Posts Tagged ‘alchemy’
“Unless you strip bodies of their corporeal nature and impart corporeal nature to incorporeal beings, nothing you expect will take place”*…

In 1965, Hubert Dreyfus wrote the first widely-considered critique of artificial intelligence, Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence, a report for RAND. He updated and expanded the work for broad publication in 1972 as What Computers Can’t Do (which was further updated and revised for two subsequent reissues) and a “sequel,” Mind Over Machine (in 1986). For a precis of Dreyfus’ views on AI, see here.
His invocation of alchemy resonates still, for example in the estimable Henry Farrell‘s consideration of Adam Becker‘s (great) recent book More Everything Forever…
Adam Becker’s “More Everything Forever” begins by describing the ideas of Eliezer Yudkowsky, an AI guru who Sam Altman thinks deserves a Nobel Prize. Yudkowsky’s ambitions for humanity include “[p]erfect health, immortality,” and a future in which “[i]f you imagine something that’s worse than mansions with robotic servants for everyone, you are not being ambitious enough.” According to Yudkowsky and his peers, a “glorious transhumanist future” awaits us if we get AI right, although we face extinction if we get it wrong.
“AI” and “transhumanist” are new terms for rather older ambitions. As the seedy occultist Dr. Trelawney remarks in Anthony Powell’s 1962 novel, “The Kindly Ones,” “[t]o be forever rich, forever young, never to die … Such was in every age the dream of the alchemist.” Renaissance alchemists won the support of monarchs like Rudolf II, the Holy Roman Emperor who squandered his realm’s money on a futile quest to discover the Philosopher’s Stone. Now, as Becker explains, AGI, or artificial general intelligence, has become the means through which philosophers might transubstantiate our mundane reality into a realm in which the apparently impossible becomes possible: living forever, raising the dead, and remaking the universe in the shape of humanity.
These ideas would be a curiosity, if they weren’t reshaping the world, and policymakers’ understanding of national security…
[Farrell explains, elaborating on the beliefs in play and explaining how they played in the Biden Administration (which, he argues, largely internalized them) and now in Trump’s…]
… The Biden administration’s policies rested on risky bets. AI may not be the universal solvent for vexing and complex technological problems promised by Altman, Amodei, and their peers. Some (including most members of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, as well as myself and colleagues) believe that current approaches will not lead to anything like self-improving AGI anytime soon. As DeepSeek’s success in building AI models suggests, semiconductors may not provide the chokehold on AI that American policymakers believed.
In any event, the Trump administration has seemingly opted for a different approach, replacing a grand plan for a global AI order with a loose approach based on the ever-shifting convergence between notions of American greatness and the particular interests of well-connected companies. This currently involves leveraging control of technology to maintain American domination, cutting deals with Gulf states, while trying to cut China out. When Trump toured the Gulf states with an entourage of tech CEOs, he offered access to top-end semiconductors in exchange for promises of massive investment, graciously accepting a jet plane, and a large-scale money transfer routed, with fees, through his family stablecoin.
This emerging blend of imperium, magical technology, and self-dealing too is reminiscent of the Renaissance. The English wizard John Dee, who claimed to have turned mercury into gold in the presence of Rudolf II, is also credited with coining the term “British Empire.” As a member of the court of Queen Elizabeth I, he combined alchemical experiment and indirect conversation with angels with more mundane plans to extend British power across the Atlantic and enrich himself.
The alchemists’ quest for immortality and universal transformation is again entangled with the struggle among empires. The dreams of perfect health, the conquest of death, and mansions with robot servants that Becker describes inspire visions of a radically transformed far future and a near present in which America can use advanced technologies to bolster its power. Such visions stem from an ideology of salvation that has indeed fueled important technological advances but may be quite wrong about where those advances will bring us.
We are being ushered into a world where AI models offer new and useful means to summarize the information of the world and draw nonobvious connections across it, but can also weave new syncretic religious beliefs together from the myriad human sources that they summarize. In the early 20th century, Weber argued that rationalized Calvinism had led to the defeat of the old gods and the inexorable disenchantment of a world dominated by bureaucracy and organized capitalism. In the early 21st, just the opposite is happening as AI draws open the gate for the return of the fantastical. Yudkowsky’s eschatology is just one of the prophetic visions attendant on AI. The practical changes that AI will bring to bureaucracy and markets will go hand in hand with religious ecstasy and fervor, as some people come to believe that they can speak to God through the machine, while others use it to elaborate their own extended fantasies about politics. As Becker’s book shows, technology is not just an abstract force changing the world, but a mirror in which human beings see their dreams and ambitions made manifest. We’re starting to discover what that looks like at scale.
Eminently worth reading full: “What AI debates have to do with alchemy,” from @himself.bsky.social.
Then consider this, from Nicklas Lundblad, a senior exec at Deep Mind, Google, Stripe, and elsewhere, recently turned public policy Fellow. In a piece adapted from a lecture in a series of talks on the philosophy of artificial intelligence that he gave at Mid-Sweden University), he puts Dreyfus’s thought into context, tracing the history of arguments with/against it over the years, as both technology and thinking about technology advanced. He concludes…
… So, we may say, what is Dreyfus answer?… That he is obsessed with showing that machines are incapable of being human?
In fact, his conclusion, already in 1965 – and then repeated in the 1972 book – is much more interesting. Here is how Dreyfus concludes his critique:
If the alchemist had stopped poring over his retorts and pentagrams and had spent his time looking for the deeper structure of the problem, as primitive man took his eyes of the moon, came out of the trees, and discovered fire and the wheel, things would have been set moving in a more promising direction. After all, three hundred years after the alchemists we did get gold from lead (and we have landed on the moon), but only after we abandoned work on the alchemic level, and worked to understand the chemical level and the even deeper nuclear level instead.
Dreyfus’ answer is not to get stuck in the question of what computers can’t do – but to reject even that last piece of thick ontology and ask if we are making a fundamental conceptual mistake. He suggests that we find what is to intelligence as chemistry is to alchemy and look for another set of concepts, another language, to describe what we are doing.
We would, in Dreyfus view, be much better of trying to build alien intelligence or replicate animal intelligence or even jettisoning the idea of intelligence entirely in favour of a new concept – perhaps something like cognicity – that removes the Difference from the research program.
Dreyfus recommendations would imply that we should drop the benchmarks that distract us and instead focus on simpler, thinner ontologies around tasks and interactions. What we need, he would suggest, is a conceptual shift into that simpler ontology – at least if we want to make real progress.
The shift into modern machine learning seems to prove that when the thicker ontology was abandoned we did discovered things obscured by the idea of man as a symbolic animal.
What if we abandon both the idea of man and machine?…
Also worthy of a full review: “Reading Dreyfus,” from @nicklaslundblad.
* Zosimos of Panopolis, an alchemist (and Gnostic mystic)
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As we think about transmutation, we might recall that it was on this date in 1954 (only 11 years before Dreyfus wrote Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence) that IBM introduced the “IBM 608,” the first calculating machine to use only solid-state transistors instead of vacuum tubes (thus needing only about 5% of the power to perform the same operations). The machine was housed in several large cabinets and could be purchased for $83,210 (or rented for $1,760 per month)… that’s just over $1,000,000 on an inflation-adjusted basis (or about $22,000 per month). It used more than 3,000 germanium transistors and could store 40 nine-digit numbers and perform 4,500 additions per second, among other operations.
“If you would be a real seeker after truth, it is necessary that at least once in your life you doubt, as far as possible, all things.”*…
René Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, was furiously condemned by his contemporaries. Why did they fear him? Sandrine Parageau explains…
The French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) is generally presented as one of the founders of modern Western philosophy and science, the man who made reason the principle of the search for truth, and who formulated the cogito, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ His assertion of mind-body dualism has given rise to a great number of objections over time, from those of 17th-century theologians to those of 20th-century feminists. In France, even though the decision of the 1792-95 National Convention to transfer Descartes’s remains to the Pantheon in Paris was not followed through, the philosopher is nonetheless regarded as ‘un grand homme’, a national hero, and being labelled ‘Cartesian’ is still today a compliment that emphasises one’s common sense, good judgment and methodical use of reason.
Yet Descartes was not always the undisputed champion of reason that he is today. In 17th-century England and the Netherlands, he was publicly and repeatedly accused of being a fraud and of lying to his readers so as to manipulate them into becoming his disciples. Of course, as one would expect, many intellectual and scientific objections were raised by his contemporaries against Descartes’s philosophy. But those ad hominem allegations were of a different nature altogether: they implied that the French philosopher resorted to well-crafted and dishonest strategies to make his readers ignorant, and therefore gullible, with the aim of making them submit to his control. Thus, according to those critics, the founder of modern science was, in truth, a purveyor of ignorance.
Such an accusation was made for example by the Protestant scholar and theologian Meric Casaubon (1599-1671 [a classicist and the first translators of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius into English]), a Geneva-born clergyman of the Church of England, in a long manuscript letter on ‘general learning’ written in 1668, in which he deplores what he perceives as the growing ignorance of his contemporaries. In this text, Casaubon accuses Descartes of deliberately encouraging his readers to make themselves ignorant by urging them to renounce their beliefs and forget all the knowledge that they have previously acquired: ‘a man must first strip himself of all that he has ever known, or believed.’
This accusation against the champion of rationalism may seem paradoxical at first, but it should not come as a complete surprise: if Descartes did not praise ignorance as such, and certainly not as an end in itself, he did encourage his readers to get rid of all their previous opinions, prejudices and false knowledge, as he himself had done after realising the uncertainty of the knowledge he had been taught as a child. Indeed, in the Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes relates how he initially loved philosophy, theology, poetry and mathematics, which he had been taught at the prestigious Collège Royal de La Flèche, before he became aware of the variety of opinions and the pervasiveness of error, which made him doubt all his knowledge and beliefs. In the Meditations (1641), a few years after the Discourse, Descartes further explains that, in the face of such doubt and uncertainty, he decided to get rid of all the opinions he had formed or acquired in order to rebuild science and knowledge on a firm basis. This experience of ‘radical’ or ‘hyperbolical’ doubt, as it has later been called, which results in the rejection of all knowledge, implying a form of self-induced ignorance, was unsurprisingly construed as an extreme stance by 17th-century commentators, and we may understand how it could be interpreted as a promotion of complete ignorance…
[Parageau unpacks Casaubon’s critique…]
… The 17th-century manipulation techniques here described by Casaubon are strikingly similar to what we now call ‘gaslighting’, a form of emotional and psychological abuse that leads the victim to question their own cognitive faculties and sometimes even their very sanity. As a matter of fact, the Dutch scholar and theologian Martin Schoock (1614-1669), Descartes’s contemporary, had, even more clearly than Casaubon and 25 years earlier, accused Descartes’s ‘new philosophy’ of leading to mental disorder, because choosing ignorance, according to Schoock in his Admirable Method (1643), amounts to deliberately putting off the light of reason in one’s mind: ‘A grown man who forgets everything is ignorant of everything, and where there is ignorance of everything, there is mental disorder.’ (My translation.)
As this passage makes clear, Schoock also thought that Descartes’s radical doubt could not but result in complete ignorance – Descartes’s philosophy was therefore a mere tool devised to spread ignorance. This call for radical doubt, as Schoock understood it, was based on the Cartesian idea that certain and evident truth can come only from within oneself. The French philosopher had allegedly ‘waged a war on books and reading’ and encouraged laziness, especially among young people, who were invited to spend all day lying down and ‘meditating’, in other words doing nothing. Descartes’s victims, Schoock adds, were primarily less-educated or naive people, who fell more readily for his deceptive arguments as they were dazzled by his reputation and influence. Indeed, the example of Descartes’s alleged use of ignorance also reveals the insidious domination of the intellectual elite over less-educated people. Thus, for Schoock as for Casaubon, the aim of Descartes’s so-called philosophy was to turn ignorant people into disciples and ensure their obedience.
If we are to believe Casaubon and Schoock, Descartes’s alleged manipulation was fairly successful, and a great number of people joined ‘the Cartesian sect’. So how come Descartes could so easily dupe his contemporaries? One answer might be that his deception did not rely on lying, but on the more strategic use and abuse of doubt. Doubt is indeed more subtle than crude lies, and therefore more efficient, provided the audience who is being manipulated is not entirely ignorant at first (otherwise, lies would work just as well), yet not educated or sagacious enough to be able to detect and expose the deception straight away. The efficiency of doubt as a strategy may also reside in its versatility. Doubt is indeed both an epistemic virtue, or the first step on the path to truth (the philosopher is always initially a doubter, someone who questions what they have been taught or what seems self-evident), and an epistemic vice, as it can lead to destabilisation and even dissolution of truth and knowledge altogether when it is excessive or misplaced…
… The condemnation of Descartes by Casaubon and Schoock should also be seen as the manifestation of a desperate effort to resist change in the intellectual context that led to the emergence of modern science. The conservative Casaubon feared and lamented the coming destruction of traditional knowledge, which he believed was brought forth by an undue insistence on method to the detriment of learning itself. One must admit that Cartesianism is indeed obsessed with method – Descartes’s famous Discourse is evidence enough. Moreover, Descartes’s call for the rejection by each individual of all their knowledge and opinions was not only interpreted as a means to get power over those who would make themselves ignorant, but also as the programmed extinction of established knowledge, which would give way to something new and therefore suspicious. Schoock shared those preoccupations but was probably even more worried about the psychological consequences of Descartes’s philosophy on his followers and the larger public if ever it managed to spread, which he seriously feared because the mere ‘novelty’ of this philosophy made it attractive to the ignorant multitude. Surprising as it may seem, Schoock’s fears about the sanity of Cartesians were not entirely unjustified. Indeed, if the allegation that Descartes deliberately produced ignorance to control people can be easily dismissed, the claim that his philosophy was likely to lead to madness is more convincing.
Most specialists of Descartes’s philosophy have ignored the affective experience described in the Discourse and the Meditations to focus instead on the order of reason in those texts. Radical doubt and the cogito have thus been interpreted as literary and rhetorical devices, or mere fables (the word is used by Descartes himself in the Discourse). They are generally seen as fictions or thought experiments, rather than as a cognitive process that Descartes actually experienced. If the autobiographical and emotional dimension of self-induced ignorance has been neglected so far, it might be because this aspect does not match the overarching interpretation of Cartesianism as the rule of reason. Descartes urged people to reject all their opinions and knowledge only as a temporary precondition to accessing truth, not as a permanent state. But still, he did encourage self-induced ignorance.
The epistemic anxiety that followed was described by Casaubon and Schoock, as mentioned above. But the origin of the search for truth is emotionally charged as well, as it is grounded in disillusionment and existential despair following the discovery that one was taught erroneous opinions as a child and was therefore deceived. This painful discovery gives rise to the need for purification through the rejection of one’s opinions and withdrawal from the world. The emotional impact of the search for truth is attested in Adrien Baillet’s late 17th-century biography of Descartes, which precisely describes Descartes’s physical and psychological distress.
As Tristan Dagron argues in his book Pensée et cliniques de l’identité (2019), or ‘Thoughts and Treatments of Identity’, the experience that Descartes relates in the First Meditation, where he describes the need for the purification of his mind, can be interpreted as a reappropriation of three dreams that he had in November 1619, which left him confused and mentally disturbed as he was confronted with radical doubt about the distinction between dreaming and waking. When he narrates those dreams, Baillet talks of Descartes’s violent agitations, exhaustion, despair and ‘enthusiasm’, some form of divine inspiration and madness (hence also Descartes’s association with religious sects by his opponents). Dagron shows that those dreams were a traumatic experience for Descartes, which is echoed in the First Meditation and its presentation of radical doubt.
The emotionally unsettling confrontation with radical doubt and madness should be acknowledged as the starting point of the search for truth in what is commonly hailed today as a radically rationalist, emotion-free system of thought – perhaps a consequence of Michel Foucault’s influential reading of the Meditations as a violent and successful attempt at muzzling madness, or a ‘coup de force’, in his book Madness and Civilization (1961). Thus, Casaubon and Schoock were right in arguing that radical doubt implied epistemic anxiety and madness, but madness is not rejected by Descartes – on the contrary, it is embraced and then healed, so to speak, by his philosophy. This might actually be the true reason why Descartes is indeed the founder of modern Western science and philosophy…
“The French Liar,” from @sparageau.bsky.social in @aeon.co.
* René Descartes
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As marshall our marbles, we might send magical birthday greetings to John Dee, the mathematician, astronomer, and geographer who was a consultant to Elizabeth I– and who was born on this date in 1527. Dee was a translator of Euclid, and a friend of both Gerardus Mercator and Tycho Brahe; he revolutionized navigation by applying geometry; and he coined the word “Brittannia” and the phrase “British Empire.” He had a tremendous impact on architecture and theater– and was the model for Shakespeare’s Prospero.
“So how come such a significant philosopher– one of very few in a country then considered an intellectual backwater– barely features in British history books? Because of his notorious links with magic” (observed BBC’s Discover). Dee was indeed involved (most heavily, toward the end of his life) in the Hermetic Arts: alchemy, astrology, divination, Hermetic philosophy and Rosicrucianism (the Protestant answer to the Jesuits, which Dee founded). Perhaps most (in)famously, Dee put a hex on the Spanish Armada, a spell widely credited at the time for the misfortunes that befell the Iberian fleet (which readers may recall).
In a way that presaged Isaac Newton, Dee’s work spanned the world’s of science and magic at just the point that those world’s began to separate.

“Good night, sleep tight, don’t let the bedbugs bite”*…
As Rodrigo Pérez Ortega reports, that admonition has a very long history…
Long before rats roamed sewers and cockroaches lurked in kitchen corners, another unwelcome guest plagued early civilizations. A new genomic study published today in Biology Letters suggests that bedbugs—the blood-feeding insects that haunt our hotel stays—were the first urban pests, proving an itchy menace for tens of thousands of years.
“This is really amazing,” says Klaus Reinhardt, an evolutionary biologist at the Dresden University of Technology who was not involved in the new study. “I think the hypothesis is quite solid.” Still, other researchers quibble over whether bedbugs can indisputably claim that title.
Many species of bedbugs depend on us—and our blood—to survive, but long ago, their prey of choice was probably exclusively bats. Genetic evidence suggests that about 245,000 years ago, some bedbugs made the jump to early humans.
This split led to two genetically distinct bedbug lineages. One kept feeding on bats and today remains largely confined to caves and natural habitats in Europe and the Middle East. The other followed humans into modern dwellings. Exactly how that scenario played out remained a mystery, however. That’s why Warren Booth, an evolutionary biologist at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and his team set out to study the genome of the common bedbug (Cimex lectularius) in depth…
… [Their findings make] bedbugs strong contenders for the title of the world’s first true urban pest that relies solely on humans, the researchers claim. Unlike more recent urban interlopers that feast on our stored food and enjoy our cozy homes—like the German cockroach (Blattella germanica), which formed a close association with humans just 2000 years ago, or the black rat (Rattus rattus), whose commensal relationship began about 5000 years ago—bedbugs may have started parasitizing humans just as our ancestors started building permanent settlements…
… the new findings underscore how humans have shaped the evolution of urban insects. Compared with their bat-feeding cousins, human-feeding bedbugs are smaller, less hairy, and have larger limbs—adaptations likely suited to navigating smooth walls and synthetic bedding. Today’s bedbugs also carry many DNA mutations linked to insecticide resistance, a relatively recent trait that reflects the pressures of modern pest control. “They’re a remarkable yet horrible species,” Booth says.
Understanding how these pests evolved together with us could help improve strategies for controlling them, especially as cities continue to grow—and as bedbugs now feed on the poultry we raise. Further research could also help us understand how our own immune system evolved, since some people develop allergies for bedbug bites. As a start, Booth and his team are analyzing centuries-old bedbug specimens in museums, to track how the insects’ genomes—and populations—have evolved over the past century alongside us.
“There’s a pretty intimate association, whether we like it or not,” Booth says. “That’s not going away anytime soon.”…
“Bedbugs may be the first urban pest,” from @rpocisv.bsky.social in @science.org.
* common children’s rhyme
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As we contemplate the chronicle of a co-evolved curse, we might recall that it was on this date in 1789 that Richard Kirwan published his essay in support of the phlogiston theory (the belief, that dates to alchemical times, in the existence of a fire-like element (dubbed “phlogiston”) contained within combustible bodies and released during burning. Kirwan was among the last of its advocates.
A well-regarded scientist in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Kirwan met and corresponded with Black, Lavoisier, Priestley, and Cavendish. Indeed, while scientific history remembers him as a defender of an incorrect theory, his work probably spurred Priestley and Lavoisier, who respectively discovered and named the actual elemental agent of combustion, oxygen.
But Kirwan is also remembered for a personal eccentricity (one of many) relevant to this post: he hated bugs (especially flies). He paid his servant a bounty for each one they killed.
“Truth is ever to be found in the simplicity, and not in the multiplicity and confusion of things”*…
From Kim (Scott) Morrison‘s and Dror Bar-Natan‘s, The Knot Atlas, “a complete user-editable knot atlas, in the wiki spirit of Wikipedia“– a marvelous example of a wide-spread urge in mathematics to find order through classification. As Joseph Howlett explains, that quest continues, even as it proves vexatious…
Biology in the 18th century was all about taxonomy. The staggering diversity of life made it hard to draw conclusions about how it came to be. Scientists first had to put things in their proper order, grouping species according to shared characteristics — no easy task. Since then, they’ve used these grand catalogs to understand the differences among organisms and to infer their evolutionary histories. Chemists built the periodic table for the same purpose — to classify the elements and understand their behaviors. And physicists made the Standard Model to explain how the fundamental particles of the universe interact.
In his book The Order of Things, the philosopher Michel Foucault describes this preoccupation with sorting as a formative step for the sciences. “A knowledge of empirical individuals,” he wrote, “can be acquired only from the continuous, ordered and universal tabulation of all possible differences.”
Mathematicians never got past this obsession. That’s because the menagerie of mathematics makes the biological catalog look like a petting zoo. Its inhabitants aren’t limited by physical reality. Any conceivable possibility, whether it lives in our universe or in some hypothetical 200-dimensional one, needs to be accounted for. There are tons of different classifications to try — groups, knots, manifolds and so on — and infinitely many objects to sort in each of those classifications. Classification is how mathematicians come to know the strange, abstract world they’re studying, and how they prove major theorems about it.Take groups, a central object of study in math. The classification of “finite simple groups” — the building blocks of all groups — was one of the grandest mathematical accomplishments of the 20th century. It took dozens of mathematicians nearly 100 years to finish. In the end, they figured out that all finite simple groups fall into three buckets, except for 26 itemized outliers. A dedicated crew of mathematicians has been working on a “condensed” proof of the classification since 1994 — it currently comprises 10 volumes and several thousand pages, and still isn’t finished. But the gargantuan undertaking continues to bear fruit, recently helping to prove a decades-old conjecture that you can infer a lot about a group by examining one small part of it.
Mathematics, unfettered by the typical constraints of reality, is all about possibility. Classification gives mathematicians a way to start exploring that limitless potential…[Howlett reviews attempts to classify numbers by “type” (postive/negative, rational/irrational), and mathematical objects by “equivalency” (shapes that can be stretched or squeezed into the other without breaking or tearing, like a doughnut and and coffee cup (see here)…]
… Similarly, classification has played an important role in knot theory. Tie a knot in a piece of string, then glue the string’s ends together — that’s a mathematical knot. Knots are equivalent if one can be tangled or untangled, without cutting the string, to match the other. This mundane-sounding task has lots of mathematical uses. In 2023, five mathematicians made progress on a key conjecture in knot theory that stated that all knots with a certain property (being “slice”) must also have another (being “ribbon”), with the proof ruling out a suspected counterexample. (As an aside, I’ve often wondered why knot theorists insist on using nouns as adjectives.)
Classifications can also get more meta. Both theoretical computer scientists and mathematicians classify problems about classification based on how “hard” they are.
All these classifications turn math’s disarrayed infinitude into accessible order. It’s a first step toward reining in the deluge that pours forth from mathematical imaginings…
“The Never-Ending Struggle to Classify All Math,” from @quantamagazine.bsky.social.
* Isaac Newton
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As we sort, we might spare a thought for the author of our title quote, Sir Isaac Newton; he died in this date in 1727. A polymath, Newton excelled in– and advanced– mathematics, physics, and astronomy; he was a theologian and a government offical (Master of the Mint)… and a dedicated alchemist. He was key to the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment that followed.
Newton’s book Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy), first published in 1687, achieved the first great unification in physics and established classical mechanics (e.g., the Laws of Motion and the principle of universal gravitation). He also made seminal contributions to optics, and shares credit with German mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz for formulating infinitesimal calculus. Indeed, Newton contributed to and refined the scientific method to such an extent that his work is considered the most influential in the development of modern science.








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