t tell us much about consumers anymore, about the painful reality of “spending inequality,” and about the obscure(d) problem of monopoly-driven inflation. He concludes…]

… Finally, there’s a more philosophical point, which I don’t think explains the short-term frustrations people feel, but is directionally correct. Do people actually want what the economy is producing? For most of the 20th century, the answer was yes. When Simon Kuznets invented these measurement statistics in 1934, financial value and the value that Americans placed on products and services were similar. A bigger economy meant things like toilets and electricity spreading across rural America, and cars and food and washing machines.

Today? Well, that’s less clear. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the second fastest growing sector of the economy in terms of GDP growth from 2019-2024 was gambling. Philip Pilkington wrote a good essay last summer on the moral assumptions behind our growth statistics. There is no agreed upon notion of what makes up an economically valuable object or activity, so our stats are inherently subtle moral judgments. Classic moral philosophers like Adam Smith believed in the “use value” of an item, meaning how it could be used, whereas neoclassical economists believed in the “exchange value” of an item, making no judgments about use and are just counting up its market price.

Normal people subscribe on a moral level to use value. Most of us see someone spending money on a gambling addiction as doing something worse than providing Christmas presents for kids, but not because of price. However, our GDP models use the market value basis. Kuznets, presumably, was not amoral, he just thought that our laws would ban immoral activities like gambling, and so use value and market value wouldn’t diverge. But they have.

It’s not just things like gambling or pornography or speculation. A lot of previously unmeasured activity has been turned into data and monetized, which isn’t actually increasing real growth but measuring what already existed. Take the change from meeting someone at a party to using a dating app. One is part of GDP, the other isn’t. Both are real, but only one would show a bigger economy.

Beyond that much of our economy is now based on intangibles – the fastest growing sector was software publishing. Is Microsoft moving to a subscription fee model for Office truly some sort of groundbreaking new product? It’s hard to say, while corporate assets used to be hard things like factories, today much of it is intangibles like intellectual property.

A boomcession, where the rich and corporate America experience a boom while working people feel a recession, is a very unhealthy dynamic. It’s certainly possible to create metrics to measure it, and to help policymakers understand real income growth among different subgroups. You could start looking at real income after non-discretionary consumer spending, or find ways of adjusting for price discrimination.

But I think a better approach is to try to knit us into one society again. The kinds of policymakers who could try to create metrics to understand the different experiences of classes, and ameliorate them, don’t have power. Instead, the people in charge still use models which presume one economy and one relatively uniform set of prices, where “consumer spending” means stuff consumers want.

I once noted a speech in 2016 by then-Fed Chair Janet Yellen in which she expressed surprise that powerful rich firms and small weak ones had different borrowing rates, which affected the “monetary transmission channel” the Fed relied on. Sure it was obvious in the real world, but she preferred theory.

Or they don’t use models at all; Kevin Warsh is not an economist, he’s a lawyer and political operative, and is uninterested in academic theory. He cares about corporate profits and capital formation. That probably won’t work out well either.

At any rate, we have to start measuring what matters again. If we don’t, then we’ll continue to be baffled that normal people hate the economy that looks fine on our charts…

The models used by policymakers to understand wages, economic growth, and consumer spending are misleading. That’s why corporate America is having a party, and everyone else is mad. Eminently worth reading in full: “The Boomcession: Why Americans Hate What Looks Like an Economic Boom,” from @matthewstoller.bsky.social (or @mattstoller.skystack.xyz).

Richard Hamming (and also to the article above, see “Goodhart’s law“)

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As we ponder the pecuniary, we might recall that it was on this date in 1958 that Benelux Economic Union was founded, creating the seed from the European Economic Community, then the European Union grew.

On that same day, Philadelphia doo wop group The Silhouettes started five weeks at the top of the Billboard R&B chart with their first single, “Get A Job.”

“Leadership of a world-economy is an experience of power which may blind the victor to the march of history”*…

A historical engraving depicting a chaotic scene with people in elaborate clothing engaging in various activities under a large structure, surrounded by ships in the background, illustrating themes of society and governance.
“The world’s doings and wanderings are but a mere fool’s errand,” Gysbert Tysens, 1720

Benjamin Braun and Cédric Durand on the citical tension between “factions of capital” in the second Trump administration…

Hegemonic decline, according to the historian Fernand Braudel [see here and here], has historically come with financialization. Amid declining profitability in production and trade, capital owners increasingly shift their assets into finance. This, according to Braudel, is a “sign of autumn,” when empires “transform into a society of rentier-investors on the look-out for anything that would guarantee a quiet and privileged life.”

This specter of Braudelian decline haunts key figures in the second Trump administration. “Tell me what all the former reserve currencies have in common,” Scott Bessent, now Treasury Secretary, mused during the campaign. “Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, UK … How did they lose reserve currency status?” The answer: “They got highly leveraged and could no longer support their military.” While Bessent, a former hedge fund manager, officially denies a program of dollar depreciation, speculators have been driving down the US exchange rate since Trump took office in January. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is the author of a 2019 report on “American investment in the 21st century,” in which he lambasts Wall Street for its shareholder value regime that “tilts business decision-making towards returning money quickly and predictably to investors rather than building long-term corporate capabilities.” His views on finance are shared by self-styled Republican “populists” such as Josh Hawley.

This residual hostility toward Wall Street has marked an ideological rupture in the first months of Trump’s second administration; on the one hand, the President’s “Liberation Day” tariffs have roiled financial markets; on the other, Wall Street has retaliated with financial panics, working to discipline the White House. Whether a coalition of self-styled MAGA populists and Trump’s electoral base—which expects rising living standards and secure jobs delivered via a tariff-led revival of US manufacturing and a deportation-led tightening of the labor market—is sustainable remains a central question of the second Trump administration. Fossil fuel firms and defense-oriented tech companies such as Palantir and Anduril find much to like in militarized nativism. But Trump’s trade policy clearly harms private finance and big tech, two sectors that have consistently supported Trump and expect to be rewarded. Attacking those sectors threatens to alienate the very factions of US capital that have heaved him back into office. 

For these capital factions, US decline is relative and can—cue Japan—be managed in a gracious manner. As Giovanni Arrighi observed in 1994, finance has always intermediated, and thus benefited from, hegemonic transitions. Today, asset management titans profit both from re-balancing US portfolios away from the declining hegemon and from offering fast-growing capital pools from China and other rising Asian economies access to US assets. Big tech, meanwhile, aims at general control over knowledge and economic coordination. It has much to lose from geoeconomic fragmentation that could cut it off from access to data, reduce its network effects, increase the cost of its material infrastructure, and push non-aligned polities to pursue digital sovereignty.

In its efforts to revive the American Empire, the Trump administration will thus have to delicately balance the interests of both manufacturing-oriented nativists and capital factions whose interests span the globe. Navigating these competing agendas will pose an enormous challenge to the longevity of the Trumpian coalition—and the stability of the global financial system as a whole…

Eminently worth reading in full: “America’s Braudelian Autumn,” from @phenomenalworld.bsky.social‬.

* Fernand Braudel

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As we debate development, we might recall that it was on this day in 1940 that Government of Vichy France, the collaborationist ruling regime/government in Nazi-occupied France during World War II, was established.

Of contested legitimacy, it took shape in Bordeaux under Marshal Philippe Pétain as the successor to the French Third Republic and was finally settled in the town of Vichy. The government remained in Vichy for four years, but was escorted to Germany in September, 1944 after the Allied invasion of France. I t then operated as a government-in-exile until April 1945, when the Sigmaringen enclave was taken by Free French forces. Pétain was permitted to travel back to France (through Switzerland), by then under control of the Provisional French Republic, and subsequently put on trial for treason.

Historical black and white photograph of a group of men, including political leaders, standing together on the steps of a building, likely from the Vichy government era during World War II.
First Vichy government in July 1940; Pétain is is fifth from right, in uniform (source)

“Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.”*…

It’s Election Day…

(GIF above: source)

* Abraham Lincoln

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As we cast our ballots, we might recall that it was on this date in 1912 that Woodrow Wilson was elected to his first term as President. The only Democrat to serve as president during the Progressive Era when Republicans dominated the presidency and legislative branches, he changed the nation’s economic policies and led the United States into World War I. He was the leading architect of the League of Nations, and his stance on foreign policy came to be known as Wilsonianism.

Wilson has not been kindly regarded by many historians; c.f.:

How did Woodrow Wilson become America’s most hated president?

Woodrow Wilson was extremely racist — even by the standards of his time

Why Woodrow Wilson Is America’s Worst President Ever

(Still, David Frum asks us to cut him a break [gift article].)

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Written by (Roughly) Daily

November 5, 2024 at 1:00 am

“When the gods want to punish us, they answer our prayers”*…

… So, the estimable Rana Foroohar suggests, American business leaders should be careful what they wish for…

For months now, I’ve been watching with alarm how many top business leaders in the US are buying the line that Donald Trump II would somehow be just like the last time around — loud, but laissez-faire. It was so depressing to see some of America’s top CEOs giggling as the former president joked at his recent Business Roundtable event in Washington. Trump said that he’d polled waitresses and caddies (presumably at Mar-a-Lago) about removing taxes on tips and they were in favour. Sure, there were reports of some grumbling about hardline tariff talk, Trump’s inability to stay on point and his general blow-hardness. But for the most part, tax cuts, deregulation and an utter lack of imagination about political risk seems to be driving business sentiment around him.

It’s not just American business that has the blinders on. I did a Lunch with the FT [gift link] with Lloyd’s of London chief executive John Neal, and I was amazed that when I asked him to think about his top US political risks, he spoke first about Joe Biden’s money printing — rather than the risk to, say, the rule of law under Trump. When I pressed him on the Trump risk, his biggest worry seemed to be the differing policies of the two candidates around things like electric vehicle production, and the decision risk that this might introduce for companies.

Really folks? Let’s have a refresher course on Trumpian economics.

In 2016, Trump talked tough about Made in America and helping working people, but most of his economic policies (aside from tariffs on China) were basically business as usual. He rolled back regulation and lowered taxes on big corporations. Much of the money went to stock buybacks, not Main Street investment. That buoyed short-term stock prices, which were also helped along by low interest rates.

But, it’s VERY unlikely we would see the same phenomenon in a second Trump administration. His tenure marked the apex of financialised growth, which is now largely tapped out. As the Federal Reserve’s End of an Era paper from June 2023 laid out, more than 40 per cent of real corporate profit growth between 1989 and 2019 came from the secular fall in interest rates, and corporate tax rates being cut. That’s what has propelled so much growth in equities in recent years.

Today, the S&P is by some measures more overvalued than it was when the housing bubble burst. In this environment, it’s difficult to see equities rising even if the Fed were to begin cutting rates in the face of a recession. It’s much more likely they’d fall, despite any new Trump tax cuts. And that is the more benign scenario. A more likely possibility is that we’d get a harder-edged, even more insular, xenophobic and paranoid version of Trump this time around.

For starters, few of the more moderate business types that served with him the first time would be willing to come into a second administration given the January 6 2021 Capitol riots and Trump’s ongoing election-loss denial. Some smart people in the business community have concerns about his propensity for fiscal profligacy at a time when rising US deficit levels are worrying investors. It’s fascinating to me that people think about Biden when they think about debt, rather than Trump. Biden’s White House has made record fiscal investment, sure, but it is investing in the real economy, while Trump’s legacy was a classic Republican formula of boosting asset markets with financialisation.

Add to that the prospects of a 10 per cent tariff on imports across the board, and 60 per cent levy on China. This goes to what has been one of the biggest problems with Trump’s trade and economic strategies from the beginning — a tendency to blame China and employ tariffs as a standalone solution to the big, complex problem of slower secular growth and growing inequality in the US. Not that Trump seems to think in such nuanced terms. The fact is that America’s economic and political problems are only partly about the failings of globalisation and the neoliberal trading system in particular. They are also about a lack of investment at home, in basic infrastructure, skills and education, as well as core research and development.

I haven’t seen anything yet that makes me think that Trump or anyone in his orbit has a plan for a multipolar world, or any sense of how to manage complex supply chain de-risking or the politics of friendshoring. And yet, 10 or 60 per cent tariffs depending on the locale would require some kind of reshoring approach. None of that will square with an asset boom, but rather quite the opposite…

A warning to business leaders supporting Trump, from @RanaForoohar @FT.

(Image above: source)

* Oscar Wilde

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As we study self-interest, we might recall that it was on this date in 1972 that an 18-1/2-minute gap appears in the tape recording of the conversations between U.S. President Richard Nixon and his advisers regarding the recent arrests of his operatives while breaking into the Watergate complex.

Still, the tapes were damming. The White House released the subpoenaed tapes on August 5. One tape, later known as the “Smoking Gun” tape, documented the initial stages of the Watergate coverup. On it, Nixon and Haldeman are heard formulating a plan to block investigations by having the CIA falsely claim to the FBI that national security was involved.

It’s a measure of how different those times were from ours that, once the “Smoking Gun” transcript was made public, Nixon’s political support practically vanished: the ten Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee who had voted against impeachment in committee announced that they would now vote for impeachment once the matter reached the House floor.

The Uher 5000 used to make the recordings, with evidence tags (source)

Written by (Roughly) Daily

June 20, 2024 at 1:00 am

“He said that there was death and taxes, and taxes was worse, because at least death didn’t happen to you every year”*…

There are lots of questions that surround taxation: how much? on what? for what? Scott Galloway (@profgalloway) explores a couple of others: how efficient? how fair?

* Terry Pratchett

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As we ruminate on returns, we might recall that it was on this date in 1920 that the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case on the constitutionality of the income tax for the second and last time (so far). The Income tax had been authorized by the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, and created later that year via the Revenue Act of 1913. In 1915 stockholders filed a brief in the U.S. Supreme Court, which arguing that the Sixteenth Amendment covers “many taxes other than on income”; in 1920, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of an income tax. Then came a second suit…

The United States Supreme Court last decided a federal income tax case on constitutional grounds in 1920, a century ago. The case was Eisner v. Macomber , and the issue was whether Congress had the power under the Sixteenth Amendment to include stock dividends in the tax base. The Court answered “no” because “income” in the Sixteenth Amendment meant “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.” A stock dividend was not “income” because it did not increase the wealth of the shareholder.

Macomber was never formally overruled, and it is sometimes still cited by academics and practitioners for the proposition that the Constitution requires that income be “realized” to be subject to tax. However, in Glenshaw Glass , the Court held in the context of treble antitrust damages that the Macomber definition of income for constitutional purposes “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions” and that a better definition encompassed all “instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”

In the century that has passed since Macomber , the Court has never held that a federal income tax statute was unconstitutional. This behavior of the Court constitutes a remarkable example of American tax exceptionalism, because in most other countries income tax laws are subject to constitutional review and are frequently ruled unconstitutional…

Reuven Avi-Yonah, “Should U.S. Tax Law Be Constitutionalized? Centennial Reflections on Eisner v. Macomber (1920)

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