Posts Tagged ‘finance’
“Neoliberalism: An ideology to absolve banks, landlords and monopolists from accusations of predatory behavior”*…
Neoliberalism has undoubtably contributed to remarkable economic growth, but it has also fostered inequality and “enshittification.” In any case, neoliberalism is, to put it politiely, showing strains. What’s next for the structure of the economy in the U.S. and the world? The estimable Branko Milanović…
Why did neoliberalism, in its domestic and international components, fail? I ask this question, in much more detail than I can do it in a short essay here, in my forthcoming The Great Global Transformation: National Market Liberalism in a Multipolar World. I am asking it for personal reasons too: some of my best friends are neoliberal. It was a generational project of Western baby-boomers which later got adopted by others, from Eastern Europe like myself, and Latin American and African elites. When nowadays I meet my aging baby-boomer friends, still displaying an almost undiminished zeal for neoliberalism, they seem like the ideological escapees from a world that has disappeared long time ago. They are not from Venus or Mars; they are from the Titanic.
When I say that neoliberalism was defeated I do not mean than it was intellectually defeated in the sense than there is an alternative ready-made project waiting in the wings to replace it. No: like communism, neoliberalism was defeated by reality. Real world simply refused to behave the way that liberals thought it should.
We need first to acknowledge that the project had many attractive sides. It was ideologically and generationally linked to the rebellious generation of the 1960s, so its pedigree was non-conformist. It promoted racial, gender and sexual equality. By its emphasis on globalization, it has to be credited by helping along the greatest reduction in global poverty ever and for helping many countries find the path to prosperity. Even its much-reviled Washington consensus—while some of its commandments were taken to an extreme length and other ignored—is fundamentally sound and has much to recommend itself. Not least that it provides an easily understandable shortcut to economic policy. It does not require more than an hour to explain it to the most economically ignorant person.
So, to go back to the original question, why did neoliberalism not remain the dominant ideology? I think there are three reasons: its universalism, hubris of its adherents (which always comes with universalism), and mendacity of its governments.
That neoliberalism is universal or cosmopolitan requires, I believe, little convincing. Liberal ideology treats, in principle, every individual and every nation the same. This is an asset: liberalism and neoliberalism can, again in principle, appeal to the most diverse groups, regardless of history, language or religion. But universalism is also its Achilles’ heel. The pretense that it applies to everybody soon comes into conflict with the realization that local conditions are often different. Trying to bend them to correspond to the tenets of neoliberalism fails. Local conditions (and especially so in social matters which are products of history and religion) are refractory to the beliefs founded under very different geographical and historical conditions. So in its encounter with the real world, neoliberalism retreats. The real world takes over.
But all universalists (communists among them too) refuse to accept that defeat. As they must because every defeat is a sign of non-universalism. That’s where the intellectual hubris kicks in. The defeat is seen as due to moral flaws among those who failed to adopt neoliberal values. To its votaries nothing short of its full acceptance qualifies one as a sane and morally righteous person. Whatever new social contract its votaries have determined is valid, were it only a week ago, must unconditionally be applied henceforth. The morality play combined with economic success that many proponents of neoliberalism enjoyed due to their age, geographical location, and education, gave it Victorian or even Calvinist undertones: becoming rich was seen not only as a sign of worldly success but as an indication of moral superiority. As Deng Xiaoping said, “getting rich is glorious”. This moral element implied lack of empathy with those who failed to find their right place within the new order. If one failed, it was because he deserved to fail. Faithful to its universalism, Western upper middle-class neoliberals did not treat co-citizens any differently from foreigners. Local failure was no less merited than the failure in a faraway place. This contributed more than anything else to the neoliberals’ political defeat: they simply ignored the fact that most politics is domestic.
The hubris which comes from success (and which got elevated to unheard-of heights after the defeat of communism) was reinforced by universalism—a feature shared by all ideologies and religions that by their very construct refuse to accept that local conditions and practices matter. Syncretism was not in the neoliberals’ playbook.
Finally, mendacity. The failure to observe, especially in international relations, even the self-defined and self-acclaimed “rules-based global order”, and the tendency to use these rules selectively—that is, to follow the old-fashioned policies of national interest without acknowledging it, created among many the perception of double standards. Western neoliberal governments refused to own to it and kept on repeating their mantras even when such statements were in glaring contradiction with what they were actually doing. In the international arena, they ended in a cul-de-sac, manipulating words, reinventing concepts, fabricating realities, all in the attempt to mask the truth. A part of that mendacity was present domestically too when people were told to shut up and not complain because the statistical data were not giving them reason and thus their subjective views were wrong and had to be ignored.
What next? I discuss that in The Great Global Transformation. I think there is one thing on which most people would agree: that the past fifty years have seen the debacles of two universalist ideologies: communism and neoliberalism. Both were defeated by the real world. The new ideologies will not be universal: they would not claim to apply to the entire world. They will be particularist, limited in scope, both geographically and politically and geared toward the maintenance of hegemony wherever they rule; not fashioning it into universal principles. This is why the talk about global ideologies of authoritarianism is meaningless. These ideologies are local, aiming at the preservation of power and of the status quo. This does not make them averse to the old imperialist temptation. But that temptation can never be extended to the world as a whole nor can various authoritarianisms work together to accomplish that. Moreover, since they lack universal principles, they are likely to clash. The only way for authoritarians not to fight with each other is to accept a very narrow set of principles, essentially those of non-interference in domestic affairs and absence of aggression, and leave it at that. Xi Jinping’s proclamation of five such narrow rules at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting may be based on such a calculation…
Neoliberalism in crisis: “Defeated by reality,” from @brankomilan.bsky.social.
For a less certain perspective: “Will Trump Bring Neoliberalism’s Apocalypse, or Merely a New Iteration?” (source of the image above).
And apposite: “Why Neoliberalism Needs Neofascists,” “Has Liberalism’s Very Success in Delivering Human Flourishing Doomed It?,” and “The future of the world economy beyond globalization – or, thinking with soup.”
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As we rethink, we might recall that it was on this date in 1975 that New York City came within two hours of bankruptcy. The city had payments due of $350 million, but had only a fraction of that available. Washington had refused craft a bailout package. It was estimated by some that 100 banks would fail if the city went bankrupt. A notice had been drafted and signed by the mayor:
But at the last minute, as creditors were lined up at government buildings and teachers were being notified to stay home, the teachers union pension fund came to the rescue, buying city bonds and giving the city the lifeline it needed to avoid default.
More at: “The Night NYC Saved Itself”
“The real danger is assuming that because you haven’t had a problem yet, you won’t have one soon”*…
Joan Didion once observed that “survivors look back and see omens, messages they missed.” That’s certainly true in investment arena… where stock indices have been hovering near all time highs while everyone awaits the falling of the shoe(s) from Trump’s tariffs and assorted other blows to the economy. Will we look back in the not-too-distant future to signs that it couldn’t, thus wouldn’t, continue?
Omens registered in advance are “early warning signs.” A classic on the economic front is the “cardboard box index“; the output of cardboard boxes is believed to be an indicator of future production of consumer goods, since cardboard containers are so common for packaging and shipping these goods. It’s down.
Mike Schuler, the managing editor of gCaptain weighs in with another…
The U.S. container shipping industry is heading toward what could be one of the most significant volume declines in its six-decade history, according to the latest analysis from shipping expert John McCown.
August data revealed only a slight 0.1% year-over-year increase in inbound container volume at the ten largest U.S. ports, following a temporary reprieve in July when volumes rose 3.2%. Meanwhile, outbound volume in August dropped 2.6%, continuing an erratic pattern that saw a 2.0% increase in July and a 1.7% decrease in June.
The marginal growth in August inbound volumes can be attributed to an exception for goods in transit after the August 7 implementation of revised reciprocal tariffs. “The new tariffs did not apply to containers that were loaded on vessels at their last foreign port of call before August 7 provided they entered the U.S. before October 5,” McCown explains.
This exemption artificially supported August figures, as “the large majority of boxes coming into the U.S. in August being exempt from the tariffs going into effect on August 7.” McCown adds that this mechanism may have even incentivized strategic deployment adjustments where “ships were loaded by August 7 and slow-steamed to the U.S.”
A stark contrast is emerging between U.S. container volumes and global shipping trends. “When U.S. container volume data is compared to global data and data in other major areas, there is a noticeable and widening gap as the downtrends in U.S. lanes are being significantly mitigated by increased volume in other areas,” notes McCown.
Evidence of this divergence can be seen in Far East export figures, which “set a new record and were 6.3% ahead of the same month last year” in July. McCown observes that “world container supply chains have already begun to adapt and reconfigure trading patterns. The U.S. is a less relevant player in world trade today than it was prior to these various tariff initiatives and will become more so as announced plans are implemented.”
The National Retail Federation has revised its projection for 2025, now expecting total inbound volume to decrease by 3.4%. When considering that year-to-date volume through August shows a 3.1% increase, this projection translates to “the remaining four months of 2025 being down 15.7% compared to the same four months in 2024.”
September will likely mark the beginning of more pronounced declines. In a September 17 presentation, the Port of Los Angeles director stated they expected inbound volume to drop 10% compared to the same month last year. Container bookings data supports this outlook, with bookings from China to the U.S. down 26% in the first week of September compared to the same period last year.
The situation could worsen if currently paused reciprocal tariffs on Chinese imports are implemented in mid-November. “If and when those tariffs are implemented, it is highly likely that they would lead to broader declines related to inbound containers to the U.S. from China,” McCown warns.
Adding another layer of complexity is the upcoming USTR ship fee plan targeting ships built in China or operated by Chinese carriers, set to take effect in mid-October. McCown describes this as “moving container volume related to trade lanes involving the U.S. into unchartered waters.” As these lanes account for more than a quarter of global container miles, “there will be a ripple effect that will be felt globally.”
The projected decline represents an unprecedented shift for an industry that has historically grown at rates exceeding U.S. GDP. “For a tangible metric that has consistently for decades grown above U.S GDP, most often at two, three or even more multiples of GDP, the unusual nature of an actual decline in inbound container volume into the U.S. cannot be overemphasized,” McCown states.
While the immediate volume impact is becoming clearer, the inflationary effects of the tariffs will take longer to manifest fully in economic data. McCown notes that “it will not be until at least when the inflation data is released in during the fourth quarter that the inflationary impact of the tariffs can begin to be accurately assessed.”
McCown concludes that the U.S. faces a difficult trade-off: “The more inbound container volume to the U.S. declines, the more commerce and growth will be impacted but the less inflation we will get. The less inbound container volume to the U.S. declines, the more inflation we will get but the less commerce and growth will be impacted. Unfortunately, there is simply no good place to be on that spectrum.”…
For what it’s worth, your correspondent does not share McCown’s confidence that a drop in container volume– in imported goods– will not raise prices. While the goods that don’t arrive won’t be passed along with tariffs baked into their prices, their substitutes, which will, per force, be scare for some time, seem likely to have their prices “bid” up…
“U.S. Container Imports Face Historic Decline as Tariff Effects Take Hold.”
All this said, prediction on the basis of indicators (and omens and signs and early warning signals and the like) is a tricky business. See, for example: “List of dates predicted for apocalyptic events.”
* G. Scott Graham, Early Warning Signals
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As we batten down, we might recall that it was on this date in 2008 that U.S. stock markets, already on edge after the near failure of Wachovia Bank the day before, fell over the edge after the House rejected a bailout plan touted to help ease the ongoing financial crisis. Markets began their decline as soon as it became apparent the bill would fail. The Dow had its worst single day point decline in history, falling 777.68 points… the day that “The Crash of 2008” became real.
“When these systems work well, they hide in plain sight”*…
Plumbing, like most bits of the infrastucture on which we depend, is ideally out of sight and out of mind. It’s usually only when it fails that we pay attention… and then, too late to preempt the damage done and the problem that we then have to fix.
Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman turns to Nathan Tankus to discuss a wonky, but crucially-important, piece of financial infrastructure now being beset by the Trump administration…
Nathan Tankus has become an essential resource during these strange and scary times. My last chat with Nathan was about DOGE’s depredations at government agencies. This time I spoke with him about disruptions in financial markets.
I continue to be astonished at how important the “plumbing” of these markets — the stuff that makes them function, which we normally don’t even notice — becomes when everything falls apart. And economists in general don’t know that much about the plumbing, so we need help from people like Nathan who do.
One thing that struck me during the conversation was Nathan’s explanation of the partial easing of financial stress after the crazy tariffs announced April 2 were replaced by the equally crazy tariffs of April 9. He points out that while a serious analysis of the April 9 tariffs showed that they were as bad in their own way as the original tariffs, the narrative was that policy had eased. And markets, he insists (and I agree) are less information processors than conventional wisdom processors.
Much more in the interview…
Watch, listen, and/or read: “Liquidity, Volatility and Market Craziness: Paul Krugman Interviews Nathan Tankus Again.”
* Deb Chachra [and here], How Infrastructure Works
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As we batten down the hatches, we might recall that this date in 1970 inaugurated a celebration of the mother of all infrastructures: it was the first Earth Day. Initially suggested by John McConnell for March 21 (the Equinox in the Northern Hemisphere, a day of natural equipoise), Secretary General U Thant signed a UN Proclamation to that effect. But Earth Day as we know it was founded by U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson (who was later awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom Award for his work) as an environmental teach-in to be held on on this date. The first Earth Day had participants and celebrants in two thousand colleges and universities, roughly ten thousand primary and secondary schools, and hundreds of communities across the United States. Later that year, President Nixon signed the Environmental Protection Agency into being. Earth Day is now observed in 192 countries, coordinated by the nonprofit Earth Day Network, chaired by the first Earth Day 1970 organizer Denis Hayes– according to whom Earth Day is now “the largest secular holiday in the world, celebrated by more than a billion people every year.”
Earth Day Flag created by John McConnell (source)
“You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today”*…
… But you might be able to make a buck on it.
We humans are prone to illusions– ideological enthusiasms, avoidance, et al.– that don’t just allow, but encourage us to avoid hard truths. If there’s one sector in which that’s less true, it’s likely finance– where the altogether unemotional logic of profit-making prevails. But as Corbin Hiar illustrates, that can accrue as finding ways to profit from, rather than avoid, the problems that are brewing…
Top Wall Street institutions are preparing for a severe future of global warming that blows past the temperature limits agreed to by more than 190 nations a decade ago, industry documents show.
The big banks’ acknowledgment that the world is likely to fail at preventing warming of more than 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels is spelled out in obscure reports for clients, investors and trade association members. Most were published after the reelection of President Donald Trump, who is seeking to repeal federal policies that support clean energy while turbocharging the production of oil, gas and coal — the main sources of global warming.
The recent reports — from Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase and the Institute of International Finance — show that Wall Street has determined the temperature goal is effectively dead and describe how top financial institutions plan to continue operating profitably as temperatures and damages soar.
“We now expect a 3°C world,” Morgan Stanley analysts wrote earlier this month, citing “recent setbacks to global decarbonization efforts.”
The stunning conclusion indicates that the bank believes the planet is hurtling toward a future in which severe droughts and harvest failures become widespread, sea-level rise is measured in feet rather than inches and tropical regions experience episodes of extreme heat and humidity for weeks at a time that would bring deadly risks to people who work outdoors.
The global Paris Agreement, from which the U.S. is withdrawing under Trump, aims to limit average temperature increases to well below 2 degrees Celsius. Scientists have warned that permanently exceeding 1.5 degrees — a threshold the world breached for the first time last year — could lead to increasingly severe climate impacts, such as the demise of coral reef ecosystems that hundreds of millions of people rely on for food and storm surge protection.
Morgan Stanley’s climate forecast was tucked into a mundane research report on the future of air conditioning stocks, which it provided to clients on March 17. A 3 degree warming scenario, the analysts determined, could more than double the growth rate of the $235 billion cooling market every year, from 3 percent to 7 percent until 2030.
“The political environment has changed, so some of them are conforming to that,” Gautam Jain, a former investment banker who is now a senior research scholar at Columbia University, said of Wall Street’s increasingly dire climate projections. “But mostly it is a rational business decision.”
The new warming estimates come as heat-trapping gases continue to rise globally and as international commitments to limit the burning of oil, gas and coal that’s responsible for the bulk of emissions have stalled. Meanwhile, megabanks like Wells Fargo are backsliding on their previous climate pledges and exiting from the Net-Zero Banking Alliance, a United Nations-backed group that encouraged members to slash their emissions in line with the Paris Agreement.
Morgan Stanley, which in October watered down its climate-related lending targets, declined to comment.
Betting on potentially catastrophic global warming is both an acknowledgment of the current emissions trajectory and a politically savvy move in the second Trump era, according to Jain.
“Nobody wants to be seen as going against” the administration’s pro-fossil-fuel energy policy, he said. “These banks are businesses, so they have to look at the risk that they have in their portfolio and the opportunities that they see in the most likely environment.”…
Making hay in the havoc: “Big Banks Quietly Prepare for Catastrophic Warming,” from @corbinhiar.bsky.social and @eenews.bsky.social via @sciam.bsky.social.
Related: “Reinsurers: placing an economic price on climate change.”
* Abraham Lincoln
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As we sweat it out, we might spare a thought for Hugh Robert Mill; he died on this date in 1950. A geographer (President of the Geographical Association) and meteorologist (President of the Royal Meteorological Society), he was influential in the maturation of geography and cartography– and relevantly to this post, in the development of meteorology as a science.
“Private equity has absolutely no reason to exist. The private equity holder has all the upside and the banks all the downside.”*…
As private equity investors become much more active in the Global South, Farwa Sial adds local economies and their labor forces to the list of those shouldering the risks of falling into the hands of operators whose m. o. is “slash and burn” (or here). Her point of reference is, as you’ll see the U.K., where private equity has wreaked havoc with essential services. But she might well have cited examples from U.S. (e.g., healthcare [or here] or infrastructure [or here]…
The effectiveness of private equity has been a subject of ongoing debate in countries of the Global North. There is substantial evidence highlighting the extractive practices associated with private equity operations across Western nations. Examples include the decline of the British high street and the financial instability of local councils in the UK, particularly in the provision of child care. Similarly, in the United States, private equity has been linked to the attrition of an already fragile healthcare system. In France, Germany and the UK., its influence has contributed to the deterioration of care homes, raising significant concerns about its broader social and economic impact.
In a recent blog, Michael Roberts characterized private equity as “vampire capital“, encapsulating the widely recognized critique that private equity firms function through a rentier model. These firms are frequently associated with practices such as asset stripping, worker lay-offs, and opting for excess leverage that increases the debt burdens of their acquisitions, all while failing to provide compelling evidence of value creation. This perspective aligns closely with earlier criticisms of private equity. During the 2000s, private equity operations were similarly likened to a swarm of locusts, reflecting widespread disapproval of their extractive and often detrimental economic practices.
In summary, such analogies emphasize the aftermath of private equity operations, leaving behind “carcasses and barren landscapes.” Nevertheless, the evidence of a hollowed-out socio-economic landscape in the Global North has not deterred the international expansion of private equity into countries of the Global South. On the contrary, ongoing reports of American private equity capturing British markets have emerged in tandem with the globalization of Western private equity. In so-called “emerging markets,” this expansion manifests in various forms, including an enthusiasm for deploying “moral money” through international development initiatives.
This article examines the role of private equity in Global South countries, focusing on three key characteristics: the escalation of indebtedness, the weakening of public markets, and the public subsidy function of development finance in facilitating private equity investments…
Exporting pain: “Private Equity in the Global South: Locusts? Vampires? The contagion effect” by @farwasial in @DevEconNetwork.
* Nassim Nicholas Taleb
(Image above: source)
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As we muse on models of modernization, we might recall that on this date in 1995, the Japanese Nikkei index fell more than 1,000 points from 19,241 to 17,785 as traders panicked over the devastation of the Hanshin (or Kobe) Earthquake. In total, the Nikkei had fallen 7.6% since the earthquake on January 17th.
The decline was the leading trigger of the failure of the 232-year-old Barrings Bank. A young trader, Nick Leeson, had speculated on Japanese derivatives. By this date in 1995, Leeson had make big bets that the Nikkei would remain between 19,000 and 21,000. As the market sank Leeson added to his positions, eventually accumulating over 60,000 futures contracts. Within a month Leeson quit the bank and was on the run (eventually he was arrested and served 3 years in jail). The losses he accumulated took Barings down; it failed and was sold to ING for 1 pound on March 6th.
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