Posts Tagged ‘climate change’
“You can have a healthy fossil-fuel balance sheet, or a relatively healthy planet”*…
The first two installments of what will be an on-going series from ProPublica and Drilled, covering fossil fuel companies in the 1990s who, even as they denied the reality of climate change, were quietly funding research that favored climate fixes that would protect their businesses…
An investigation by ProPublica and Drilled has found that fossil fuel companies have been funding climate research at prestigious U.S. universities for more than 30 years. Their support has helped amplify the work of scientists who promote the idea that we can stop the climate crisis without breaking our dependence on oil, gas, and coal.
The research produced by those schools in turn shaped global climate models, as well as the policy and technology solutions adopted by governments around the world.
Ultimately, it fostered a misperception that climate change could be solved without dramatically curtailing fossil fuels — a notion that has delayed emissions cuts by decades.
Corporate funders sponsored entire centers, paid the salaries of researchers, kept offices on campus and in some cases had veto power over projects.
Companies maintain they are supporting innovation and needed science. Universities say that with safeguards, sponsorship enhances research programs while preserving academic independence.
Still, the impact of funding constitutes a pattern that Benjamin Franta, an associate professor of climate litigation at University of Oxford, called the “colonization of academia.”…
“Why Carbon Capture Can’t Conceivably Solve Climate Change“- For decades, oil companies have funded universities’ research into climate change “solutions” that would not require the public to stop using oil and gas. Carbon capture is one of their favored ideas. One snag: It won’t fix the climate crisis. From Katie Worth and Lucas Waldron.
“How Oil Execs Shaped A Landmark Climate Study“- BP created an elite Princeton research center to address the climate problem without getting off fossil fuels. Its key work, a paper known as “Wedges,” shaped climate discourse for a generation. From Maddie Stone.
As the first piece concludes…
Climate experts know about the costs, technical troubles, and failures of CCS [Carbon Capture and Sequestration] test projects.
Yet many of them have continued to boost the technology, even as they have downplayed solutions showing greater progress.
For example, the same modelers who overestimated the potential of geological carbon storage repeatedly underestimated solar power — one of the energy technologies that would allow more oil to remain in the ground.
A distressing– but critically important– read. How the fossil fuel industry turned the plan to solve climate change into a plan to save itself: “Carbon Captured,” from @propublica.org and @drilledmedia.bsky.social.
And as a reminder that, while climate change is certainly reason enough, it’s by no means the only reason to care: “Five Americans die every hour from toxic vehicle emissions, study finds.”
* Bill McKibben
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As we face facts, we might give ourselves a short break on this, the anniversary of “Raspberry Beret,” by Prince & The Revolution, hitting #1 on the charts in 1985.
Here is the official video (now in 4K). Directed by his Purple Majesty himself, it features graphics and animation from Drew Takahashi, George Evelyn, and the crew at Colossal Pictures.
“Adaptation and mitigation are two sides of the same coin. If mitigation is about preventing the unmanageable, adaptation is about managing the unavoidable.”*…
Adapting to climate change is quickly becoming part of everyday life. Nabig Chaudhry outlines seven trends we’re seeing for 2026 and beyond…
Within the climate and scientific communities, there’s growing concern about how quickly the world is approaching (and may exceed) 2°C of warming. 2024 was the first calendar year in which global average temperature exceeded 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. The impacts of rapid warming are becoming harder to miss: The climate is changing quickly almost everywhere, local and global climate risks are growing, progress on mitigation has become more politically constrained and uncertain, and many of our systems and policies aren’t prepared for the conditions ahead.
Growing climate risk is increasing the demand for new technologies, tools, strategies, and ways of thinking about climate adaptation. Since publishing our Insights on Climate Adaptation in 2025 report, the practice of climate adaptation has continued to develop, as more people, communities, organizations, and institutions work to understand and respond to climate risks.
People use different language to describe climate adaptation (including climate resilience), but the work centers on helping people, communities, and organizations manage the risks of a changing climate. Those activities are expanding, and we can already see signs. For example, new funding and investment vehicles are emerging, such as Tailwind Futures, and adaptation is receiving more dedicated space at major climate convenings, including The Adaptation Forum, a co-hosted gathering of thought leaders in the adaptation space during Climate Week NYC 2025.
In my role as Director of Climate Adaptation Research at Probable Futures and through my PhD program at the University of California, Berkeley, I speak with experts, read emerging research, and study adaptation developments every day. Through these conversations and insights, I’ve reflected on which adaptation trends are likely to emerge and strengthen…
Chaudhry npacks seven different trends; here, let me highlight two. The first is one that (Roughly) Daily has visited before, insurance…
Elevating insurance as a force in adaptation planning, policy, and behavior
Insurance is a valuable adaptation tool, as it can transfer risk, support recovery after climate shocks, and help signal where danger is increasing through premiums, deductibles, coverage limits, or insurer retreat. It can also shape incentives, because the way risk is priced can influence whether and how people and institutions reduce exposure, strengthen buildings, or avoid certain kinds of development.
As climate risks grow, damage to property and homes becomes more frequent and severe. Property owners are experiencing those shocks both physically (flooding, fire, wind damage, etc.) and financially as insurance markets adjust and recalibrate in response to changing probabilities and severities. Insurance markets have begun reflecting climate risk, and those changes are starting to influence where and how people build homes and infrastructure, where they invest in property, and where they choose to live.
A useful example of how insurance is beginning to influence adaptation efforts in the public sphere is Strengthen Alabama Homes, a program of the Alabama Department of Insurance. The program provides grants to help homeowners retrofit their homes and roofs to reduce wind damage from extreme winds and storms. Homeowners who participate can receive discounts on the wind portion of their homeowner’s insurance premium, which makes insurance not only a tool for recovery but also a tool for encouraging adaptation before exposure occurs.
Insurance pricing is one way climate risk is made visible, priced, and acted on through adaptation. I expect that insurance will increasingly influence adaptation planning, policy, and behavior, not only by helping people recover after climate shocks, but by shaping the choices people make before those shocks occur. The development of the insurance industry will therefore be an important factor in adaptation. If insurers become a source not only of risk pricing but also of risk information, adaptation guidance, and incentives to reduce risk, they could help more people act before losses occur. But that would require a meaningful shift in the role of insurance companies, from mainly pricing and transferring risk to also helping people reduce it…
The second goes to the contentious topic of geoengineering…
Expanding debate around the role of climate intervention
As warming continues, risks keep growing. We have more, clearer, worrisome signals that irreversible change, tipping points, and local climate changes so severe that adaptation is impractical if not impossible, are not far off. In response, people and institutions are starting new conversations about global-scale responses. One of those responses is climate intervention, sometimes called geoengineering.
Climate intervention generally refers to intentional efforts to alter Earth’s systems in order to counteract some of the effects of climate change. It can include approaches that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, as well as approaches that reflect a portion of sunlight back into space, such as stratospheric aerosol injection.
Its relationship to adaptation is uneasy, but important. If climate intervention is, at its core, an effort to manage the otherwise unmanageable risks of global climate change, then is it another tool for adapting to climate change, or is it something fundamentally different? There is no consensus, and there may never be, not least because global action will cause uneven responses locally. We don’t know much about the potential impacts of some climate interventions, how they could affect different regions unequally, or what long-term consequences they may have for Earth’s climate and natural systems.
There are good reasons to have informed conversations and do fundamental research on intervention. People with adaptation expertise can help explore, illuminate, and explain what climate intervention could mean for society and nature. There are also likely to be benefits for adaptation professionals to participate in these conversations and research projects. Even if climate intervention is never widely deployed, the debate itself may shape adaptation thinking, climate policy, research funding, public trust, and international governance.
Climate change requires people to consider risks and options, whether for mitigation, adaptation, or intervention. Treating strategies for managing the rate, pace, and impacts of climate change as distinct and separate is unlikely to lead to good outcomes. I am hopeful that there will be more collaboration across these new fields as society faces new challenges that have a common root cause. This may include more discussion about how these technologies should be governed, whether they should receive more investment, and whether climate intervention is a possible third leg alongside mitigation and adaptation…
Eminently worth reading in full: “The near-term future of climate adaptation: emerging trends.”
* U. N. Environmental Program
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As we prepare, we might recall (wistfully) that it was on this date in 1942 that Bing Crosby, with the Trotter Orchestra and the Darby Singers, recorded Irving Berlin’s song, “White Christmas.” According to the Guinness Book of World Records, this version is the best-selling single of all time with an excess of 50 million copies sold worldwide. (In fact, the version most often heard today is not the original. After frequent use, the master had become damaged, so on March 18, 1947, Crosby re-recorded the holiday hit.)
“It is by the deep, hidden currents that the oceans are made one”*…
A significant part of the earth’s climate infrastructure is under threat. New research suggests the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (or AMOC) could weaken by half this century with wide ranging consequences for weather, food, and sea levels across the world. Alison Smart and Charlotte Venner unpack the past and ponder the future of this critical ocean current…
London, England, and Quebec City, Canada sit at roughly the same latitude (51°N and 47°N, respectively) but have vastly different climates. Historically, Quebec City had 99 freezing days in an average year—weather you might expect from its relative proximity to the Arctic—but London only experienced three freezing days in an average year, despite being slightly further north. This difference is largely due to an ocean current called the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), which distributes warmth from the Tropics via the Atlantic Ocean.
Now, impacts from climate change are weakening the AMOC, and it could collapse entirely in the near future. AMOC collapse would rapidly make regions of the Northern Hemisphere with historically mild weather colder and harsher, while triggering irreversible changes in the global climate.
The AMOC is both the product of a stable climate and a factor in maintaining weather patterns around the planet. To plan for future scenarios, we need to first understand how the AMOC works and what might happen if it collapses…
[Smart and Venner explain the AMOC and outline the ways in which it shapes the climate of regions around the world…]
… Even minor weakening of the AMOC can significantly impact local climates, as has happened several times in the past 12,000 years. A “Little Ice Age” occurred in Europe in the Middle Ages, likely connected to a disruption in the AMOC. Just a slight slowdown in the AMOC could make Europe colder overall, disrupt global precipitation patterns from South America to India, and worsen drought in Africa.
The more freshwater pours into the ocean, and the more ocean temperatures rise, the weaker the AMOC becomes—until, at some threshold, it could stop moving altogether.
It is possible that the AMOC will collapse entirely if warming continues. There is no agreed-upon global average temperature at which collapse becomes certain, but there are signals we can track and historical examples we can examine to predict the likelihood of collapse…
… The consequences of total AMOC collapse would be far-reaching, severe, and irreversible on timescales relevant to humans. AMOC collapse would cool parts of the Northern Hemisphere and warm parts of the Southern Hemisphere by multiple degrees Celsius and drastically alter weather around the world.
In Europe, winter temperatures would drop, cold snaps could increase, and winter storms would intensify. A 2025 research letter found that, even if global warming reached 2°C, AMOC collapse would make Europe colder than it is today, creating extreme winters in Northwestern Europe in which record cold might reach -20°C (-4°F) in London and -50°C (-58°F) in Scandinavia. Even milder cold days would increase, with approximately 150 to 180 frost days per year in Utrecht, Netherlands, compared to a historic average of about 53. Precipitation would likely shift and decrease, potentially drying out some parts of Europe and making others wetter.
Around the world, other climates would change, likely in less extreme ways.
- North America. The East Coast of North America would likely experience rapid sea level rise as the gravitational pull of the AMOC weakens, as well as cooler conditions, with some parts of Eastern Canada and the North Atlantic coast cooling by several degrees Celsius, erratic storms, weather variability, and more intense hurricanes.
- Tropics & South America. Without the AMOC, the ITCZ would shift south, potentially leading to drying in the Northern Tropics and parts of the Amazon and wetter conditions in the Southern Tropics.
- Africa. Because of the shift in the ITCZ, West Africa and the Sahel would be much drier, experiencing severe and frequent drought and reduced rainy seasons. The Sahel could possibly transition from a semi-arid climate to hot dry desert.
- Asia. Because of the shift in the ITCZ, weakened and more erratic monsoons in Asia would lead to increased drought and a higher risk of extreme precipitation events.
These changes may occur rapidly, create climate risks, and cause systemic disruption in affected regions. The collapse of the AMOC would also be a tipping point in the global climate, meaning that the changes would likely be difficult, if not impossible, to reverse on human timescales.
Once the AMOC passes a critical threshold of weakening, called a tipping point, it would continue to weaken until it collapses. AMOC collapse could also create systemic impacts that activate other tipping points as well as feedback loops that could generate further warming.
For example, if AMOC collapse contributed to changes like a permanent dieback of the Amazon Rainforest or increased ice loss, those changes would generate their own warming effect on Earth’s climate. A 2026 paper suggests that AMOC collapse would result in substantial carbon release from oceans and add around 0.2°C in additional atmospheric warming.
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions may slow warming enough to reduce weakening and delay collapse. If collapse begins, it is unlikely we could stop it. There is no feasible technological way to reengineer ocean currents…
A bracing, but important read: “A complete guide to the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC).”
See also: “What would happen if the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) collapses? How likely is it?”
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As we put on our sailin’ shoes, we might send interconnected birthday greetings to Andrew Sharrett; he was born on this date in 1946. An archaeologist, his application of world-systems theory to questions of change on large, often global, scale made him one of the most influential archaeologists of the late 20th/early 21st centuries. Sharrett is best known for his theory of the secondary products revolution; but his work touched on a broad range of fundamental human developmental issues: global migration and colonization, the spread of agriculture, the development of metallurgy and urbanism, and the development of new forms of consumption, to name a few. All of those dynamics were, as Sharrett observed, shaped in significant ways by the climatic conditions in which they unfolded.
“Did you have any orange juice today?”*…
… if so, it’s less and less likely that it was from Florida.
The canonical articles on the Florida orange juice industry are John McPhee’s two-parter from The New Yorker from the 1960s. But that was then.
Alex Sammon has picked up the baton, with an article on the brutal, unrelenting decline of that business…
Quiet fell over the room, which was neither full nor very loud to begin with, and the 2026 Florida Citrus Show began.
“It should be a great day,” began the event’s first speaker. “Rain should hold off today, even though we definitely need more rain.” No one laughed.
There was no need to say that things were bad. Everyone knew it. The mood wasn’t sour—citrus farmers could handle sour. It was something else. Postapocalyptic. Florida is in the midst of its worst drought in 25 years, but the dry spell actually ranked far down on the list of challenges these bedraggled growers were facing.
In 2003, the mighty Florida orange industry produced 242 million boxes of fruit, with 90 pounds of oranges per box, most of which went on to become orange juice. Now, not even 25 years later, the United States Department of Agriculture was forecasting a pitiful 12 million boxes of oranges, the least in more than 100 years, the worst year since last. A decline of more than 95 percent.
And everyone knew, more or less, that even that figure was not happening. “Twelve million? I would doubt it,” Matt Joyner, CEO of Florida Citrus Mutual, the state’s largest trade group, told me. There was chatter that even 11 million might be out of reach. Could the total end up being less than that, just seven figures? In Florida, the citrus capital of the world, you are today more likely to see the oranges printed on the state’s 18 million license plates than a box of actual fruit.
Rick Dantzler, chief operating officer of the Citrus Research and Development Foundation, took the podium. He was blunt. “It’s been a dumpster fire of a year,” he said.
On the list of immediate problems: the implementation of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs, then the government shutdown, then a stunning, historic freeze, days long, at the end of January and early February, that besieged the fragile orange trees.
And yet those, too, were just footnotes to the even larger problem. Already, Florida had lost about three-quarters of its citrus growers. The last of them, these spent survivors, these hangers-on, had trudged to the Citrus Show to talk about the real problem, which was the disease.
In 2005, Florida first got signs of a new affliction in its groves called citrus greening disease. It also has a Chinese name, Huanglongbing, or HLB, because it came from China, where oranges also came from in the first place.
Citrus greening disease is caused by a bacterial infection that is delivered by the gnawing of the Asian citrus psyllid. (It’s now believed the psyllid first turned up near the Port of Miami in 1998.) The flea-sized psyllid bites the leaves and transmits the disease, which slowly chokes out the tree’s vascular system from the inside, taking years to finally show itself. By the time a tree is displaying symptoms—three to five years, in most cases—it’s too late…
Read on for an explanation of how this catastrophe has materialized and for a consideration of what it means for Central Florida (and the other major supplier, Brazil, which is also suffering).
“Who Killed the Florida Orange?” from @alexsammon.bsky.social in @slate.com.
Other comestible news from Florida: “A deadly bacteria is creeping up the Atlantic Coast. How worried should you be?“
* Harold Brodkey, First Love and Other Sorrows: Stories
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As we contemplate the consequences of climate change and contagion, we might consider an alternative to orange juice on this, National Raisin Day. But while raisins are richly nutricious, they are not so strong on Vitamin C, so we’ll have to keep looking…
“What is really amazing, and frustrating, is mankind’s habit of refusing to see the obvious and inevitable until it is there, and then muttering about unforeseen catastrophes”*…
One of the effectively-secret ingredients in the world’s economic growth over the last couple of centuries has been insurance. The ability to insure against catastrophic loss has underwritten (pun intended) the trillions and trillions of dollars of loans that have funded the construction and acquisition that has enabled the growth of both commercial endeavor and the the accumulation of personal wealth (directly through home ownership and indirectly through equity ownership in those commercial endeavors or participation in pension schemes that own that equity).
But in a way that was enitrely predictable, climate change is rendering a growing portion of the world uninsurable. Gavin Evans ponders what that might mean…
The Florida peninsula looks like a sore thumb. It juts into the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic, where the water is getting warmer year on year, prompting fiercer hurricanes that can blow down houses like collapsing decks of cards. Climate scientists are convinced all hell will break loose sooner or later when a monster-sized, property-destroying storm makes a direct hit on Miami or Tampa-St Petersburg. Given three near-misses in the recent past, the experts view such a calamity as inevitable. It’s a huge risk for anyone living there – they stand to lose everything – but also for those bearing the financial side of this risk, the insurance companies. Some in the industry are seeing this as a portent for their future – an impending existential threat with profound implications for the economic system.
There are no easy solutions for people still paying off mortgages and those who want to buy property along the Florida coast, because the potential payout on the back of a mammoth storm is so high that the reinsurers (who insure the insurers against catastrophe) are refusing to underwrite their clients and, with no reinsurance, there’s no insurance; and with no insurance, no mortgages; and with no mortgages, no property market. Insurance protects investments against loss and is therefore a pillar of the economic system. If it goes, economies are destabilised.
Many panicked homeowners have rushed to make their houses less risky for insurance companies by reinforcing their roofs with hurricane clips, installing impact-resistant windows, doors and shutters, and strengthening their foundations. But it’s not just storms and higher, warmer seas that concern insurers. Rising temperatures mean that the frequency, range and ferocity of wildfires are also on the rise.
So far this year, 3,374 wildfires have burned an area of Florida totalling 231,172 acres (at the time of writing), and it is even worse in California where 7,855 blazes have killed at least 31 people, destroyed more than 17,000 houses and devoured 525,208 acres of land, at an estimated cost of more than $250 billion. Here, too, homeowners rushed to make their properties more palatable to cold-footed insurers – clearing their surroundings of anything flammable, covering yards with gravel, sheathing houses with fire-resistant stucco, and replacing wooden roofs with steel.
But, even for the most diligent, insurance companies have turned tail, dumping existing clients and abandoning fire-prone and storm-prone areas altogether. On the Californian fire front, 2024 was a turning point as several insurers ceased issuing new policies because of fire-associated risks, including the United States’ biggest property insurer, State Farm, which cancelled policies in parts of Los Angeles. It is all too easy to view this cynically, but it’s happening because property insurers have been reporting year-on-year losses from climate change-related payouts.
Insurance companies survive by making more money from covering risk than they lose from these risks, which is why they prefer clients less likely to claim (insofar as they can predict the risk involved) and require them to pay substantial excess to discourage claims. When payouts rise above the premium intake, insurance companies either hike up these premiums or withdraw. But when that risk is considered catastrophic, potentially affecting many thousands of clients, as with Floridian storms and Californian fires, it is the reinsurers who are the first to retreat because they will ultimately bear most of the cost.
Reinsurers aggregate payout patterns to establish the likelihood of having to make huge payouts from future natural catastrophes. They do this by gathering exposure data from existing insurers in a geographical area, and by examining catastrophe models (computer simulations that estimate potential losses from natural perils). When they put all this together with detailed analysis of conditions within the area, they come up with a figure for their total potential loss if a catastrophic event strikes.
This is why reinsurers focus so intensely on climate change. Take a glance at the websites of big ones like Swiss Re and Munich Re and you get a sense of how central this is to their calculations – a concern that has spread to property insurers who are starting to hire climate consultants. Even more than market volatility, climate is their biggest headache. ‘You won’t meet a single insurance or reinsurance CEO who doesn’t believe in climate change,’ the insurance investor and former Lombard Insurance CEO James Orford told me. ‘They see it in the numbers – a combination of more extreme, less predictable events, combined with big losses of sums insured. All the modelling suggests these are uninsurable risks.’…
[Evans recaps the history of insurance, starting in Genoa, in the mid-14th century, with the insuring of maritime expeditions; examines the current state of play; examines the efforts (and gauges the weaknesses) of state’s efforts to step up with coverage when insurers step away; then considers another role for states…]
If states do withdraw from insurance and reinsurance, some of the most lucrative areas of the US, Canada, Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia will be devastated: no mortgages and no banks, leading to more ghost towns and villages. ‘It ends with depopulation and abandonment,’ said Agarwala. ‘Climate change reduces the operating space for humanity.’ In the UK, rising sea levels and coastal erosion could literally reduce operating space, putting 200,000 British homes at risk by 2050. There’s no coastal-erosion insurance, which puts more burden on the state, mainly to pay for new defences, but also to help people move.
Governments can take action in other ways, by investing greater sums in risk-prevention and management. There are signs of this happening such as the ‘fire-hardening’ and storm-prevention efforts in Florida, and improved flood defences in the UK; meanwhile, the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility is being used in several countries to build and renovate operations centres to cope with wildfires, and to buy firefighting helicopters.
In future, it is likely that voters will demand that their state and national governments do far more, regardless of the cost. They will want tougher building codes, including limitations on building in risky areas; expensive fire-prevention and fire-fighting schemes; better flood and storm defences; improved early catastrophe management, involving relocating people from risky areas and, when disaster strikes, rapid life-saving interventions such as large-scale emergency evacuations. If the insurance industry is forced to retreat by the climate crisis, all of this infrastructural investment will require vast chunks of taxpayers’ money. It is hard to avoid the feeling that this is part of our destiny, and that the sore thumb of the Florida peninsula is pointing us to the future…
Whole regions of the world are now uninsurable, bringing radical uncertainty to the economy: “The insurance catastrophe,” from @aeon.co.
See also: “An Uninsurable Country” (a report form NRDC), “The Insurance Crisis Is So Desperate People Are Turning Socialist” (a gift article from Bloomberg), and “The Uninsurable Future: The Climate Threat to Property Insurance, and How to Stop It” (from Yale Law Review)
* Isaac Asimov
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As we cover up, we might send highly-charged birthday greetings to a man who made foundational contributions both to the detection of climatic conditions and to a technology that may help allieviate climate change: John Frederic Daniell was born on this date in 1790. Named the first professor of chemistry at the newly founded King’s College London in 1831, he was an avid meteorologist. He invented the dew-point hygrometer known by his name and a register pyrometer; in 1830 he erected a water-barometer in the hall of the Royal Society.
But Daniell is better remembered as a chemist (and physicist), especially for his invention of the Daniell cell, an element of an electric battery much better than voltaic cells, the standard before him. Indeed, the Daniell cell is the historical basis for the contemporary definition of the volt (the unit of electromotive force in the International System of Units). All advances in battery technology since then were “from” the base that Daniell laid.
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