(Roughly) Daily

Posts Tagged ‘democracy

“The pure and simple truth is rarely pure and never simple”*…

An all-too-timely 2016 piece from philosophy professors Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse

So much Political commentary seems to proceed by means of debate rather than report. This is an understandable consequence of new technology which makes engagement easy. Our heightened exposure to debate is a good thing, too. Open debate is democracy’s lifeblood. Yet popular political disagreement has taken on an odd hue. Rather than presenting facts and professing a view, commentators present views concerning the views of their opponents. And often, it’s not only views about opponents’ views, many go straight to views about opponents. Despite heated disagreements over Big Questions like healthcare, stem-cell research, abortion, same-sex marriage, race relations and global warming, we find a surprising consensus about the nature of political disagreement itself: All agree that, with respect to any Big Question, there is but one intelligent position, and all other positions are not merely wrong, but ignorant, stupid, naïve. And as a consequence, those who cling to these views must be themselves either ignorant or wicked. Or both.

A minute in the Public Affairs section of any bookstore confirms this: Conservatives should talk to liberals “only if they must” because liberalism is a “mental disorder.” Liberals dismiss their Conservative opponents, since they are “lying liars” who use their “noise machine” to promote irrationality.

Both views betray a commitment to the Simple Truth Thesis, the claim that Big Questions always admit of a simple, obvious, and easily-stated solution. The Simple Truth Thesis encourages us to hold that a given truth is so simple and so obvious that only the ignorant, wicked, or benighted could possibly deny it. As our popular political commentary accepts the Simple Truth Thesis, there is a great deal of inflammatory rhetoric and righteous indignation, but in fact very little public debate over the issues that matter most. Consequently, the Big Questions over which we are divided remain unexamined, and our reasons for adopting our different answers are never brought to bear in public discussion.

This brings us back to our original observation – there seems to be so much debate. Yet what passes for public debate is in fact no debate at all. No surprise, really. Debate or discussion concerning a Big Question can be worthwhile only when there is more than one reasonable position regarding the question; and this is precisely what the Simple Truth Thesis denies.

It would be a wonderful world were the Simple Truth Thesis true. Our political task simply would be to empower those who know the simple truth, and rebuke the fools who do not. But the Simple Truth Thesis is not true. In fact, it’s a fairytale—soothing, but ultimately unfit for a serious mind. For any Big Question, there are several defensible positions; it is precisely this feature that makes them big. Of course, to say that a position is defensible is not to say that it’s true. To oppose the Simple Truth Thesis is not to embrace relativism (which is itself a version of the Simple Truth view), nor is it to give up on the idea that there is truth; it is rather to give up on the view that the truth is always simple.

This intellectual distance is difficult because we feel invested in our own Big Answers. But it’s a fantasy to think that the billions of people with whom we disagree have all simply failed to appreciate the facts. This fantasy is easily dissolved once we come to realize that those who reject our own Big Answers often give good reasons for their views and against ours. We might not find ourselves convinced by their reasons, of course, but we can no longer see them as ignorant or foolish.

The lesson to draw is that there is a difference between being stupid and being wrong; the most important truths are often the most difficult to discern, even by the most careful and sincere inquirers. This lesson dismantles the Simple Truth Thesis and leads us to acknowledge that although there may be but one correct answer to each Big Question, there are several defensible views concerning which of the going answers is, indeed, correct. So if the Big Questions matter to us, we should be most eager to hear the reasons of our opponents. We should pursue real disagreement, with real interlocutors, not the cooked-up arguments against caricatured opposition on offer from the political commentary industry.

Democracy is the proposition that a just, peaceful, and morally decent society is possible among equals who disagree over Big Questions. Democracy tries to enable such a society by maintaining the conditions under which citizens could reason together, and, despite ongoing disagreement, come to see each other as reasonable. Citizens who see each other in this way can agree to share in the task of collective self-government despite ongoing and even growing discord over Big Questions. The Simple Truth Thesis repudiates this ideal. Accordingly, as our politics become more argumentative, they become less concerned with actual argument. Yet if we lose our capacity to argue with each other—to confront openly each other’s reasons—we will lose our capacity to see each other as equal partners in self-government, and thus we will lose our democracy…

If only: “The Myth of Simple Truths,” in @3QD.

(Image above: source)

* Oscar Wilde

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As we dig Diogenes, we might send exciting birthday greetings to Otto Binder; he was born on this date in 1911. An author of science fiction and non-fiction books and stories, and comic books, he is best known as the co-creator of Supergirl and for his many scripts for Captain Marvel Adventures and other stories involving the entire superhero Marvel Family. He is credited with writing over 4,400 stories across a variety of publishers under his own name, as well as more than 160 stories under the pen-name Eando Binder.

Indeed, it was as Eando that he wrote “I, Robot” is a scifi short story , part of a series about a robot named Adam Link, that was published in the January 1939 issue of Amazing Stories. Very innovative for its time, “I, Robot” was one of the first robot stories to break away from Frankenstein clichés. It was reprised in two different comic series, and adapted into episodes of The Outer Limits.

Isaac Asimov— who is famous for his own I, Robot and the series of novels that followed from it, was heavily influenced by the Binder short story. In his introduction to the story in Isaac Asimov Presents the Great SF Stories (1979), Asimov wrote: “It certainly caught my attention. Two months after I read it, I began ‘Robbie’, about a sympathetic robot, and that was the start of my positronic robot series. Eleven years later, when nine of my robot stories were collected into a book, the publisher named the collection I, Robot over my objections. My book is now the more famous, but Otto’s story was there first.”

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Written by (Roughly) Daily

August 26, 2024 at 1:00 am

“A republic, if you can keep it”*…

Nathan Gardels on one of the deepest issues at play in the social and political sphere in the U.S and around the world…

It is a mark of just how deep the crisis of governance across Western democracies has become that conflict irresolvable through political competition is giving way to the reconsideration of founding constitutions and the institutions they invest with legitimacy.

At its heart, this crisis is about trust. As the political scientist Francis Fukuyama has argued, “Belief in the corruptibility of all institutions leads to the dead end of universal distrust. American democracy, all democracy, will not survive a lack of belief in the possibility of impartial institutions; instead partisan political combat will come to pervade every aspect of life.” And so it has.

The ongoing populist surge of recent years did not cause the crisis. It is a symptom of the decay of democratic institutions that, captured by the organized interests of an insider establishment, failed to address the dislocations of hyper-globalization, the disruptions of rapid technological change and the attendant creep of widening cultural cleavage. Too many were left behind and struggled while others prospered and played.

Adding danger to decay, the fevered partisans of populism are intent on throwing out the baby with the bathwater, assaulting the integrity of the very institutions which protect republics from themselves through checks and balances, or that are critical to the fair administration of complex societies. The rebellion against a moribund political class has become a revolt against governance itself and the infrastructure that goes with it.

Populists who fashion themselves as tribunes of the people have never met independent and impartial institutions they can happily abide. Believing they are the embodiment of majority will, any constraint on their power is portrayed as a contrivance by elites to keep the masses down.  When cemented with cultural resentment against those at the top who look down on the unsophisticated rabble living in the sticks and outside the fashionable status sphere, anti-elitist sentiment has enough truth value to stick.

We’ve seen versions of this over recent years where the previous governments in Poland and Brazil, as well as the present government in Israel, have sought to politicize the top courts and limit their independence from the powers that be. Hungary under Viktor Orbán, an outright proponent of illiberal democracy, has done the same, seeking further to stifle independent media, think tanks and civil society organizations for good measure.

In Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, the president-in-waiting elected by a landslide earlier this year, has pledged to continue pursuing President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador’s plan for popular election of that nation’s Supreme Court, thus making its slant coincide with the interests of the ruling party. Sheinbaum, like her predecessor, is also bent on disempowering the independent electoral commission that oversees the polls and certifies voting outcomes.

With the U.S. Supreme Court already dominated by ultra-conservative judges, partisans of Donald Trump have turned their attention to slashing the powers of what it calls “the administrative state” — those agencies with the discretionary authority under legislative mandate to regulate private sector activities in realms from environmental impact to food and drug safety to publicly traded securities to the monopolistic conduct of large companies. Most of these agencies have been in place since the early 20th century as the Progressive Era’s response to the vast inequality, child labor, unsanitary industry, crony corruption and robber barons of the unregulated Gilded Age.

The aim of modern-day populists is to both diminish and politicize the regulatory technocracy to fit their agenda. The famous Project 2025 plan prepared by the Heritage Foundation in anticipation of another Trump presidency has gone so far as to propose the abolition of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration — the key body monitoring climate change, which they don’t believe in. My colleague Nils Gilman aptly calls this endeavor “institutional vandalism.” [See here for a taste of Gilman’s sharp thinking on the more general issue at play.]

Though the Trump campaign has sought to distance itself from the details of Project 2025, which may scare sensible voters in the runup to the November election, few have any doubts that it provides the essential roadmap for action if Republicans come to power.

Following verdicts to overturn Roe vs. Wade on abortion, blunt the scope of regulatory agencies and codify presidential immunity, the realization of what a stacked Supreme Court means has prompted President Joe Biden to engage the battle over institutions head on.

As his last stand after bowing out of the presidential race, the president is embarking on a quixotic quest to undo the impact of recent rulings and seek a constitutional amendment to reform how the Supreme Court works. First, arguing that “no one is above the law,” he would repeal the presidential immunity recently granted and impose a “binding code of conduct” with strict ethics guidelines prohibiting political activity by justices and requiring transparent disclosure of gifts.

The core structural change of Biden’s proposal is to get rid of lifetime terms and limit them to 18 years, with staggered appointments every two years (when one of the terms expires) to avoid the enduring sway of justices chosen by one political regime and ideological persuasion. In short, a process which would perpetually unstack the highest court instead of invite and enable its stacking.

This is an uphill battle, for sure, since amending the constitution would entail a 2/3 vote of both houses of Congress and approval of ¾ of all state legislatures.

“Defend the institutions” is hardly a rallying cry that will stir the passions of the public in the same way as the instinctive appeal of demagogues who promise simple solutions to complex problems while blaming all misfortune on the world outside or perceived enemies within. But repairing and restoring the integrity of democracy’s infrastructure is the only path back to trust. That is a tall order in the short term.

Popular emotion is the Achilles heel of democracies. Institutions that temper emotion through the cool deliberation of disinterested reason are what make the system work to the benefit of all.

As Fukuyama rightly says, democracies can’t survive without at least a belief in the possibility of impartial platforms for the administration of justice and governance. That proposition will be tested as never before in the battle over institutions in the near years ahead…

A challenge to democracy’s infrastructure: “The Battle Over Institutions,” from @NoemaMag, with @FukuyamaFrancis and @nils_gilman.

* Benjamin Franklin’s response to Elizabeth Willing Powel‘s question in 1787: “Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?”

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As we rally around the rudiments, we might recall that it was on this date in 1935 that President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act, part of his New Deal program that created a government pension system for the retired.

By 1930, the United States was, along with Switzerland, the only modern industrial country without any national social security system. Amid the Great Depression, the physician Francis Townsend galvanized support behind a proposal to issue direct payments to older people. Responding to that movement, Roosevelt organized a committee led by Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins to develop a major social welfare program proposal. Roosevelt presented the plan in early 1935 and signed the Social Security Act into law on August 14, 1935. The Supreme Court upheld the act in two major cases decided in 1937.

The law established the Social Security program. The old-age program is funded by payroll taxes, and over the ensuing decades, it contributed to a dramatic decline in poverty among older people, and spending on Social Security became a significant part of the federal budget. The Social Security Act also established an unemployment insurance program [only a few states had poorly-funded programs at the time] administered by the states and the Aid to Dependent Children program, which provided aid to families headed by single mothers. The law was later amended by acts such as the Social Security Amendments of 1965, which established two major healthcare programs: Medicare and Medicaid.

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Roosevelt signs Social Security Bill (source)

“The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history”*…

… and of their present. Anne Applebaum explores the ways in which autocrats in China, Russia, and elsewhere are now making common cause with MAGA Republicans to discredit liberalism and freedom around the world…

… Even in a state where surveillance is almost total, the experience of tyranny and injustice can radicalize people. Anger at arbitrary power will always lead someone to start thinking about another system, a better way to run society. The strength of these demonstrations, and the broader anger they reflected, was enough to spook the Chinese Communist Party into lifting the quarantine and allowing the virus to spread. The deaths that resulted were preferable to public anger and protest.

Like the demonstrations against President Vladimir Putin in Russia that began in 2011, the 2014 street protests in Venezuela, and the 2019 Hong Kong protests, the 2022 protests in China help explain something else: why autocratic regimes have slowly turned their repressive mechanisms outward, into the democratic world. If people are naturally drawn to the image of human rights, to the language of democracy, to the dream of freedom, then those concepts have to be poisoned. That requires more than surveillance, more than close observation of the population, more than a political system that defends against liberal ideas. It also requires an offensive plan: a narrative that damages both the idea of democracy everywhere in the world and the tools to deliver it…

… the story of how Africans—as well as Latin Americans, Asians, and indeed many Europeans and Americans—have come to spout Russian propaganda about Ukraine is not primarily a story of European colonial history, Western policy, or the Cold War. Rather, it involves China’s systematic efforts to buy or influence both popular and elite audiences around the world; carefully curated Russian propaganda campaigns, some open, some clandestine, some amplified by the American and European far right; and other autocracies using their own networks to promote the same language…

…the convergence of what had been disparate authoritarian influence projects is still new. Russian information-laundering and Chinese propaganda have long had different goals. Chinese propagandists mostly stayed out of the democratic world’s politics, except to promote Chinese achievements, Chinese economic success, and Chinese narratives about Tibet or Hong Kong. Their efforts in Africa and Latin America tended to feature dull, unwatchable announcements of investments and state visits. Russian efforts were more aggressive—sometimes in conjunction with the far right or the far left in the democratic world—and aimed to distort debates and elections in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Still, they often seemed unfocused, as if computer hackers were throwing spaghetti at the wall, just to see which crazy story might stick. Venezuela and Iran were fringe players, not real sources of influence.

Slowly, though, these autocracies have come together, not around particular stories, but around a set of ideas, or rather in opposition to a set of ideas. Transparency, for example. And rule of law. And democracy. They have heard language about those ideas—which originate in the democratic world—coming from their own dissidents, and have concluded that they are dangerous to their regimes…

The origins and the operations of today’s all-too-successful authoritarian disinformation efforts: “The New Propaganda War” (gift article) from @anneapplebaum in @TheAtlantic. Eminently worth reading in full.

Apposite: “‘Everyone is absolutely terrified’: Inside a US ally’s secret war on its American critics,” @zackbeauchamp on India’s campaign to threaten and discredit critics of the Modi regime, in @voxdotcom. Plus: “India’s YouTubers take on Narendra Modi” (gift link to @TheEconomist).

* George Orwell

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As we analyze agitprop, we might recall that it was on this date in 1998 that Michael Fortier was sentenced to 12 years in prison and fined $200,000 for failing to warn authorities about the plot to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.

Carried out by right-wing (white supremacist- and militia-sympathizing) anti-government extremists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, the bombing (on April 19, 1995, at 9:02 AM) killed 168 people, injured 680, and destroyed more than one-third of the building, which had to be demolished. The blast destroyed or damaged 324 other buildings and caused an estimated $652 million worth of damage. It was the deadliest act of terrorism in U.S. history before the September 11 attacks in 2001, and still the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history.

McVeigh had shared his plans with Fortier (his Army roommate); Fortier had accompanied McVeigh on a scouting trip to the building in advance of the blast; and Fortier had failed to warn officials of the attack.

The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building two days after the bombing, viewed from across the adjacent parking lot (source)

“The good of man must be the end of the science of politics”*…

Long lines of people queuing outside the polling station in the black township of Soweto, in the southwest suburbs of Johannesburg, Wednesday, 27 April, 1994. The majority of South Africa’s 22 million voters were voting in the nation’s first all-race elections. (AP Photo/Denis Farrell)

Democracy is an easy ideal to embrace (at least for most). But the devil’s in the details. Mohamed Kheir Omer and Parselelo Kantai review the history of democracy in post-colonial Africa and wonder if it’s not time to revisit some of those “details”…

The first peaceful transfer of power in post-colonial Africa was in Somalia in 1967 when Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke defeated incumbent President Aden Abdullah Osman Daar. The second would only follow a quarter of a century later, when in November 1991 trade union leader, Frederick Chiluba defeated incumbent Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda in the country’s first multiparty election since 1972 when single party rule had been introduced.

For Africa’s Big Men, news of Kaunda’s defeat was yet another signal of what threatened to become Africa’s second Wind of Change after the one that had swept away colonial rule and brought them into power at the end of the 1950s. In the streets of the capitals, the people were in revolt. Dakar, Abidjan, Cotonou, Kinshasa, Yaounde, Nairobi, Harare and several others – all rocked by youth demanding the end of single-party rule and the return of pluralism. Having previously only worried about coups sanctioned and financed in Western metropolises, the dawning realisation that they now had to fear popular revolts – both in the street and at the ballot box – suggested, even to the least paranoid of them, that their former patrons were abandoning them.

[Those Cold War-era autocrats had been] agents of the neocolonial system that had guaranteed the expropriation of Africa’s resources since the moment of flag independence; for them, ‘democracy’ was the ultimate betrayal. Since it was their friends in Washington, London and Paris who had won the Cold War, why were they abandoning their faithful clients? Why was a new dispensation being organised without their participation?…

African governments were forced into accepting political liberalisation – that is, the re-introduction of opposition parties – as part of a set of conditions on balance of payments support, itself necessitated by the structural adjustment austerity programmes initiated in the mid-1980s following the debt crisis of circa 1982. With the Cold War over, a vernacular of “good governance”, “transparency” and “accountability” became the mediating language of relations between the rich OECD countries and their aid recipients in Africa. In many African countries, the adoption of multiparty democracy was mandated by Western creditors as a precondition for continued assistance.

Democracy, therefore, was more a creature of the market than of popular citizen aspirations. Western media commentators referred to the package of conditional aid as “market democracy”. In many cases across the continent, the original campaigners for pluralism found themselves side-lined in favour of a new set of actors with closer links to Western embassies and who espoused reformist visions in line with neoliberal orthodoxy. In time, it would dawn on even the more radical political actors that unless they toed the new line, they would lose their place on the donor gravy train…

[The authors review the history and offer some observations that point in the direction of moving from an inherited one-size-fits-all democracy towards a set of culturally-specific applications of the democratic principle…]

… Consider the Gada system, a traditional socio-political system practiced by the Oromo people in Ethiopia and parts of northern Kenya. It is a complex form of social organisation that governs the political, social, economic, and religious life of the community. This indigenous institution predates many modern forms of governance and democracy, showcasing elements of direct democracy, checks and balances, and the peaceful transition of power. Leaders are elected through a democratic process which includes term limits. It also includes a legislative assembly and mechanism for conflict resolution. It has been recognised by UNESCO as an Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.

A number of countries in Africa such as Rwanda, Senegal, Madagascar, Lesotho and Morocco employ a mixed electoral system, blending elements of proportional representation with majoritarian or plural systems, which highlight the diversity of electoral systems across Africa, with each country tailoring the mixed electoral model to its specific political, social, and historical context.

Somalia currently uses  the 4.5 model, based on a power-sharing model among the four major clans, while giving minority clans a half share to improve inclusivity. Some argue the move killed the possibility of a national identity. The system got corrupted, failed to reform and with foreign regional interference, is struggling to perform.  These mixed electoral systems offer a means to promote inclusivity and representation while striving for effective governance. However, the specific design and implementation of these systems can significantly impact their effectiveness and the extent to which they achieve these goals.

Other indigenous systems include the philosophy of Ubuntu (consensus building) in Southern Africa where its cultural and philosophical ethos indirectly influences the values foundational to democratic processes in societies where it’s integral to cultural heritage. Its emphasis on inclusivity, communal conflict resolution, collective participation, and ethical conduct shapes the spirit and objectives of governance and elections, impacting not the technical aspects of how votes are cast and counted, but the overarching principles guiding democratic engagement and policymaking.

These traditional models, which often involve direct democracy and community consensus, might offer valuable insights for creating more effective governance structures in Africa.

30 years since electoral democracy was re-introduced, a re-evaluation of election strategies is required – one that considers a mixed approach that incorporates local traditions with modern electoral processes. This approach may better serve the interests of the African populace, addressing the endemic issues of violence, corruption, and inefficacy plaguing the current system.

This would necessitate recognition and legitimation of both systems within African cultural, historical, and political contexts. Key to this approach is engaging a broad spectrum of stakeholders to ensure the model accurately reflects Africa’s diverse societies. Utilising traditional networks for voter education and mobilization can enhance participation and reduce costs. Forming electoral committees composed of both contemporary officials and traditional leaders will ensure the electoral process is transparent, fair, and locally relevant. Incorporating traditional elements into state ceremonies related to elections can also deepen the process’s legitimacy and cultural resonance. Promoting decentralization through local governance structures that combine traditional and elected authority is crucial. Continuous dialogue for model refinement and the necessity of legal and constitutional adjustments to support this hybrid model are essential for its success. Implementing this model demands careful planning, extensive consultation, and phased introduction, aligning it legally and functionally within each country’s governance framework…

Learning from our mistakes: “Africa’s democratic dividend,” from @africaarguments.

While there are lessons here we can apply to more “mature” democracies, we should remember that getting democracy “right,” in the various ways that might be accomplished, across Africa is the primary point. See, for example, “This Will Finish Us” (“How Gulf princes, the safari industry, and conservation groups are displacing the Maasai from the last of their Serengeti homeland”).

* Aristotle

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As we ponder political process, we might recall that it was on this date in 2012 that Puntland inaugurated its constitution, 14 years after declaring itself an autonomous region within the Somalia federation. The constitution established the Puntland Electoral Commission, which has been guiding the region’s gradual shift from a parliament-based vote system to multi-party elections.

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“As democracy is perfected, the office of president represents, more and more closely, the inner soul of the people. On some great and glorious day the plain folks of the land will reach their heart’s desire at last and the White House will be adorned by downright moron.”*…

This is a year, Niccolo Conte demonstrates, in which that possibility is especially present around the world…

With almost half of the world’s population residing in countries holding executive or legislative elections in 2024, it’s set to be the busiest election year ever recorded…

Many people are already aware of the U.S. presidential and legislative elections set to be held on November 5th, especially due to American influence on the global political stage and media coverage.

But two governments affecting larger populations, India and the European Union, are also slated to have elections in 2024…

A few notable elections have already occurred. Taiwan held general elections on January 13th, with the more anti-China Democratic Progressive Party retaining the presidency but losing its majority in the legislature.

[And in February, Indonesia held general elections; while the results are still being tabulated, early indications are that it could make for some material changes in the world’s third-largest democracy.]

Pakistan also held elections on February 8th, with former Prime Minster Imran Khan’s party and affiliates winning a plurality of seats but losing power to a military-backed coalition.

Pakistan’s election results were cast into doubt by foreign observers and media, with Khan having been arrested and sentenced to prison on corruption charges. It is far from the only country holding controversial and potentially undemocratic elections in 2024.

Bangladesh’s landslide January 7th elections were boycotted by the opposition and voters, and Russia’s March 15th elections had three anti-war presidential candidates barred from competing, including Alexei Navalny before his controversial death in February…

The biggest global election year on record: “Mapped: 2024 Global Elections by Country,” from @Niccoloc in @VisualCap.

* H. L. Mencken

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As we peruse the polls, we might recall that it was on this date that it was on this date in 12 BCE that Caesar Augustus (AKA Octavian), the first Roman Emperor, was elected Pontifex maximus (the chief high priest of the College of Pontiffs [Collegium Pontificum] in ancient Rome)– adding stature as head of Rome’s state religion to his imperial credentials.

Augustus as pontifex maximus (source)