Posts Tagged ‘corporate fraud’
“Things gained through fraud are never secure”*…
… Still, the damage done to the defrauded is too often too real. A unsettling report from the front lines of financial accounting…
The level of corporate earnings manipulation is similar to that of past pre-recessionary periods, according to research by professors at the University of Missouri and Indiana University.
Their finding is based on the M-Score, a screening model that catches fraud in corporate earnings reports. Messod Daniel Beneish, a professor at the Indiana University Kelley School of Business, created the M-Score in the 1990s. The “M” stands for manipulation, and the measure is also sometimes referred to as the Beneish M-Score.
Based on known examples of past financial misreporting, the M-Score combines eight ratios on a company’s balance sheet to assess its fraud risk. A higher M-Score means a company is more likely to be manipulating its earnings.
“It allows us to assess fraud risk in real time,” said Matt Glendening, an accounting professor at the University of Missouri. “The advantage of using a measure such as the M-Score is that if you use actual instances of accounting fraud, not all cases are caught, especially the less severe cases. And also, there is a delay between the misreporting period and the time at which the fraud is actually revealed.”
One notable M-Score success came in 1998, when a group of Cornell students used the M-Score to flag Enron as having an elevated fraud risk. This was three years before the public learned that the company was inflating its profits, resulting in what was then the largest corporate bankruptcy in history and several executives going to jail.
…
Corporate earnings are traditionally manipulated either by overstating revenues or understating expenses. How companies do this varies, but it could include recognizing sales revenues early or understating inventory.
“There are all sorts of capital market pressures on firms to maintain stock price, maintain earnings growth,” Glendening said. “There could also be some compensation incentives at play.”
In 2019, Beneish expanded the M-Score, creating a new measure that goes beyond individual companies to the economy as a whole. With the help of Glendening and two other co-authors, Beneish created the aggregate M-Score, which now compiles the M-Scores of 2,004 companies to measure the likelihood of earnings manipulation across the economy. Earlier in 2023, the aggregate M-Score was at its highest level in 40 years.
“Accounting manipulation matters for the economy at large,” Glendening said. Companies use other business’ earnings data to inform hiring, purchasing, and production decisions. “What we are finding is that the level of aggregate misreporting is very similar to what we’ve observed in pre-recessionary periods.”
Ask not for whom the bell tolls: “This little-known accounting measure is ringing an economic warning bell,” from Kai Ryssdal (@kairyssdal) and Andie Corban on @Marketplace.
See also: “Corporate Fraud” (source of the image above)
* Sophocles
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As we look more closely, we might recall that it was on this date in 1974 that the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend that America’s 37th president, Richard M. Nixon, be impeached and removed from office for a variety of offenses that arose from the Watergate Affair. Several days later (August 5), as the full house discussed the trial, the “Smoking Gun” tape was released, demonstrating that Nixon was in fact involved in the cover-up. His political capital destroyed, Nixon resigned– in a nationwide television address– on August 8, effective the next day.
“The opposite of knowledge is not ignorance, but deceit and fraud”*…
In follow-on to our last look at corporate fraud, a provocative piece by Byrne Hobart…
This paper has been getting some attention lately for its eye-catching estimates: 11% of publicly traded companies are committing securities fraud every year, with an annual cost of over $700bn…
[There follows an illuminating discussion of lessons that can be drawn for the follow-on to Arthur Andersen’s collapse after the implosion of Enron, the rules/regulations developed then to prevent similar public company frauds, and a consideration of whether corporate fraud has waned– at least among publicly-traded companies– and is perhaps a little less wide-spread than the paper argues…]
But since fraud is a human problem, and not purely a matter of better accounting standards, it’s not likely to have just gone away. But if the rate of accounting problems among big publicly-traded companies is lower than the 11% number cited in the paper, the question isn’t “why did it disappear?” but rather “where did it go?” And we can take our list of trends against fraud and invert them:
• Sarbanes-Oxley does apply to private companies, but only on the penalty side, not the disclosure side. But accounting frauds in private companies are often less visible; many investments go to zero, anyway, and it’s less embarrassing for everyone involved not to say why.
• There are no short-sellers in private markets. There have been efforts here, but they don’t work out because the market doesn’t clear (“everyone wanted to short Theranos, Dropbox and WeWork”). The closest you can get to shorting is to pass on a round and then brag about it later. Big deal: I didn’t invest in FTX, either.
• There’s less data available on private companies, though the rise of alternative data tools means it’s easier to get decent proxies.
• Startups are not expected to return capital. It’s a bad sign if they do. They’re often valued either based on strategic considerations or starting with a multiple of sales—a dollar of sales is much easier to fake than a dollar of earnings or cash flow, so the incentive to do so is strong.
• The idea market in startups is liquid when it comes to successes, but it would be pretty tacky for a VC to write a long blog post explaining why they passed on a live deal. (That memo may exist internally, but to the extent that it’s shared it’s in the form of a quick summary over Twitter DM or Signal.)
JPMorgan Chase’s writedown of their fintech acquisition Frank is a great case study in all of these forces. The NYT has a good story digging into the details: Frank’s founder is a serial exaggerator whose self-promotion veered into fraud (once again, if the rate of continuous improvement in public perception to be maintained exceeds what the fundamentals can deliver, compound interest works its ruthless magic). The company was valued at a high multiple of what turned out to be a flexible metric, total email addresses captured. And there were alternative datasets that could have pointed to problems: given the likely number of student aid applicants in the US, Frank’s numbers implied that it had reached near-dominant market share in the category with little marketing. Meanwhile, its monthly site traffic was not enough to have acquired that sizable a customer list over Frank’s entire existence. So it could have been caught, if the buyer had been looking for fraud. But one paradox of frauds and cheats in general is that lying is less than half the work—most of the effort is in appearing not to need to lie. The more impressive a company looks, the more embarrassing the basic due diligence questions are.
A down market and a series of high-profile failures might give private markets the same kind of natural experiment that Arthur Andersen’s failure did for public markets. Due diligence checklists will get longer and more thorough, and new funding rounds will feel more like a cross-examination and less like a party. One reason for a high base rate of fraud is that at least some of it stems from inattention rather than malice—the Arthur Andersen study finds that most of the frauds were fairly minor, and could be more the result of poor internal metrics than of intent to mislead. But either way, standards will get higher, and private companies will need to step up their efforts accordingly…
Has the primary locus of corporate fraud moved from public to private companies? “Where Fraud Lives and Why,” from @ByrneHobart.
[Image above: source]
* Jean Baudrillard
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As we do due diligence, we might recall that it was on this date in 2016 that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) sent a letter to Theranos after an inspection of its Newark, California, lab. The investigation, which took place in the fall of 2015, had found that the facility did not “comply with certificate requirements and performance standards” and caused “immediate jeopardy to patient health and safety.” This followed on three exposes on Theranos in the Wall Street Journal (in October [here and here] and December of 2015) and a critical FDA report. Things unraveled from there: in March, 2018, Thearnos, CEO Elizabeth Holmes, and President Sunny Balwani were charged by the FCC with fraud. Three month later, a federal grand jury indicted both Holmes and Balwani on two counts of conspiracy and nine counts of wire fraud, finding that the pair had “engaged in a multi-million dollar scheme to defraud investors, and a separate scheme to defraud doctors and patients.” Theranos closed in 2018. Holmes was convicted and sentenced to 11 years in prison for her crimes (a sentence she is appealing); Balwani, to 13 years.
Theranos was a private company, funded by investors including Henry Kissinger, Betsy DeVos, Carlos Slim, and Rupert Murdoch.
Elizabeth Holmes found guilty (source)
“Things gained through unjust fraud are never secure”*…
Mischief is cyclical—it is bred in good times and uncovered in bad times…
The bad news just keeps coming. Ten months after America’s stock market peaked, its big technology companies have suffered another rout. Hopes that the Federal Reserve might change course have been dashed; interest rates are set to rise by more than previously thought. The bond market is screaming recession. Could things get any worse? The answer is yes. Stock market booms of the sort that crested in January tend to engender fraud. Bad times like those that lie ahead reveal it.
“There is an inverse relationship between interest rates and dishonesty,” says Carson Block, a short-seller. Quite so. A decade of ultra-low borrowing costs has encouraged companies to load up on cheap debt. And debt can hide a lot of misdeeds. They are uncovered when credit dries up. The global financial crisis of 2007-09 exposed fraud and negligence in mortgage lending. The stockmarket bust of the early 2000s unmasked the deceptions of the dotcom bonanza and the book-cooking at Enron, Worldcom and Global Crossing. Those with longer memories in Britain will recall the Polly Peck and Maxwell scandals at the end of the go-go 1980s.
The next downturn seems likely to uncover a similar wave of corporate fraud…
The archetypal sin revealed by recession is accounting fraud. The big scandals play out like tragic dramas: when the plot twist arrives, it seems both surprising and inevitable. No simple formula exists to sort the number-fiddlers from the rest. But the field can be narrowed by searching within the “fraud triangle” of financial pressure, opportunity and rationalization…
As Warren Buffett has noted, “you don’t find out who’s been swimming naked until the tide goes out.” Read on for more from @TheEconomist, “A sleuth’s guide to the coming wave of corporate fraud” (a gift article: no paywall).
* Sophocles
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As we contemplate criminality, we might recall that it was on this date in 1997 that MCI and Worldcom announced what was then the largest merger in history, valued at $37 Billion, creating the second largest telecom company in the U.S. (after ATT).
Worldcom, the acquirer, completed the deal in 1998, then continued to grow via acquisition. MCI Worldcom (as then it was) filed for bankruptcy in 2002 (the Dot Com Bust) after an accounting scandal (as referenced above), in which several executives, including CEO Bernard Ebbers, were convicted of a scheme to inflate the company’s assets… which were ultimately acquired by Verizon.
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