Posts Tagged ‘Braudel’
“Leadership of a world-economy is an experience of power which may blind the victor to the march of history”*…
Benjamin Braun and Cédric Durand on the citical tension between “factions of capital” in the second Trump administration…
Hegemonic decline, according to the historian Fernand Braudel [see here and here], has historically come with financialization. Amid declining profitability in production and trade, capital owners increasingly shift their assets into finance. This, according to Braudel, is a “sign of autumn,” when empires “transform into a society of rentier-investors on the look-out for anything that would guarantee a quiet and privileged life.”
This specter of Braudelian decline haunts key figures in the second Trump administration. “Tell me what all the former reserve currencies have in common,” Scott Bessent, now Treasury Secretary, mused during the campaign. “Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, UK … How did they lose reserve currency status?” The answer: “They got highly leveraged and could no longer support their military.” While Bessent, a former hedge fund manager, officially denies a program of dollar depreciation, speculators have been driving down the US exchange rate since Trump took office in January. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is the author of a 2019 report on “American investment in the 21st century,” in which he lambasts Wall Street for its shareholder value regime that “tilts business decision-making towards returning money quickly and predictably to investors rather than building long-term corporate capabilities.” His views on finance are shared by self-styled Republican “populists” such as Josh Hawley.
This residual hostility toward Wall Street has marked an ideological rupture in the first months of Trump’s second administration; on the one hand, the President’s “Liberation Day” tariffs have roiled financial markets; on the other, Wall Street has retaliated with financial panics, working to discipline the White House. Whether a coalition of self-styled MAGA populists and Trump’s electoral base—which expects rising living standards and secure jobs delivered via a tariff-led revival of US manufacturing and a deportation-led tightening of the labor market—is sustainable remains a central question of the second Trump administration. Fossil fuel firms and defense-oriented tech companies such as Palantir and Anduril find much to like in militarized nativism. But Trump’s trade policy clearly harms private finance and big tech, two sectors that have consistently supported Trump and expect to be rewarded. Attacking those sectors threatens to alienate the very factions of US capital that have heaved him back into office.
For these capital factions, US decline is relative and can—cue Japan—be managed in a gracious manner. As Giovanni Arrighi observed in 1994, finance has always intermediated, and thus benefited from, hegemonic transitions. Today, asset management titans profit both from re-balancing US portfolios away from the declining hegemon and from offering fast-growing capital pools from China and other rising Asian economies access to US assets. Big tech, meanwhile, aims at general control over knowledge and economic coordination. It has much to lose from geoeconomic fragmentation that could cut it off from access to data, reduce its network effects, increase the cost of its material infrastructure, and push non-aligned polities to pursue digital sovereignty.
In its efforts to revive the American Empire, the Trump administration will thus have to delicately balance the interests of both manufacturing-oriented nativists and capital factions whose interests span the globe. Navigating these competing agendas will pose an enormous challenge to the longevity of the Trumpian coalition—and the stability of the global financial system as a whole…
Eminently worth reading in full: “America’s Braudelian Autumn,” from @phenomenalworld.bsky.social.
* Fernand Braudel
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As we debate development, we might recall that it was on this day in 1940 that Government of Vichy France, the collaborationist ruling regime/government in Nazi-occupied France during World War II, was established.
Of contested legitimacy, it took shape in Bordeaux under Marshal Philippe Pétain as the successor to the French Third Republic and was finally settled in the town of Vichy. The government remained in Vichy for four years, but was escorted to Germany in September, 1944 after the Allied invasion of France. I t then operated as a government-in-exile until April 1945, when the Sigmaringen enclave was taken by Free French forces. Pétain was permitted to travel back to France (through Switzerland), by then under control of the Provisional French Republic, and subsequently put on trial for treason.
“History may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly, and what appears not to move at all.”*…
Out of Italy was Braudel’s attempt to… explain a historical flash in the pan: the Italian Renaissance.
For Braudel, history was a struggle to see connections across the high walls of academic disciplines. This kind of approach to the past, showing that all ‘civilisations have their feet on the ground’, is Braudel and the Annales school’s most important legacy: the value of interdisciplinary research, as exemplified by their radical programme, is now so tacitly accepted as to be hardly worth mentioning.
If Italy’s rise must be explained, so, Braudel thought, must its decline. Today, historians are not so concerned with questions of cultural supremacy and decay; they don’t view culture as a vital force that can be ‘concentrated and exhausted’ in a couple of centuries. But the explanation for the fizzling out of this creative energy in the mid-17th century vexed Braudel. He saw the seeds of Italy’s decline within its greatness, borrowing Léon Brunschvicg’s image for ancient Greece’s influence (which Brunschvicg in turn had taken from Hegel): the owl of Athena takes flight only at nightfall. ‘Rightly or wrongly,’ Braudel wrote, ‘it seems to me that there must be a kind of nightfall preceding, and determining, almost every case of cultural greatness. It is the darkness that provokes a multitude of lights.’ The catastrophes of the Italian Wars (1494-1559) and a declining economy were the shadows that prompted the brilliance of Renaissance art and culture; it was peace and economic tranquillity that ‘spread like treacle through Italian life’ after the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. Greatness (and influence) was born in darkness.
To make his point Braudel asks us to imagine conversations with three Baroque architects: with Agostino Barelli (from Bologna), standing outside his Theatine Church in Munich in 1660; with Carlo Antonio Carlone (from Como), as he began work on his Church of the Nine Angelic Choirs in Vienna in 1663; and with Andrea Pozzo (from Trento), while he oversaw the construction of his Jesuit Church in Vienna in 1701. Three Italians, three major building projects outside Italy. They would have been surprised to learn that Italy was on the path to decline…
How could cultures as vibrant as Baroque Italy or interwar Europe have been so radically diminished? Italy’s economic dominance would be supplanted first by the capitalist burghers of the Netherlands and then by English industrialists….
Braudel’s writing also sought to confront the inability of even the greatest historians to predict what would happen next. In this light, his pessimism about human time and human stories can be hard to face… And yet Braudel is optimistic about human civilisations:
Mortal perhaps are their ephemeral blooms, the intricate and short-lived creations of an age, their economic triumphs and their social trials, in the short term. But their foundations remain. They are not indestructible, but they are many times more solid than one might imagine. They have withstood a thousand supposed deaths, their massive bulk unmoved by the monotonous pounding of the centuries.
Nothing changes, and individual lives barely leave an imprint. But this is not tragic determinism. It is an unshakeable belief in the persistence of human history through time. ‘A Renaissance,’ Braudel writes, ‘is always possible.’
On Fernand Braudel‘s Out of Italy, and an appreciation of its insightful author, a leader of the Annales school of history: “Down with Occurrences.”
* Fernand Braudel
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As we think in time, we might recall that it was on this date in 1803 that Spanish representatives in New Orleans executed documents ceding sovereignty over the Louisiana Territory to France. Twenty days later, France transferred the Territory to the United States.
The U.S. gained possession of 828,000 square miles of territory (an area that includes all or part of 15 current U.S. states and 2 Canadian provinces). Americans had originally sought to purchase only the port city of New Orleans and its adjacent coastal lands; but Napoleon, cash-strapped by his war with England, offered the (much) larger parcel– and the U.S. quickly agreed.
“Orwell feared that what we fear will ruin us. Huxley feared that what we desire will ruin us”*…
On the occasion of Cyber Monday…
Science fiction writer William Gibson coined the phrase, “The future is already here — it’s just not very evenly distributed.” It’s a well-known and oft-repeated line.
I’m proposing a slight variation, or perhaps a corollary principle: The dystopia is already here — it’s just not very evenly distributed…
From Michael Sacasas, a run-down of (some of) the signs of trouble in our times: “The Dystopia Is Already Here.”
Lest we descend into despair, we should remember that there are things we can do to stem the dark tide… we just have to do them. For example, we can use the resources of groups like Common Sense Media; we can support the work of EFF and other privacy and rights groups; we can switch to the tools of open makers like Mozilla; we can contribute to open knowledge resources like the Internet Archive and Wikimedia…
Oh, and just in case our resolve begins to slip, we can revisit Sacasas’ page, as he’s keeping it open add to the list of grim symptoms as more emerge…
* Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death
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As we hang onto the baby as we ditch the bath water, we might spare a thought for Fernand Braudel; he died on this date in 1985. An accomplished historian, he is probably best remembered as the leader of the Annales School of historiography. His scholarship focused on three main projects: The Mediterranean (1923–49, then 1949–66), the remarkable Civilization and Capitalism (1955–79), and the unfinished Identity of France (1970–85)– in all of which he set the bar for Annales practitioners by using deep and comprehensive research into the minute particulars of everyday life to illustrate broad, sweeping socio-economic trends.
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