Posts Tagged ‘investment’
“We hear all this talk about integrating the world economically, but there is an argument to be made for not integrating the world economically”*…
… and indeed, those arguments seem to be holding increasing sway. Tyler Cowan ponders the possible economic implications of a future in which global economic interdependence recedes– a future in which globe’s economies, freer of each other, don’t rise and fall with each other (as they largely have for decades) to the same extent…
Will we see less co-movement in global economic growth?
That is the question behind my latest Bloomberg column (soft pay wall). China is now, and looking forward, less of a common growth driver around the world. Oil price shocks may not be less important for humanitarian outcomes, but they matter less for many of the largest economies. America is now an oil exporter, and the EU just made some major adjustments in response to the Russia shock. More renewable energy is coming on-line, most of all solar.
The column closes with this:
In this new world, with these major common shocks neutered, a country’s prosperity will be more dependent on national policies than on global trends. Culture and social trust will matter more too, as will openness to innovation — and, as fertility rates remain low or decline, so will a country’s ability to handle immigration. A country that cannot repopulate itself with peaceful and productive immigrants is going to see its economy shrink in relative terms, and probably experience a lot of bumps on the way down.
At the same time, excuses for a lack of prosperity will be harder to come by. The world will not be deglobalized, but it will be somewhat de-risked.
Dare we hope that these new arrangements will produce better results than the old?
Or perhaps a more general rising tide was the only way many countries were going to make progress?
Marginal Revolution
Byrne Hobart reflects further…
When economies were tightly linked, growth in the US led to more demand for manufactured goods from China, which created more demand for raw materials from other parts of the developing world. But if that link is weaker, it’s entirely possible for there to be a boom in some places and a bust elsewhere. That probably increases the personal returns from global macro investing while decreasing its social return: when the world is closely-linked, there are massive positive externalities in predicting recessions, because there are so few places to hide. It’s comparatively less essential for the world to know that German is slowing down but growth in Indonesia is picking up, but it also means that macro questions are more tractable.
The Diff
* Arundhati Roy
###
As we think tectonically, we might recall that it was on this date in 1865 that the U.S. first issued Gold Certificates.
Americans began to move out west in the first half of the 19th century. Banks started printing their own money to fund land purchases, and that quickly led to two problems: loose money-printing had a volatile effect on prices, and it became increasingly hard to tell what was counterfeit from what wasn’t.
To tackle these problems, the government decreed in the 1830s that it would only accept transactions in gold and silver. But of course, lugging metals around is nobody’s idea of fun. So in 1863, Congress paved the way for the first “gold certificates” to be printed two years later, in November 1865.
A gold certificate was, in effect, a form of paper currency backed by gold – although not entirely. The Treasury was allowed to issue $120 in gold certificates for every $100-worth of gold it held in its vaults…
MoneyWeek
“I Seen My Opportunities and I Took ’Em”*
U.S. Senators and Congresspeople are routinely privy to news that easily fits the definition of insider information (“a fact about a public company’s plans or finances that has not yet been revealed to shareholders and that could give an unfair advantage to its possessors if acted upon“), investing on which would constitute the crime of insider trading in any other setting. There are easy ways to avoid this risk (blind trusts, widely-held stock funds, et al.); still, over half of our elected representatives trade individual stocks.
The chart above is from Quiver Strategies, a company with a “democratizing” mission:
Over the past decade, alternative data has exploded in popularity among professional money managers. Alternative data allows investors to tap into new and unique data sources to aid their decisions. However, alternative data is typically priced for institutional clients, and is not widely available to retail investors.
Trends in FinTech such as commissions-free trading have made it easier than ever to actively manage your own portfolio, which has created millions of retail traders around the world.
Quiver was founded by two college students in February of 2020, with the goal of bridging this information gap between Wall Street and non-professional investors.
Maybe not surprisingly, one of the most successful families of strategies they’ve identified tracks the stock trades of Senators and Congresspeople (per the illustration above; use pull-down to see others).
Huge majorities of Americans favor a ban on Congressional trading; and a few legislators have introduced a bill to curtail it (along with others). But it been tried before, and failed. As for this wave, as Reuters reports “It was unclear when the legislation might be considered in committee or whether it will advance to the full Senate for debate and votes anytime this year.”
[Toth to Mark Frauenfelder and Boing Boing]
* Tammany Hall boss George Washington Plunkitt, as part of his justification of what he called “honest graft“
###
As we hold our noses, we might note that today is National Happy Hour Day.
“Not all private equity people are evil. Only some.”*…
But as Rogé Karma explains, that could be enough to cause big trouble, as a large and growing portion of our economy is disappearing behind a veil…
The publicly-traded company is disappearing. In 1996, about 8,000 firms were listed in the U.S. stock market. Since then, the national economy has grown by nearly $20 trillion. The population has increased by 70 million people. And yet, today, the number of American public companies stands at fewer than 4,000. How can that be?
One answer is that the private-equity industry is devouring them. When a private-equity fund buys a publicly traded company, it takes the company private—hence the name. (If the company has not yet gone public, the acquisition keeps that from happening.) This gives the fund total control, which in theory allows it to find ways to boost profits so that it can sell the company for a big payday a few years later. In practice, going private can have more troubling consequences. The thing about public companies is that they’re, well, public. By law, they have to disclose information about their finances, operations, business risks, and legal liabilities. Taking a company private exempts it from those requirements.
That may not have been such a big deal when private equity was a niche industry. Today, however, it’s anything but. In 2000, private-equity firms managed about 4 percent of total U.S. corporate equity. By 2021, that number was closer to 20 percent. In other words, private equity has been growing nearly five times faster than the U.S. economy as a whole.
Elisabeth de Fontenay, a law professor at Duke University who studies corporate finance, told me that if current trends continue, “we could end up with a completely opaque economy.”
This should alarm you even if you’ve never bought a stock in your life. One-fifth of the market has been made effectively invisible to investors, the media, and regulators. Information as basic as who actually owns a company, how it makes its money, or whether it is profitable is “disappearing indefinitely into private equity darkness,” as the Harvard Law professor John Coates writes in his book The Problem of Twelve. This is not a recipe for corporate responsibility or economic stability. A private economy is one in which companies can more easily get away with wrongdoing and an economic crisis can take everyone by surprise. And to a startling degree, a private economy is what we already have.
America learned the hard way what happens when corporations operate in the dark. Before the Great Depression, the whole U.S. economy functioned sort of like the crypto market in 2021. Companies could raise however much money they wanted from whomever they wanted. They could claim almost anything about their finances or business model. Investors often had no good way of knowing whether they were being defrauded, let alone whether to expect a good return.
Then came the worst economic crisis in U.S. history…
Read on for a bracing account of: “The Secretive Industry Devouring the U.S. Economy,” (gift article) in @TheAtlantic.
* Paul Krugman
###
As we clean our glasses, we might spare a thought for Ivy Lee; he died on this date in 1934. A publicity expert and a founder of modern public relations, he was among the first to persuade business clients– foremost among them, the Rockefeller family– to woo public opinion. Ultimately he advised rail, steel, automobile, tobacco, meat packing, and rubber interests, as well as public utilities, banks, and even foreign governments.
Lee pioneered the use of internal magazines to maintain employee morale, as well as management newsletters, stockholder reports, and news releases to the media. And he did a great deal of pro bono work, which he knew was important to his own public image; during World War I, he became the publicity director for the American Red Cross.
“It’s the economy, stupid”*…
It’s no secret that economic conditions have political impacts; still the stark, almost mechanical character of that impact can still be surprising– and can raise the question of motive. Consider on the findings of a recent study by analysts at Sveriges Riksbank, Sweden’s central bank…
Using a novel regional database covering over 200 elections in several European countries,
this paper provides new empirical evidence on the political consequences of fiscal consoli-
dations. To identify exogenous reductions in regional public spending, we use a Bartik-type
instrument that combines regional sensitivities to changes in national government expendi-
tures with narrative national consolidation episodes. Fiscal consolidations lead to a signifi-
cant increase in extreme parties’ vote share, lower voter turnout, and a rise in political frag-
mentation. We highlight the close relationship between detrimental economic developments
and voters’ support for extreme parties by showing that austerity induces severe economic
costs through lowering GDP, employment, private investment, and wages. Austerity-driven
recessions amplify the political costs of economic downturns considerably by increasing dis-
trust in the political environment.
Here, Adam Tooze:
With a significant data set, this paper argues that post-2008 austerity clearly increased support for far-right parties by deepening recessions and generating social fragmentation. Note that the authors measure support for “extreme” parties, which risks lumping together fascists and socialists through liberal “horseshoe theory” — the most ostensibly objective, empirical social science has a dose of ideology in it! — but this is nonetheless important in confirming the old Keynesian claim that was so starkly forgotten by Eurozone political elites after the financial crisis. The question that arises, then, is why a truth discovered through much pain in the 1930s (slashing demand only deepens economic and social problems) was set aside: was this a case of foolishness or the pursuit of other, narrower [economic self-serving and/or political] interests?
Why do we keep making the same mistakes: “The Political Costs of Austerity,” from @riksbanken and @adam_tooze.
For a sense that there may be some remedial action afoot, at least in the aid available to troubled economies, see “A reboot of the World Bank and IMF tests US influence” (gift article; source of the image above)… though it’s fueled by geopolitical competition for influence, so may simply be trading one problem for another…
And for a contrary view: “The Economic Anxiety Explanation of Fascism Is Wrong” (though the author’s case begins from the assertion that “there just is little to no evidence that economic hardship leads to fascism,” a claim weakened by the paper above; still his larger argument is worth reading).
* James Carville, while he was serving as a strategist to Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign (which unfolded during a recession)
###
As we wonder if it is, in the end, all about the Benjamins, we might recall that on this date in 1929 Yale economist Irving Fisher wrote in the New York Times that “Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau.” Eight days later, on October 24, 1929, the stock market began a four-day implosion on what became known as Black Thursday. This crash cost investors more than World War I and was a main catalyst of the Great Depression.
Fisher’s declaration was in response to Great Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, then-recent description of America’s stock market as “a perfect orgy of speculation,” which was quickly followed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon’s assertion that American investors “acted as if the price of securities would infinitely advance.” Fisher’s prognostication has entered history as the worst stock market prediction of all time.
“Where you have a concentration of power in a few hands, all too frequently men with the mentality of gangsters get control. History has proven that.”*…
In 2018, John Coates wrote a paper that argued that “in the near future roughly twelve individuals will have practical power over the majority of US public companies.” That article has now become a book in which he has expanded his analysis. FT Alphaville reports…
…
The 2018 paper was focused on index funds, and that is the bit most people have freaked out about. After all, even Vanguard’s founder Jack Bogle raised the dangers of a narrow clutch of rapidly growing passive investment giants controlling more and more of the corporate world.
However, the book finally comes good on a promise made in the original paper to also explore the implications of the rise of private equity. It is the missing piece of the puzzle. As Coates puts it in the intro:
A “problem of twelve” arises when a small number of actors acquires the means to exert outsized influence over the politics and economy of a nation. In US history, problems of twelve have recurred, as the result of a clash of two fundamental forces: economies of scale in finance on the one hand, and constitutional commitments to fragmented and limited political power on the other. Each time, the “problem” has been two-sided. The concentration of wealth and power in a small number of hands threatens the political system and the people generally, and the political response can threaten the financial institutions in which wealth and power are accumulating, even when those institutions create economic benefits.
Today, two late-twentieth century institutions — index funds and private equity funds — are creating a new problem of twelve. As financial organizations, they amass and invest capital, and have been primarily scrutinized through a financial lens. As with other financial institutions, they pool savings from dispersed individuals and channel it to fund major projects. They facilitate capitalism, which has created huge benefits for humanity — wealth, health, and much longer life spans — along with inequality, misery, and the existential threat of climate change. Finance creates value by facilitating change, but distributes the gains unequally, and magnifies the gales of “creative destruction.”
But both kinds of funds are now so large, and have influence over so much of the economy, that they have economic and political power, whether they want it or not. Their power makes them targets of political threats. Both institutions exhibit “economies of scale.” Both are active politically — directly, and indirectly — through their control of businesses.
Their growing and concentrated wealth and power threatens the foundations of a democratic republic built on Montesquieu’s separation of powers as well as federalism — the “checks and balances” taught to every civics student. In a predictable response, the republic is increasingly threatening each type of institution with new restrictions, burdens, and limits. Because index funds certainly, and private equity funds possibly, create value within the US economy, the threats to them are as important as their potential threats to American democracy…
In a thoughtful analysis, FT Alphaville asks, is this a problem to be solved or a dilemma to be managed? “The ‘Problem of Twelve’ — redux” (gift article) from @FTAlphaville.
* Lord Acton (perhaps better known for his remark in an 1887 letter to an Anglican bishop, “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”)
###
As we contemplate consolidation, we might spare a thought for Fischer Black; he died on this date in 1995. An economist, he is best remembered as the co-creator of the Black-Scholes model, a technique for valuing financial options. The model established that an option could be priced from a set-in-stone mathematical equation, which allowed the Chicago Board Options Exchange (C.B.O.E.), a new organization, to expand their business to a new universe of financial derivatives. Within a year, more than twenty thousand option contracts were changing hands each day. Four years after that, the C.B.O.E. introduced the “put” option—thus institutionalizing the bet that the thing you were betting on would lose. “Profit at all prices” had joined the mainstream of both economic theory and practice, and by 2007, the international financial system was trading derivatives valued at one quadrillion dollars per year.
The Nobel Prize is not given posthumously, so it was not awarded to Black in 1997 when his co-author Myron Scholes received the economics honor for their landmark work on option pricing along with Robert C. Merton, another pioneer in the development of valuation of stock options. However, when announcing the award that year, the Nobel committee did prominently mention Black’s key role.
As Warren Buffett (whose birthday is today) observed: “The Black–Scholes formula has approached the status of holy writ in finance … If the formula is applied to extended time periods, however, it can produce absurd results. In fairness, Black and Scholes almost certainly understood this point well. But their devoted followers may be ignoring whatever caveats the two men attached when they first unveiled the formula.” Indeed, the “ruthless” application of the model has led to a number of disasters for investors (c.f. Long-Term Capital Management).
You must be logged in to post a comment.