Posts Tagged ‘economy’
“Let’s go to the numbers”*…
From the McKinsey Global Institute, the executive summary of their snapshot– a “balance sheet”– of the global economy…
• The global balance sheet takes stock of all assets, liabilities, and wealth, providing a lens into economic health. This annual update estimates that it reached nearly $1.8 quadrillion ($1,800 trillion) in 2025, up from $1.7 quadrillion in 2024. Several asset classes grew further out of balance with the underlying economy, raising the possibility of corrections through inflation, asset valuation losses, or, optimally, productivity growth.
• The balance sheet’s mounting detachment from the global economy was driven by the world’s two biggest economies in 2025. US equity values soared to 2.4 times corporate net assets as profits were double their share of GDP since 2000. China’s corporate debt grew to 80 percent of real assets, versus 50 percent globally. Government debt remains near all-time highs in the United States and has grown most rapidly in China.
• Globally, most corporate and household debt and real estate moved closer to 25-year averages relative to GDP. Inflation helped with this normalization, although values remain well above pre-2000 levels. The ratio of productive assets to GDP held steady amid flat investment.
• Global household wealth growth rose to a new high of $570 trillion, driven by “paper” gains. Only 20 percent came from real capital formation, while valuations of existing assets grew four percentage points faster than already-high consumer price inflation. In the United States and Canada, equity values drove wealth growth. China, France, and Germany saw a drop in paper wealth as real estate prices declined. In the United Kingdom and Japan, inflation pushed up asset values.
• Major economies were on different pathways entering 2026. The United States has been in a “productivity acceleration” scenario, but high public debt and equities add the possibility of “sustained inflation” or “balance sheet reset.” Europe has gravitated toward “secular stagnation” as sluggish demand depresses growth and interest rates. China has experienced a partial balance sheet reset amid declining property values, although government spending and corporate investment have continued to propel balance sheet growth.
In this report, we provide an update on the global balance sheet in 2025, exploring to what extent its recent expansion, and by extension wealth growth, has been “in balance.” The analysis finds that wealth was, to an even greater extent than previously, rooted in asset values rising faster than real economy investment and growth, creating record levels of global wealth “on paper.”
Although many economies that were studied experienced wealth and balance sheet swings, the global picture was largely driven by its two biggest: the United States and China. Higher US equity values and the accumulation of China’s public and private debt brought some near-term economic benefits but left their economies more vulnerable to potential corrections.
Businesses use both income statements and balance sheets to develop a complete picture of their financial health. Analysts of the global economy tend to focus on the former. Since 2021, MGI has developed a “global balance sheet” to fill this gap, representing a clearer view into the world economy’s wealth and health.
Our previous reports found that from the mid-1990s to the COVID-19 pandemic, household wealth expanded faster than gross domestic product. Asset prices for real estate, equities, and bonds grew, as did debt and deposits. This occurred amid declining (and eventually rock-bottom) interest rates, rapidly expanding US profits, and a property boom in China. Productivity did not keep pace across advanced economies, nor did real wealth formation through net new investment.
When the balance sheet outruns the underlying economy, weaknesses can be exposed. When real estate and equity values rise faster than GDP, capital may disproportionately go to asset repurchases, sometimes with a lot of leverage. This may push up valuations but leave the economy deprived of the type of investment that generates long-run growth. For households, wealth rises but merely on paper, with heightened risks of eventual corrections. Growing asset values also tend to exacerbate wealth inequality, as existing owners of wealth see large gains while entering asset markets becomes harder for others (for example, young households trying to buy a home).
Elevated balance sheets may correct in one of three ways. A productivity acceleration scenario involves higher income supporting high asset values and debt; this is the most preferred outcome. A sustained inflation scenario brings down the real values of assets and debt, recalibrating the balance sheet with higher nominal GDP. But it can erode inflation-adjusted wealth along with other undesirable side effects. A balance sheet reset scenario, entailing a drop in asset values, deleveraging, and defaults, would shrink the balance sheet in absolute terms, with severe wealth losses and, often, lengthy periods of lost economic growth. Or the balance sheet may just stay high, particularly under secular-stagnation-like conditions of low investment and interest rates, as seen in the United States and Europe in the 2010s. That’s seemingly good for wealth, but at the cost of low growth and rising leverage.
Historically, most balance sheet corrections have taken place through higher inflation. Indeed, the inflation coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States and Europe brought a correction in the balance sheet (and wealth) ratio to GDP. In China, a drop in property values drove a decline in wealth to GDP.
In 2025, global wealth reached a higher dollar value than ever before. But how “healthy” was this new growth? After postpandemic corrections, some balance sheet items have resumed expansion and reached new heights. This was particularly the case for US equity as AI fueled market optimism and corporate earnings continued to climb. Rising government debt relative to GDP remains a challenge in many economies amid higher interest rates. Stocks of currency and deposits remain high compared to longer-term historical norms. Altogether, this has culminated in even more wealth on paper than in the past several decades and raises the stakes for US corporate earnings to deliver.
Balance sheets, and macroeconomic factors like productivity and inflation, point to diverging trends across major economies. Recognizing the swing factors that can shift an economy to productivity acceleration is more urgent than ever: for the United States, corporate earnings and greater government saving (in other words, less borrowing); for Europe, greater investment; for China, higher domestic consumption.
Future global wealth and stability may depend on it…
[The report unpacks 0with lots of charts/data) the contents– the constituent elements– of the balance sheet, examines whether or not it is “in balance,” and considers whether the growth that it reflects has been “healthy.” (McKinsey worries that it has not been.) It concludes, addressing the executives who are McKinsey’s primary clients…]
… A balance sheet that is out of kilter with the economy—in other words, with high paper wealth fueled by debt and liquidity levels significantly above historical norms—can unwind via higher productivity, higher inflation, or asset price corrections. Balance sheets may also remain large, typically under secular-stagnation-like conditions, effectively kicking the can down the road for potential correction.
Each of these four scenarios shapes the long-term economic outlook. Only productivity acceleration delivers real economic growth justifying valuations, thus protecting wealth. The others sacrifice wealth, growth, or both. Sustained inflation reduces real values of wealth, secular stagnation sees low growth, and a balance sheet reset signals a loss of wealth and growth. Importantly for business leaders, two scenarios would likely mean structurally higher interest rates: Productivity acceleration would entail greater demand for capital amid higher business investment, while sustained inflation would likely involve central banks tightening policy rates and, ultimately, higher long-term yields.
All scenarios are possible for all major economies. However, they appear to be on different pathways, with different swing factors that could move them from one trajectory to another.
For executives, this means both preparing for an unusually broad array of economic pathways and carefully watching the swing factors, which rise above the noise of daily indicators (see sidebar “Business planning for all scenarios”). Leaders across sectors and industries could also explore ways to encourage the optimal outcome, the productivity acceleration scenario.
Major economies show significant divergence in trends across macro drivers of productivity, inflation, and interest rates, along with fundamental balance sheet components including real estate, equity, and debt.
The United States has seen a structural uptick in both productivity growth and interest rates relative to the prepandemic period. Productive investment, particularly driven by the tech sector, has recently grown. High equity values also signal market confidence, although they may pose some downside risks. Meanwhile, inflation remains above the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent target and government debt remains near all-time highs, adding further inflation risk.
The eurozone has experienced a return to secular-stagnation-like conditions, akin to the prepandemic period, amid flat productivity and higher saving. Europe’s balance sheets overall appear more in balance compared to the US balance sheet (with a few exceptions, such as Italy’s government debt). Productivity growth rates, however, are down across the region’s three largest economies (Germany, France, and Italy). Until recently, inflation was mostly trending toward the European Central Bank’s 2 percent target, although Europe is more exposed to energy price changes. Personal savings rates remain high amid a drop in aggregate demand and per capita household wealth has declined in PPP terms in Germany and France.3 Productive investment remains below prepandemic and global averages.
China continues to work through a partial balance sheet reset in the face of a continued decline in real estate, with questions about future growth drivers amid low household demand and a boom in corporate investment. Productivity growth has receded in recent years, although it remains above the rate in advanced economies. Inflation and, in tandem, nominal interest rates have dropped, and concerns have shifted to dealing with deflation risks. At a macro level, lower household property investment has been offset by higher corporate investment, especially among state-owned enterprises, and by government spending. This has coincided with a substantial rise in corporate and government debt, both reaching all-time highs.
While the United States is the only major economy showing signs of productivity acceleration, it is not guaranteed long term, and other economies have a potential path to it. Focusing on “swing factors” could help filter signal from noise in the daily flow of indicators, market fluctuations, and political headlines. These factors differ by economy.
In the United States, swing factors that could knock the economy out of productivity acceleration include the “fiscal tightrope” and corporate earnings.
- Government debt stands at about 120 percent of GDP. Combined with higher interest rates, this means more public spending will need to be directed toward debt repayment. Public spending could come under pressure, especially from bond investors, in the form of higher market interest rates. These translate into higher business costs of capital. If fiscal policy tightens too little, a public debt crisis or sustained inflation becomes more likely. Too much, and secular stagnation is a potential outcome. To bring budgets back into balance, greater fiscal saving (or lower borrowing) on the order of three percentage points of GDP would be needed.
- On the corporate-earnings side, an equity or wealth reset could be triggered by a large structural shift in the longer-term outlook—for example, from AI disappointment or large geopolitical disruption. Equities are at all-time highs, at 3.7 times GDP and 2.4 times net assets, and constitute nearly 40 percent of household wealth. A price correction could result in a sharp pullback in demand, ushering in an extended period of low growth. It is thus imperative that corporate earnings deliver on high expectations…
Eminently worth reading in full: “The global balance sheet 2026: Imbalance and divergence.”
See also: “World Economic Situation and Prospects 2026” from UNCTAD (the UN Trade and Development Organization), whose review of the global finacial situation resonates with McKinsey’s, but whose recommendations are targeted to global policy makers and development champions:
• Strengthen coordination across macroeconomic policies. Monetary policy alone cannot manage persistent price pressures. Better alignment between monetary, fiscal and industrial policies is essential to stabilise inflation, support investment and protect vulnerable groups.
• Use fiscal policy strategically and credibly. Targeted and temporary measures can help protect households from high prices and support social cohesion, while credible medium-term fiscal plans and prudent debt management are essential to rebuild fiscal space.
• Scale up multilateral cooperation and development finance. Implementing commitments under the Sevilla Commitment, including debt reform and expanded concessional and climate finance, is vital to closing investment gaps and reducing systemic risks.
• Reinforce an open, rules-based trading system. Strengthening transparency, predictability and cooperation in global trade remains central to sustaining growth and limiting fragmentation in an increasingly uncertain global economy.
And for a differently-flavored kind of accounting: “What the Big Mac index reveals about a global currency beef.”
* Catchphrase often used by financial and sports journalists to transition to statistics or financial data, e.g., on public radio’s wonderful Marketplace.
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As we ponder the political economy, we might recall (hoping that history doesn’t repeat itself) that on this date in 1929, while the U.S. economy was already showing signs of strain (agricultural strains and a sagging consumer market), the U.S., its businesses, and its financial markets were still in the “Roaring Twenties.” Roughly three months later (on October 24, 1929, “Black Thursday,” and October 29, 1929, “Black Tuesday”) America– and the world– suffered the Wall Street crash of 1929 and began the slide into the Great Depression.
By this date in 1932, stocks had lost roughly 90% of the value they had had three years earlier. GDP in the U.S. had fallen 30%; GDP around the world was down 15%. International trade fell by more than 50%, and unemployment in some countries rose as high as 33% (peaking in 1933 at 25% in the U.S.).
“Jobs in factories will come roaring back into our country”*…
When President Trump announced sweeping tariffs on “Liberation Day” last spring, the promise was that manufacturing– and the jobs it provides– would return to the U.S. Scott Lincicome (from the conservative Cato Institute) assesses the “progress” to date…
US manufacturing ended 2025 with a thud, capping a rough year for the sector. To recap, manufacturers shed 63,000 jobs, according to the latest data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It wasn’t just labor that was hurting. The Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing index clocked in at 47.9 for December, marking the 10th consecutive month of contraction as new orders were especially weak and costs at historically elevated levels.
Then there’s the Federal Reserve’s Beige Book of regional economic conditions and surveys from the regional Fed banks, which have repeatedly documented cases of manufacturers delaying hiring and investment amid weak market conditions, rising costs, shrinking profit margins and persistent uncertainty. As for the “hard” data, manufacturing capacity and output, while incomplete, sagged through the Fall.
Overall, the evidence reveals a sector that’s stagnant at best, and a long way from the manufacturing renaissance President Donald Trump promised when he took office for a second time a year ago. No wonder administration officials have pivoted from predicting a factory boom in 2025 to now saying it will happen in 2026 and beyond.
Better tax, regulatory, and monetary policy should indeed provide a tailwind for manufacturing, but the sector will probably continue to struggle. If so, Trump’s tariffs will be a big reason why…
[Lincicome unpacks the several ways that Trump’s tariffs have confounded domestic manufacturing: increased costs (especially on materials/compnents not available in the U.S.) and tariff and policy/regulations that might be politely called “inconsistent” (or less politely, “flighty”); last year, the US tariff code was amended 50 times)– which has added management/coordination costs (Federal Reserve economists estimate that domestic manufacturers will pay $39 billion to $71 billion annually to comply with the new regime, representing time and money they can’t spend on their businesses); but perhaps even more damagingly, has created uncertainty that has slowed corporate action/investment. Lincicome concludes…]
… The harms to manufacturers are consistent with research on past tariff episodes and help to explain why the sector struggled in 2025 — and why things might not get much better this year. Recent forecasts also suggest caution, with manufacturers and supply chain professionals predicting continued headwinds due to the costs, uncertainty and complexity of tariffs. And the Supreme Court won’t save them. If it invalidates Trump’s “emergency” tariffs in the coming days, administration officials have promised to invoke alternate authorities to recreate them.
Global supply chains took years to develop. They’ll take even longer to reorganize and will do so at great cost if, that is, they don’t break altogether in the meantime…
“America’s Manufacturing Renaissance Is Missing in Action,” (gift article) by @scottlincicome.bsky.social in @opinion.bloomberg.com.
Relatedly, Trump’s immigration policy was (like the “manufacturing boom”) supposed to have reduced the federal deficit. The Administration is deporting immigrants at a brisk clip– but at an extraordinary cost, both economically and constitutionally. That’s not to mention the costs to the targeted immigrants themselves, to their familires and to the companies and economies of which they have been preponderantly positive and productive parts. Indeed, a different group at Cato recently published a thorough study demonstrating that– far from being a drag on the economy– immigrants have reduced federal (and state and local) deficits by $14.5 Trillion since 1994… though, of course that contribution is now, thanks to the ICE storm, slowing down.
The immigration crackdown was also supposed to turbo-charge job growth (for the U.S.-born); it has not. Indeed, the climate of fear and the difficulty in securing visas has led to a hiring boom abroad: “Silicon Valley can’t import talent like before. So it’s exporting jobs.”
It’s easy to see Trump’s election and the imposition of his economic and immigration policies as America’s Brexit. That abrupt rupture of social, cultural, and economic conventions is now about a decade old… and the results aren’t pretty…
Brexit, the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the European Union, is a rare contemporary example of a major developed economy raising trade barriers and more generally pulling back from international economic integration. When the Brexit referendum took place in 2016, academic and professional economists generally forecast that the policy about-face would result in a negative hit to the United Kingdom’s economy of about 4% of GDP over the long-term. Rather than a sudden, visible economic shock following the vote, the costs of Brexit have been gradual and cumulative. Now, almost a decade later, new research aims to assess Brexit’s actual impact on the United Kingdom’s economy, which involves the challenging task of comparing the country’s economic indicators to what they would have been if the United Kingdom had remained in the European Union. This research finds that, ten years on, the economic cost of Brexit has been larger than analysts predicted and that prolonged policy uncertainty contributed importantly to the magnitude of the impact… We estimate that by 2025, Brexit had reduced UK GDP by 6% to 8%, with the impact accumulating gradually over time… Understanding the ways in which Brexit resulted in a drag on economic growth for the United Kingdom provides potential lessons about the costs of abruptly pulling back from the global economy for other countries… – “The Economic Costs of Brexit on the UK” (where there is much more detail)
* Donald Trump
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As we interrogate empty promises (and lest we think that history doesn’t rhyme), we might recall that it was on this date in 1856 that the Know Nothing Party (dba, “the American Party” and “Native American Party”) convened in Philadelphia to nominate its first presidential candidate. A nativist (and largely anti-Catholic) group composed of anti-immigrant/Old Stock breakaways from the American Republican and Whig parties, the Know Nothings nominated Millard Fillmore.
The last member of the Whig Party to serve as President, Fillmore had been a Congressional Representative from New York who was elected to the Vice Presidency in 1848 on Zachary Taylor’s ticket. When Taylor died in 1850, Fillmore became the second V.P. to assume the presidency between elections.
Fillmore’s signature accomplishment was the passage of the Compromise of 1850 passed, a bargain that led to a brief truce in the battle over slavery– but was so ill-conceived (it contained the Fugitive Slave Act) and unpopular that Fillmore failed to get his own party’s nomination for President in the election of 1852, which he sat out. Unwilling to follow Lincoln into the new Republican Party, he got the nomination of the Know Nothings– though he was not a member of the party and hadn’t sought it; he was out of the country during the convention. Fillmore finished third in the 1856 election. By the 1860 election, the Know Nothings were no longer a serious national political movement.
“Financialization is neither finance-nor enterprise-driven”…
The estimable Brad DeLong has observed that Marx was right: “all that is solid melts into air”…
Since 1870, worldwide, on average, according to our flawed standard measures, every thirty years about 4/5 of the economy have improved in technology and productivity by roughly 25%, at a rate of roughly 0.8% per year. And 1/5 of the economy has quintupled in technology and productivity, at a rate of about 5.4% per year. That leaves average productivity, worldwide, roughly twice what it was a generation before. And it is a different, although overlapping, share of the economy that undergoes this massive leading-sector push every generation.
And so, since 1870, we have seen successive Steampower, Applied-Science, Mass Production, Globalized Value-Chain, and now Attention Info-Bio Tech modes, with these transformations occurring faster and more completely in today’s rich countries and slower and incompletely in today’s poor countries, but with life even in poor countries being substantially transformed vis-à-vis life 150 years ago…
… For most people, a generation sees (i) some change in their roles as producers in the organization and productivity of their jobs and the pieces of the societal division of labor that they do, some change in their roles as consumers and utilizers of most of the products of the human division of labor, but about one-fifth or so of their life as consumers and utilizers of the products of the human division of labor completely upended, largely in a good way. And then there are the 1/5 of people whose jobs and whose roles as producers were caught up in the Schumpeterian creative-destruction leading-sector technology tsunami, for whom little is the same as it was thirty years before. That change is to their substantial detriment if they tried to do the old thing in the old way: their real incomes then would be only 1/4 or so of what they would have expected. But that change would have been to their substantial benefit had they found a way to successfully surf the wave.
To summarize: Since 1770, the modern economy changes by puncture, not glide. Every thirty years these days, a sector explodes—lifting productivity, reorganizing firms, and scrambling career ladders. Roughly four-fifths inch forward, while one-fifth quintuples and redefines the frontier. Those leading sectors—steam, mass production, information—rebuild institutions and stress politics as they march. Most people experience partial gains in consumption and workflow; the unlucky fifth face brutal displacement unless they pivot fast. Past waves forged industry, mass production, suburbia, microelectronics; each remapped the social order, often painfully. Average living standards rise, but the distribution is jagged, and the politics volatile. Today’s leading edge runs through data centers and cognitive work: prompts, context engineering, evaluation, and synthesis. The liberal arts—long buffered—now sit at ground zero. Survival means translation: turn judgment, clarity, and taste into leverage over machines and markets, while rebuilding public capacity to manage the turbulence…
– “All That Is Solid Melts into Air”: Since 1870, Roughly One-Fifth of the Economy Is Transformed Every Thirty Years,” from @delong.social
And how’s that going? Two dispatches from the front, on separate but fundamentally-related phenomena emerging in our current “puncture.” First, Luke Goldstein on the way in which a great many major corporations — from airlines to social media platforms — now aspire to become unregulated banks. As he explains, “bankification” today accounts for the highest profit margins in the US economy, crippling productive capacity and setting the stage for the next crash…
The US economy is turning into one giant bank.
Starbucks holds nearly $2 billion of customers’ money in its rewards program. That’s more than the total deposits managed by 85 percent of chartered banks, making the coffee chain one of the biggest financial institutions in the country.
Conversely, Capital One, one of the world’s top banks, now operates its own cafes on city street corners.
Airlines are now little more than flying banks, given that they make more money from selling frequent-flyer points to credit card companies than they do flying passengers.
More Americans than ever are in debt to their nearby grocery store due to predatory “buy now, pay later” loans offered during checkout.
As you’re wheeled into an emergency medical procedure, the nurse may ask if you’d prefer to pay on a deferred-payment loan plan, an increasingly common way to finance health care expenses.
And if you can’t pay your rent on time, it could soon become common for your apartment building owner to lend you the money, putting you in debt to your landlord.
These are snapshots of the new wave of financialization sweeping across the country, where the lines between finance and commerce are being blurred.
Upward of 40 percent of Americans now pay for basic items like groceries and health care using borrowed money — and this excludes credit cards. A third of younger Americans hold their savings on nonbank tech platforms like Venmo, and industries from retail to transportation derive anywhere from 14 percent to half of their profits from partnerships with credit card companies.
While this new type of financialization takes many different forms, the endgame is the same: Most major corporations now aspire to become unregulated banks, opening up new avenues to make even more money hand over fist. Banks operating credit cards are the highest-profit-margin enterprises in the economy. Every company wants a share of the loot, amassed from high fees and low overhead costs.
This development has been supercharged by the Silicon Valley investor class, under the Orwellian term “embedded finance.” Others call it “bankification.”
The peddlers of embedded finance promise a world of “frictionless transactions,” providing consumers efficiency and convenience by integrating financial and nonfinancial services.
But these new profit streams come with a range of potential harms….
– “Everything Is Becoming a Bank” from @jacobinmagazin.bsky.social
Next, Ted Gioia on the rise of our gambling culture. He begins by recounting the grimy details of the recent gambling bust that rocked professional basketball (includsing the roles of ESPN and the NBA itself… though…)..
… It’s not just sports. Two weeks before the FBI arrests, the New York Stock Exchange invested $2 billion in the Polymarket betting operation. As Gordan Gekko says in the movie Wall Street: “It’s all about bucks, kid.”
Does the NYSE now count as the sixth family running gambling in New York?
No, it’s not that simple. There are lots of gambling businesses in New York, starting with the government. The NY State Lottery brings in more cash than all the Mafia families combined. So the NYSE is a johnny-come-lately to the gaming tables, like country rubes visiting the Statue of Liberty…
[Gioia unpacks the “ideas”seven rules of casino design and management” of casino design expert Bill Friedman (“a former gambling addict who wrote a very influential (and expensive) book on casino design”]
… Of course, the real insidious process is happening online, where every big web platform is imitating a gambling casino. And they rake in gangsta profits bigger than any gangsta has ever made.
How bad is it? Consider this fact: Among the eight largest companies in the world, at least half of them promote addiction with screen interfaces that mimic slot machines…
– “Why Is Everything Turning into a Casino?” from @tedgioia.bsky.social
The last word, which applies to both pieces, from Gioia:
Of course, none of this demands your participation. You can leave the casino at any moment—or never enter in the first place. Even if gambling is addictive, most people refuse the bait.
That’s especially true right now. Las Vegas tourism has fallen dramatically. And when you interview consumers, they will tell you why—they are upset at the casinos. The gambling business has become too exploitative and manipulative.
So people just walk away.
The exact same thing is starting to happen with social media. And for the same reason—folks are fed up with the apps. Many stop using them, and brag about it to their friends. So the trend of walking away feeds on itself…
… Maybe businesses need to find a different role model than a casino. It’s not hard to think of a few examples.
So let me close with a wild idea.
Perhaps they can design web apps to serve people—instead of controlling, manipulating, and surveilling them. After all, many businesses once thrived with that simple formula. It’s not too late to return to that practice…
By way of understanding “casino design and management” techniques at work online, see also “Catalog of Dark Patterns, “a variety of dark pattern examples, sorted by category, to better understand deceptive [consumer experience] design practices,” from Dark Patterns.
And by way of context: “The Invisible Economic Crisis,” (Louis Hyman interviewed in TNR), “It Is Trump’s Casino Economy Now. You’ll Probably Lose,” from Kyla Scanlon. and Scanlon’s follow-up piece in her newsletter: “How Bible Sales and Chipotle Explain the Economy.”
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As we just say no, we might recall that it was on this date in 1834 that the first mention of the card game poker was published, a reference to an account by English actor Joseph Cowell, who reported that the game was played in New Orleans and on Mississippi River boats (as recounted in Jonathan H. Green‘s book, An Exposure of the Arts and Miseries of Gambling.
Poker itself originated in the late 18th century, and had probably spread throughout the Mississippi River region by 1800. It was played in a variety of forms, with 52 cards, and included both straight poker and stud. 20 card poker (the variety referenced by Cowell) was a variant for two players. (It is a common English practice to reduce the deck in card games when there are fewer players).
“Wheat feeds the West, rice sustains the East”
Tomas Pueyo on why this is so… and what that has meant for culture and history…
What’s your staple, bread or rice?
This is a momentous fact, for it might have determined politics, culture, and wealth.
How? Well, bread comes from wheat, and rice from… rice…
… Wheat and rice are not harvested in the same places. Rice and bread are the predominant food where rice and wheat are respectively the predominant crops. Here’s another way to look at the same data:
This, in turn, is determined mainly by this:
… But this doesn’t fully explain it since it also rains a lot in Ireland, for example, but nobody grows rice there. You need the heat found closer to the equator: Rice grows in hot, wet, flat, floodable areas, whereas wheat prefers cooler, drier, better drained areas.
Flooding rots wheat but can 3x the yields of rice. That makes wheat well adapted to hills, whereas rice can only survive on hills when they are terraced.
This sounds like just a fun fact, but it ain’t. Because rice generates twice as many calories per unit of area.
This means that rice nourishes families on half the land that wheat requires. Which means population density in rice areas can be twice as high as in wheat areas, or four times with double cropping. A hectare of land can feed 1.5 families with wheat and 6 with rice.
Yet rice paddies also require a lot of work—twice as much as wheat. And that work is almost year-round: preparing paddies, raising seedlings in nurseries, transplanting every single seedling by hand into flooded fields, managing water, pumping it, weeding, harvesting, and threshing—often followed by a second rice crop or a winter crop. These tasks peak during transplanting and harvest, creating critical seasons where a huge amount of work must be done in a short window of time.
Crucially, this labor cannot be delayed—if you miss the planting window or harvest late, the crop is ruined. As a result, rice farmers developed reciprocal labor exchange: neighbors help each other transplant and harvest in time. The timeliness pressure meant rice villages became tightly cooperative communities to ensure everyone’s fields were tended before it was too late.
Wheat farming historically had a more seasonal rhythm with periods of relative quiet. Wheat is typically sown in the fall or spring and then mainly just left to grow with the rain. Aside from episodic weeding or guarding the fields, there was less continuous labor until harvest time. Harvest itself was a crunch period requiring many hands with sickles—European villages would collaborate during harvest, and farmers might hire extra reapers.
These differences made these regions diverge across politics, culture, and economy…
Read on: “How Bread vs Rice Molded History,” from Pueyo’s Uncharted Territories.
* adage
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As we deliberate on our diets and their destinies, we might recall that it was on this date in 1887 that Chester A. Hodge of Beloit, Wisconsin received patent No. 367,398 for ‘spur rowel’ barbed wire (consisting of spur shaped wheels with 8 or 10 points mounted between 2 wires). It was one of many patents for barbed wire (e.g., here), which spread across the American West rapidly (thanks, in no small measure to the guy featured in the almanac entry here)– and (by protecting farmers from foraging open-range cattle) paved the way for the expansion of wheat (and other kinds of) farming.
“The sacred moon overhead / Has taken a new phase”*…
As Oliver Hawkins and Peggy Hollinger report, an analysis of commercial radio spectrum filings shows a growing number of players– government agencies, but increasingly private companies– bettting on the emergence of a lunar economy…
Private companies are staking claims to radio spectrum on the Moon with the aim of exploiting an emerging lunar economy, Financial Times research has found.
More than 50 applications have been filed with the International Telecommunication Union since 2010 to use spectrum, the invisible highway of electromagnetic waves that enable all wireless technology, on or from the Moon.
Last year the number of commercial filings to the global co-ordinating body for lunar spectrum outstripped those from space agencies and governments for the first time, according to FT research. The filings cover satellite systems as well as missions to land on the lunar surface.
“We will look back and see this as an important inflection point,” said Katherine Gizinski, chief executive of spectrum consultancy River Advisers, which has filed for lunar spectrum for three satellite systems on behalf of other companies since 2021.
Although total registrations were lower in 2024 than the previous year, the increased proportion of commercial filings reflects a race to build the infrastructure that will enable the “cislunar economy”, the area between the Earth and Moon…
More on the players and the game: “The race to claim the Moon’s airwaves” (gift article), from @financialtimes.com. See also:
* William Butler Yeats, “The Cat and the Moon”
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As we linger over the lunar, we might recall that it was on this date in 1971 that NASA accomplished the third lunar EVA: Commander Alan B. Shepard and Lunar Module pilot Edgar D. Mitchell became the fifth and sixth men to walk on the Moon (in the lunar highlands near the crater Fra Mauro) as part of the Apollo 14 mission.
During this four-hour “activity,” they deployed the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP)– scientific experiments that were left on the lunar surface and other scientific and sample collection apparatus. B efore lifting off on the next day, the astronauts went on another moonwalk almost to the rim of nearby Cone crater, collecting 42.9 kg of samples along the traverse. At the end of this 3.45 km walk, Shepard used a contingency sampler with a Wilson 6-iron connected to the end to hit two golf balls.
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