(Roughly) Daily

Posts Tagged ‘philosophy’

“You can deny, if you like, nearly all abstractions: justice, beauty, truth, goodness, mind, God. You can deny seriousness, but not play”*…

Portrait of a scholarly man with long gray hair, dressed in a dark robe, gazing thoughtfully to the side against a muted background.
John Locke (source)

Henry Oliver on John Locke as an exemplar of the importance of play…

One day, when my son was three years old, he stuck his finger into a candle. We were sitting at the table before dinner and he touched the flame without warning. When his sister asked him why he had done it, he told her he just wanted to know what the flame was like. I remembered this when I was reading Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in the section when Locke discusses how certainly we can know the world beyond ourselves, and he writes: “he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him.” (IV.xi.8) This is how the love of philosophy begins: in a curiosity of the world and a willingness not just to question it, but to test it directly. It illustrates Locke’s larger point about man’s capacity to reason without the use of formal logic. “God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational.” (IV.xvii.4) We become philosophical as we become interested in knowing the qualities and limits of the world and ourselves. And that begins in childhood.

For the modern, empirical, skeptical mind, Locke’s finger-in-the-flame is akin to the philosopher leaving Plato’s cave. In that experiment, my son became a novice of philosophy. What he learned, he could not communicate. He did not have the language he needed. He was, essentially, at play when he touched that flame. To philosophise, then, requires some play. To be rational requires us to do “irrational” things, like touching a flame.

Play is formal. It might follow the rules of a game, the conventions of the theatre, or the tropes of impersonation—but play is a form of something else. In this way, language is a form of play for our experiences, not the things themselves, but a means of presenting them. Play can be a means of acquiring knowledge that we can express in language, but to begin with it is a means of acquiring impressions, ideas, concepts, feelings, and sensations.

Free play is informal. It is unfamiliar. In its freedom, it is play, just as in their rules the other modes of play are play. Free play might be random (like when children slap paint on paper) or it might be stylized (like free-style swimming) or it might be simply open-ended (as when an invented game keeps changing its content, rules, methods). This is why some play seems both formal and informal, such as when we “play around” with something—an instrument, some materials, an idea—and we are both working at the margin of the known rules and forms and being informal and open-ended.

Over time, play can become practice. The more predictable play becomes, the less playful it is. Children get bored with their imaginary games and begin to expand them: new characters, scenarios, scenes; the old ways of playing are either formalized or discarded. Practice is inherently more boring; it is a form of work. To maintain a good practice, we must, at intervals, allow for some play to revive, reinvent, or reinvigorate the practice. So, the athlete or chess player must know the patterns of their games and must be able to play creatively. So, the thinker or professional must know the accepted knowledge and forms of their discipline and be able to think creatively.

Many modes of life—education, occupations—have to be both work and play, the dynamic development of practices. In ‘Nature: A Fragment’, Goethe says, “we live within her, yet are foreign to her.” So it is with children at play, with students at study. Play is part of the quest for knowledge: we must play both in the sense of removing limits and of pretending. As with children, we must be able to say “this is in the game”, without compromising our sense of the game not being the same as “real life.”

When my son touched that flame, he was playing. When he told his sister that he merely wished to know what the flame was like, that was a similar way of thinking about the world as when they both tell me that something is “in the game.” Occasionally, I hear them saying things that are extraordinary, rude, or that sound like they need help—or that are just downright weird. In response to my puzzlement or offers of help, they explain, off-handedly, “Dad! It’s in the game!” Play is, without them intending it to be, a way of conducting thought experiments with their accumulating knowledge of the world. Touching the candle was a more traditional physical experiment. It was a means of playing that confirmed to my son the existence of the flame, in a way that words and ideas alone never could.

Philosophical play can become abstruse, distant from reality. Locke is hardly a “playful” philosopher, in the colloquial sense. But the plain and clear nature of his prose makes him intellectually exciting because he is always at play, always in the dynamic development of practices and conclusions. He is searching for truth. His insistence on the “plain and clear deductions of words” (IV.viii.11) and his opposition to general and trifling propositions (IV.viii.9) make him substantively and rhetorically compelling. It also brings a repetitive but playful structure to his arguments…

[Oliver considers Locke’s thinking, concluding…]

… Just as my son touched the flame to know the world (and thus to acquire the materials to begin to reason about it), Locke remembered the water and the colours on the bubble (materials he had long ago acquired). The “play” of this way of thinking is all the interplay between mind and reality, idea and experience. What starts as a game of child’s play becomes a practice of reasoning, but in Locke’s hands, the practice is always being played with, always being dynamically tested, refined. New things are always allowed to be “in the game” so long as they enable the pursuit of truth. Locke is not overly formal, following the “rules of philosophy”, but allows the rules of his method to be determined by their ability to enhance his pursuit of truth. Of the metaphysical philosophers who make “trifling” general propositions, he writes:

one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things: v.g. he that having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them: v.g. substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive, rational, may make several undoubted propositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really is: and of this sort, a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity, and some sort of natural philosophy: and, after all, know as little of God, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out (IV.viii.9)

This “trifling” is all abstracted play, not based on any experience: it does not base the game on the world. The player is not required to have touched a flame.

Philosophy, as Locke practices it, requires play because there is so little we really know. There are no substances which do not have something in them that “baffles our understandings”, to see ideas and their connections, and to know the proofs of these, requires “single and slow steps, and long poring in the dark”. Our knowledge comes not only short of reality “but even of the extent of our own ideas.” (IV.iii.6) He constantly emphasises that the world cannot be entirely known to us through reason.

…how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting. He that, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly (IV.xi.10)

We must feel the world. We know things through our sensations. To those sensations we must apply reason. We must accept as revealed certain aspects of life and make ourselves more precise in how we discuss those aspects. That is: we find the world through play, and we find the language to describe the world through play, and that play becomes the practice of reasoning.

Some games are high-spirited and dramatic; some are slow and tense; some are hard to see as games, such as when a child sits quietly on the beach and moves the sand around, or re-arranges the pebbles. Locke’s reasoning is often over-determined, persnickety, and can feel like he is attempting to separate out each grain of sand, but in this, as much as in anything else, he has the playful quality of a child who simply wishes to know what it is like to touch the flame, to satisfy himself that the flame does not only exist within the confines of “in the game.”

Frolic is fundamental: “John Locke: The Playful Philosopher.”

Apposite: Richard Feynman (e,g., “Richard Feynman, Spinning Plates and Serious Play“) and Claude Shannon (e.g., “We know the past but cannot control it. We control the future but cannot know it.”)

* Johan Huizinga, in his remarkable Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (And as for the kinds of games we might play, see James Carse‘s Finite and Infinite Games.)

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As we celebrate coltish curiosity, we might send lighthearted birthday greetings to Art Clokey; he was born on this date in 1921. An animator, director, producer, screenwriter, and voice actor, he was a pioneer in the popularization of stop-motion clay animation, best known as the creator of the character Gumby (and as the original voice of Gumby’s sidekick, Pokey).

A man wearing a captain's hat and a t-shirt featuring Gumby characters sits on a couch beside a large Gumby plush toy and a small Pokey plush toy, with a colorful poster of 'A Gumby Adventure' in the background.

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Written by (Roughly) Daily

October 12, 2026 at 1:00 am

“If you do not resist the apparently inevitable, you will never know how inevitable the inevitable was.”*…

A serene landscape depicting several people reclining on the ground, surrounded by food items like fruits and meats, under a tree. The scene captures a sense of leisure and indulgence.
The Land of Cockaigne, Pieter Bruegel the Elder, 1567 (source)

Ah, but how best to resist?

In a short piece adapted from his recent book, On Resistance- A Manifesto, Curtis White offers a plain-spoken, almost playful– but at the same time provocative– prescription in the form of “seven theses on resistance”…

(1) Our politics are a binary melodrama: humanist against evangelical, Democrat against Republican, socialist against fascist, woke against racist, Kimmel against Trump, comedians against reality-show celebrities. By dominating the stage, these dramas exclude other ways of understanding who we are and what we want, in other words, what we lack. 

(2) These melodramatic struggles distract us from the real question—what values shall we live by? Our true values are not to be found in what we think, or in what we say we believe, but in how we live. 

(3) This contradicts the idea, common among us, that we are a free country rich in belief. “I believe X,” we are told, with the expectation that others will respect that belief, even if it makes no sense. It is as if belief has been reserved only for the unbelievable. 

(4) The value we live through in the present moment is no different from the foundational value of ancient Greece and Rome: the “right of conquest.” This may sound hyperbolic, but the people of Gaza, Venezuela, and even Greenland understand it well. This value instructs friend and foe alike, “You can do whatever you want on the condition that you make your desires fit my ends, or else.” As Trump aide Stephen Miller acknowledged in a CNN interview in January 2026, “We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.” Vae victis, woe to the victims. 

(5) The worst psychopathology of everyday life is to be treated unjustly and not to know it. This injustice inevitably concerns money, its inequities, and its specious allure. Buddhist philosopher David Loy writes, “Money is the flight from emptiness that makes life empty.” This is the truth, but it is also something that we don’t know. 

(6) Rather than seeing emptiness as a mark of failure, can we see it as something to reclaim? Emptiness is a fundamental human joy if we feel free to respond to it. Freedom to play, to create, to live in our own strength. As Tibetan Buddhist Tarthang Tulku thought, “Life is the play of energy in the void.” Children are primed for life through play, but their play only prepares them for a world that doesn’t exist. 

(7) Jesus was a heretic because he hated hypocrites, those whose “throats were open graves.” In Nietzsche’s estimation, this made him “the noblest of men.” Jesus made himself useless to the ways of the Temple and useless to the ways of Empire. He encouraged us to take back our emptiness from the ethical absolutes of the Mosaic Law and from the false gods of Rome. He began the very human remaking of his Father’s earthly kingdom without any ethical guidance beyond the primordial aspirations of love. As Saint Augustine taught, simply, “Love and do what you will.”

Make yourself useless! Take back your emptiness! Make something beautiful!

As universities rid themselves of the arts, humanities, and social sciences, they become glorified vocational schools for those seeking jobs in tech or business. One might object that there is no human interest in the skills developed in such schools, but at least the people are employed, we’re told, and they’re getting the “good jobs.”

But even that logic is in doubt when so many students find that entry-level employment has been monopolized by AI, and, amid the West’s never-ending Industrial Revolution, by automation. This reality is leaving tens of thousands of people, heads filled with expensive skills that nobody wants or needs, living in their childhood bedrooms or their parents’ basement, gloomily doom-scrolling through the day, wondering how in the world their student loans will ever be repaid, and feeling just generally unneeded and unwanted. Not surprisingly, the consequences for mental health have been bad. According to a 2023 Gallup poll, 47 percent of Gen Z adults are anxious or depressed “often or always” because of social media, financial stress, and isolation. 

But the numbers are, indeed, brow-raising: in late 2025, the unemployment rate among college graduates stood at nearly 6 percent, while the general unemployment rate was just over 4 percent. So, why go to college at all? Sure, apprentice to one of the trades. Go for construction, as if there were no downside to manual labor. 

Techno-capitalism’s circle in hell is the hole (or parental basement) of the Empty Self. Imagine Dante walking in this hell, wondering about the devilish devices that the damned are staring into, fingers flying, and Virgil commenting, “They’re looking for themselves.”

Dante asks, “What are they seeing, master?” 

Virgil replies, “Ghosts.” 

“And what sin did they commit for this punishment?” 

“Their sin was their lifelessness.” 

Virgil has Bob Dylan’s “Desolation Row” on heavy rotation. 

Gen Z youth imagine that their future is dependent on studying subjects for which they have no living interest. They have only the failing assumption that writing code, analyzing data, programming, or engineering software will eventually lead to prosperous material lives—or just survival, no matter how dull the reality is. 

This is made even more hellish by the fact that the people in it are alone. My generation had to disengage from television, but a life lived online is another level of insidious alienation and, worse yet, it is all on the inside, eroding inner life, leaving nothing for the soul, nothing for soul-work, everything for addictive pleasure and profit. As David Foster Wallace commented in a 1996 interview with David Lipsky for Rolling Stone, sounding out a now familiar doom:

At a certain point we’re going to have to build up some machinery inside our guts to help us deal with this. The technology is just going to get better and better. And it’s going to get easier and easier and more and more convenient, and more and more pleasurable, to be alone with images on a screen, given to us by people who do not love us but want our money. If we don’t do that, then (a) as individuals, we’re going to die, and (b) the culture’s going to grind to a halt.

But Wallace didn’t mean to blame the young. The difference between Gen Z and earlier generations is that our young have to suffer the effects of techno-alienation much more intensely because the technology has indeed gotten “better and better.” They will be caught within it for a much longer time, and without the helpful memory of any sort of “time before tech.” Perhaps this is why Gen Z is currently experiencing a paradoxical nostalgia for the analogue world of the 1990s. 

Well, then, what are we to do? How about, “Workers of the world, relax! Make yourselves useless, you have nothing to lose but your virtual chains!” 

In On Tyranny, Timothy Snyder asks us to say no to rising fascism by preserving liberal democratic institutions. But he never imagines that there might be reasons to say no to those institutions, to our “managers of despair,” as well. He offers little understanding of the importance of a resistant culture, innately anarchic, opposing all that is anti-human. Resistant cultures seek to provide a place where we can become who we really are, a place where we are not mere functions of the world we happened to be born into, not diminished creatures whose being has been reduced to a marketable “skill set.” 

Resistant cultures work through honesty, intelligence, and beauty. They ask of us what Buddha asked of his followers: listen, consider, and cultivate. Listen to what we have discovered; consider what you have heard; and if you like what you have heard and considered, if it speaks to you, then join with others in the sangha, the Buddhist community, where you can cultivate a path that others in their turn may follow. This is the ideal way to join any human group: not by thoughtlessly inhabiting its damaged forms and conditions, but by freely engaging, considering, choosing, and, with this freedom in place, making something beautiful. As Thich Nhat Hanh taught, “The next Buddha will be a sangha” [community].

I have written this manifesto in what Vladimir Nabokov called “a state of aesthetic bliss,” which he defined as: a sense of being somehow, somewhere, connected with other states of being where art (curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm. 

That’s the hill I intend to die on, for all the good intending will do me. Because that hill may already be gone. I have reclined in its grasses for so long—gazing down on moving water, assuming that all I had to do was turn and I’d be looking up toward the crest—that I may have missed the moment when the earthmovers came in, noisy though they are, and the mountaintop removal began. And then a guy in an orange vest and a hard hat comes up and explains to me that, “Son, you’re living in the world of yesterday.” 

Stefan Zweig’s complaint in The World of Yesterday was exactly this: A form of moral beauty had disappeared beneath him and he was left suspended in air. As Goth Rock legend Robert Smith of the Cure sings in “Endsong,” the last song on their album Songs of a Lost World (2024): it’s gone, gone, “Nothing left of all I loved.” 

And yet, I hope that this manifesto, in its playfulness, its nonlinear anarchy, expresses not a longing for the work of the past but energy for the future. Not illustrations for an ideology, but the pure energy of worldmaking. In a sense, we need to “forget the Beatles” and the countercultures they inspired. Presently, that culture lives only a gray half-life through Spotify playlists, Hollywood biopics about Dylan and the Doors (et tu, Led Zep?), and the blasphemous productions of corporate giants like Universal Music Group, selling us our own past. That music has been, in tech parlance, the victim of “enshittification,” the apotheosis of which will be that quickly approaching time when music’s “zone” is flooded with AI slop. As one AI music generator named “imoliver” commented, “I have no musical talent at all. I can’t sing, I can’t play instruments, and I have no musical background.” All this under the cover of “democratizing songmaking,” never mind that the mark of the best music has heretofore been its soulful heresies. What was once alive and full of the warmth of sharing is now only about creating a brand and making a buck in a world where anyone, anywhere, could make the next big hit. 

You’ve heard of the Land of Cockaigne, that fanciful place where abundance reigns [see image at top, and here]. Well, welcome to the Land of Cliché, where AI rummages through all that has been said and sung and then throws it against the wall to see what sticks. Someone should be ashamed, but we’re all too excited about this brave new world to know it. 

The arts need to de-shittify and return to peasant energies, ready to be changed, changed utterly, into something a new generation can live in and live through. In the Imagination, a new comedy will rise, because its loving playfulness, its caring embrace of others, is always with us, regardless of every inhuman distortion of the world as it stands. Hegel called this comedy the “World in Love.” Ultimately, that is what Nietzsche’s “transvaluation of all values” seeks, too: love not as an ethical command but as an artful metaphysic. 

Suddenly it is at an end. THE WORLD IS NEW!”—William Carlos Williams, Spring and All

Seven theses on resistance: “Song of a Lost World,” from @laphamsquarterly.bsky.social.

Triangulate with: “Planetary Politics Now,” from Susan Buck-Morss (“The planet is indifferent to political discourses. It counts time in eons, not presidential tenures. Planetary-thinking forces awareness that the cognitive maps of modernity no longer make sense. Neither conservative nor liberal political positions are up to the task of the present.”)

… to all of which your correspondent would humbly add, yes and– VOTE.

* Terry Eagleton

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As we ponder positive possibilities, we might recall that on this date in 1635, in Massachusetts, the General Court of the then-Colony banished Roger Williams for speaking out for the separation of church and state and against the right of civil authorities to punish religious dissension and to confiscate Indian land. Williams moved out to edge of the Narragansett Bay, where with the assistance of the Narragansett tribe, he established a settlement at the junction of two rivers near Narragansett Bay, located in (what is now) Rhode Island. He declared the settlement open to all those seeking freedom of conscience and the removal of the church from civil matters– and many dissatisfied Puritans came. Taking the success of the venture as a sign from God, Williams named the community “Providence.”

Williams stayed close to the Narragansett Indians and continued to protect them from the land greed of European settlers. His respect for the Indians, his fair treatment of them, and his knowledge of their language enabled him to carry on peace negotiations between natives and Europeans, until the eventual outbreak of King Philip’s War in the 1670s.  And although Williams preached to the Narragansett, he practiced his principle of religious freedom by refraining from attempts to convert them.

Roger Williams statue, Roger Williams Park, Providence, R.I.

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Written by (Roughly) Daily

October 9, 2026 at 1:00 am

“Unless you strip bodies of their corporeal nature and impart corporeal nature to incorporeal beings, nothing you expect will take place”*…

A detailed engraving depicting a bustling kitchen scene with several figures engaged in various tasks, including cooking and working with pots and utensils, while a window reveals activity outside.
The Alchemist, Philip Galle (after Pieter Bruegel the Elder) c. 1558 (source)

In 1965, Hubert Dreyfus wrote the first widely-considered critique of artificial intelligence, Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence, a report for RAND. He updated and expanded the work for broad publication in 1972 as What Computers Can’t Do (which was further updated and revised for two subsequent reissues) and a “sequel,” Mind Over Machine (in 1986). For a precis of Dreyfus’ views on AI, see here.

His invocation of alchemy resonates still, for example in the estimable Henry Farrell‘s consideration of Adam Becker‘s (great) recent book More Everything Forever…

Adam Becker’s “More Everything Forever” begins by describing the ideas of Eliezer Yudkowsky, an AI guru who Sam Altman thinks deserves a Nobel Prize. Yudkowsky’s ambitions for humanity include “[p]erfect health, immortality,” and a future in which “[i]f you imagine something that’s worse than mansions with robotic servants for everyone, you are not being ambitious enough.” According to Yudkowsky and his peers, a “glorious transhumanist future” awaits us if we get AI right, although we face extinction if we get it wrong.

“AI” and “transhumanist” are new terms for rather older ambitions. As the seedy occultist Dr. Trelawney remarks in Anthony Powell’s 1962 novel, “The Kindly Ones,” “[t]o be forever rich, forever young, never to die … Such was in every age the dream of the alchemist.” Renaissance alchemists won the support of monarchs like Rudolf II, the Holy Roman Emperor who squandered his realm’s money on a futile quest to discover the Philosopher’s Stone. Now, as Becker explains, AGI, or artificial general intelligence, has become the means through which philosophers might transubstantiate our mundane reality into a realm in which the apparently impossible becomes possible: living forever, raising the dead, and remaking the universe in the shape of humanity.

These ideas would be a curiosity, if they weren’t reshaping the world, and policymakers’ understanding of national security…

[Farrell explains, elaborating on the beliefs in play and explaining how they played in the Biden Administration (which, he argues, largely internalized them) and now in Trump’s…]

… The Biden administration’s policies rested on risky bets. AI may not be the universal solvent for vexing and complex technological problems promised by Altman, Amodei, and their peers. Some (including most members of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, as well as myself and colleagues) believe that current approaches will not lead to anything like self-improving AGI anytime soon. As DeepSeek’s success in building AI models suggests, semiconductors may not provide the chokehold on AI that American policymakers believed.

In any event, the Trump administration has seemingly opted for a different approach, replacing a grand plan for a global AI order with a loose approach based on the ever-shifting convergence between notions of American greatness and the particular interests of well-connected companies. This currently involves leveraging control of technology to maintain American domination, cutting deals with Gulf states, while trying to cut China out. When Trump toured the Gulf states with an entourage of tech CEOs, he offered access to top-end semiconductors in exchange for promises of massive investment, graciously accepting a jet plane, and a large-scale money transfer routed, with fees, through his family stablecoin.

This emerging blend of imperium, magical technology, and self-dealing too is reminiscent of the Renaissance. The English wizard John Dee, who claimed to have turned mercury into gold in the presence of Rudolf II, is also credited with coining the term “British Empire.” As a member of the court of Queen Elizabeth I, he combined alchemical experiment and indirect conversation with angels with more mundane plans to extend British power across the Atlantic and enrich himself.

The alchemists’ quest for immortality and universal transformation is again entangled with the struggle among empires. The dreams of perfect health, the conquest of death, and mansions with robot servants that Becker describes inspire visions of a radically transformed far future and a near present in which America can use advanced technologies to bolster its power. Such visions stem from an ideology of salvation that has indeed fueled important technological advances but may be quite wrong about where those advances will bring us.

We are being ushered into a world where AI models offer new and useful means to summarize the information of the world and draw nonobvious connections across it, but can also weave new syncretic religious beliefs together from the myriad human sources that they summarize. In the early 20th century, Weber argued that rationalized Calvinism had led to the defeat of the old gods and the inexorable disenchantment of a world dominated by bureaucracy and organized capitalism. In the early 21st, just the opposite is happening as AI draws open the gate for the return of the fantastical. Yudkowsky’s eschatology is just one of the prophetic visions attendant on AI. The practical changes that AI will bring to bureaucracy and markets will go hand in hand with religious ecstasy and fervor, as some people come to believe that they can speak to God through the machine, while others use it to elaborate their own extended fantasies about politics. As Becker’s book shows, technology is not just an abstract force changing the world, but a mirror in which human beings see their dreams and ambitions made manifest. We’re starting to discover what that looks like at scale.

Eminently worth reading full: “What AI debates have to do with alchemy,” from @himself.bsky.social.

Then consider this, from Nicklas Lundblad, a senior exec at Deep Mind, Google, Stripe, and elsewhere, recently turned public policy Fellow. In a piece adapted from a lecture in a series of talks on the philosophy of artificial intelligence that he gave at Mid-Sweden University), he puts Dreyfus’s thought into context, tracing the history of arguments with/against it over the years, as both technology and thinking about technology advanced. He concludes…

… So, we may say, what is Dreyfus answer?… That he is obsessed with showing that machines are incapable of being human?

In fact, his conclusion, already in 1965 – and then repeated in the 1972 book – is much more interesting. Here is how Dreyfus concludes his critique:

If the alchemist had stopped poring over his retorts and pentagrams and had spent his time looking for the deeper structure of the problem, as primitive man took his eyes of the moon, came out of the trees, and discovered fire and the wheel, things would have been set moving in a more promising direction. After all, three hundred years after the alchemists we did get gold from lead (and we have landed on the moon), but only after we abandoned work on the alchemic level, and worked to understand the chemical level and the even deeper nuclear level instead.

Dreyfus’ answer is not to get stuck in the question of what computers can’t do – but to reject even that last piece of thick ontology and ask if we are making a fundamental conceptual mistake. He suggests that we find what is to intelligence as chemistry is to alchemy and look for another set of concepts, another language, to describe what we are doing.

We would, in Dreyfus view, be much better of trying to build alien intelligence or replicate animal intelligence or even jettisoning the idea of intelligence entirely in favour of a new concept – perhaps something like cognicity – that removes the Difference from the research program.

Dreyfus recommendations would imply that we should drop the benchmarks that distract us and instead focus on simpler, thinner ontologies around tasks and interactions. What we need, he would suggest, is a conceptual shift into that simpler ontology – at least if we want to make real progress.

The shift into modern machine learning seems to prove that when the thicker ontology was abandoned we did discovered things obscured by the idea of man as a symbolic animal.

What if we abandon both the idea of man and machine?…

Also worthy of a full review: “Reading Dreyfus,” from @nicklaslundblad.

* Zosimos of Panopolis, an alchemist (and Gnostic mystic)

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As we think about transmutation, we might recall that it was on this date in 1954 (only 11 years before Dreyfus wrote Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence) that IBM introduced the “IBM 608,” the first calculating machine to use only solid-state transistors instead of vacuum tubes (thus needing only about 5% of the power to perform the same operations). The machine was housed in several large cabinets and could be purchased for $83,210 (or rented for $1,760 per month)… that’s just over $1,000,000 on an inflation-adjusted basis (or about $22,000 per month). It used more than 3,000 germanium transistors and could store 40 nine-digit numbers and perform 4,500 additions per second, among other operations.

A historic black and white photograph of a vintage IBM computer system, featuring multiple large components including a mainframe and peripherals.

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Written by (Roughly) Daily

October 7, 2026 at 1:00 am

“But what kind of freedom does one have if one can use it only as someone else prescribes?”*…

A man in an orange jumpsuit being escorted by law enforcement.

As Ravi Somaiya suggests, Ted Kaczynski— the Unabomber– and his manifesto, Industrial Society and Its Future, were uncomfortably prescient about modern politics…

I was going through some old papers last week, when I came across two handwritten letters I received from Ted Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, in 2017 and 2018.

My address was filled out in Kaczynski’s own stark, strangely spaced block capitals, precise and somehow odd. The return address was Florence Supermax prison in Colorado, a highly controlled and secured facility which houses a 9/11 conspirator, the cartel boss Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, and the leaders of the Latin Kings and the Aryan Brotherhood, among other notorious, or notoriously dangerous, criminals.

Kaczynski was a gifted mathematician — he went to Harvard at 16 — and a loner, who abandoned his career to live in isolation and pursue a bombing campaign against the rise of technology, and the fall of the natural world, from 1978 until 1995. He was caught in 1996, and was serving several life sentences when he died in custody in 2023.

I wrote to him because I was fascinated by his combination of breathtaking prescience — his 35,000-word manifesto, published in 1995, is absolutely correct and reads like a description of modern life — and a cruelty and contempt for his fellow man that led him to squander that gift and kill three people and wound dozens of others in the service of fomenting a moronic fantasy revolution.

It’s a combination that defines modern politics — a solid basic intuition, matched with an idiot desire to hurt anyone who disagrees. And it gets at something in modern culture, which often asks whether we can enjoy the work of someone whose other actions we find morally lacking. I guess I thought if I understood Kaczynski better, I’d understand all that better too.

It was the wrong question, and thus an endeavor doomed to failure. But when I opened one of the letters I found that it had led me to ask him what he thought about Donald Trump. His answer was brilliant and also made me uncomfortable in a way that I still can’t quite describe.

He started by apologizing for the delay in replying. (Even if you find killing people acceptable, you still get a twinge if you keep someone waiting for a message.)

“There’s a lot to be said in regard to DT and the social and political phenomenon that he represents, but I don’t have the time to say it all here,” he wrote. “So I’ll just call your attention to the paragraph that appears on pages 52-53 of my book.”

This, in my limited experience, was very Kaczynski. He loved to be awkward, and elliptical. He also pointed out that the paragraph was written long before the notion of Trump as a political figure became a realistic one.

I got a copy of his book, and have to admit to a frisson as I opened it. I confirmed that he’d written the section in 2010. Then I found the pages he’d cited. It was one short paragraph. To understand it, you have to understand the underlying theory he has, which is detailed on pages 28 and 29:

“Biological organisms, evolving through natural selection, eventually invade every niche in which biological survival is possible at all, and, whatever measures may be taken to suppress them, some organisms will find ways of surviving nonetheless. Within any complex, large-scale society, a similar process will produce self-propagating systems that will invade every corner and circumvent all attempts to suppress them. These systems will compete for power without regard to the objectives of any government (or other entity) that may try to steer the society. Our argument—admittedly impossible at present to prove conclusively—is that these self-propagating systems will constitute uncontrollable forces that will render futile in the long run all efforts to steer the society rationally.”

The precise paragraph he cited goes on:

“Two competing, entirely legal self-prop systems that have arisen in the U.S. during the last few decades are the politically correct left and the dogmatic right (not to be confused with the liberals and conservatives of earlier times in America). This book is not the place to speculate about the outcome of the struggle between these two forces; suffice it to say that in the long run their bitter conflict may do more to prevent the establishment of a lastingly peaceful world order than all the bombs of Al Qaeda and all the murders of the Mexican drug gangs.”

He’s … right. Or, rather, I agree with him. I covered the rise of the Tea Party on the right, and Occupy on the left, at around the time he wrote it. And they have since risen from niche movements to define the entirety of our politics.

Each needs the other to secure its support and push it to greater extremes of ideology and violence. And the love-hate conflict between them is so destructive and widespread that it leaves little room for anything else.

And now I’m making the political argument of a conspiracist murderer. I spent a few days troubled over this, and then remembered that theory rarely survives contact with reality, no matter how brilliant the theorist.

Kaczynski was making the same mistake as the political groups he describes — he failed to understand that people fundamentally want to be happy, and get along with other people, and that they will find unexpected and unpredictable ways to get to that spot. He also failed to understand that nothing is permanent, and that nature works in cycles.

Intellectual humility was not his strong suit. In that, he was a man of our era, more than of his own…

“The Unabomber on Donald Trump,” from Bungalow Magazine.

Further to Somiya’s conclusion– and in fairness to Kaczynski– elsewhere in Industrial Society and Its Future, Kaczynski channels Jane Jacobs and Christopher Alexander:

A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. That is, you cannot plan out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to function as it was designed to do. People do not consciously and rationally choose the form of their society. Societies develop through processes of social evolution that are not under rational human control…

Full text of Kaczynski’s manifesto is here.

(Images above: left source; right source)

* Theodore J. Kaczynski, Industrial Society and Its Future

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As we fumble into the future, we might that it was on this date in 1582 that Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Poland introduced the Gregorian calendar. While this was “October 5” in the rest of the world, those four countries, adopting Pope Gregory XIII’s innovation, skipped ten days– so that there, the date shifted from October 4 the day before to October 15. With the shift, the calendar was aligned with the equinoxes, and the lunar cycles used to establish the celebration of Easter. Britain and its colonies resisted this Popish change, and used the Julian calendar for another century and a half, until September 2, 1752.

An old printed calendar document titled 'Lunario Novo' detailing the new reform of the year's correction according to Pope Gregory XIII, featuring illustrations, months, and dates.
Lunario Novo, Secondo la Nuova Riforma della Correttione del l’Anno Riformato da N.S. Gregorio XIII, printed in Rome by Vincenzo Accolti in 1582, one of the first printed editions of the new calendar (source)

Written by (Roughly) Daily

October 5, 2026 at 1:00 am

“Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people”*…

Silhouette of a human head filled with a cosmic pattern of stars, galaxies, and molecular structures against a light background.

As we float awash in the debate over who/what is conscious (only humans? animals? plants? AI? everything?), we might take a moment to ponder the role of consciousness. For example, in science.

Harald A. Wiltsche argues that physicists, and scientists in general, attempt to paint an objective picture of reality. Consciousness, experience, and subjectivity are forcibly pushed out of the picture. Indeed, even where science is empirical, this empiricism rarely involves a consideration of human consciousness, but rather the readings of some mechanical measuring device, or some hypothetical abstracted sum of all perspectives – a God’s eye view or view from nowhere.

A phenomenologist of science, Wiltsche paints a different picture. Physics, even in the form of quantum mechanics, has its origins in the phenomenology of human consciousness. No matter how hard scientists try, it can never escape those origins, and to truly move forward, it must understand and embrace them…

Physics and phenomenology are usually taken to inhabit different worlds. Physics aims at a description of objective reality in mathematical terms. Phenomenology—the philosophical movement inaugurated by Edmund Husserl—is an a priori investigation into consciousness and into the ways things appear in experience. Physics deals with equations, invariants, and symmetries, aiming to represent reality minus observers; phenomenology seems to concern precisely what physics leaves out: subjectivity, consciousness, meaning. If the two meet at all, it is only in polite, but ultimately inconsequential, interdisciplinary dialogue.

My claim is that this picture is mistaken. Physics does not stand outside phenomenology. It presupposes the very structures phenomenology seeks to analyse—above all, the structured correlation between subject and object through which objectivity first becomes intelligible. The task, therefore, is not to unite two distant domains, but to recognize a relation that has been there from the beginning…

[Wiltsche makes his point first with reference to spacetime physics, then to quantum mechanics. He concludes…]

… The question, then, is no longer whether physics and phenomenology should be united. As physics confronts its own conceptual foundations, the challenge is to bring into view the structures phenomenology has analyzed since its inception—and to explore how they can illuminate the meaning of objectivity in modern theory.

Eminently worth reading in full.

Physics cannot escape its roots in phenomenology: “Consciousness is the hidden architecture behind fundamental and quantum physics” (or archived version here) from @haraldwiltsche.bsky.social in @iai.tv.

Bonus question: if Wiltsche is right that consciousness is essential to advancing our understanding of reality, and consciousness is something that other things, living and “inanimate,” (do or can) possess, what does that mean for our quest to understand realit(ies)?… Or does a question like this simply (albeit implicitly) affirm anthropocentrism? How will we know?

See also: “A physicist is just an atom’s way of looking at itself“

* Edmund Husserl

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As we contemplate consciousness, we might note that it was on this date in 1977, at the High Wyncombe Town Hall in England, that the Bunch of Stiffs tour kicked off. It featured Nick Lowe’s Last Chicken in the Shop, Elvis Costello and The Attractions, Ian Dury and the Blockheads, Wreckless Eric and The New Rockets, and Larry Wallis’ Psychedelic Rowdies– acts managed by Dave Robinson and Jake Riviera before they formed the Stiff Records label, which released a live album of the festivities in February of 1978.

Concert poster for 'Bunch of Stiffs' featuring Elvis Costello and Nick Lowe, at Town Hall, High Wycombe on Monday, October 3rd. Ticket price £1.30.

source