(Roughly) Daily

In a widely-cited article from May, Gillian Tett marks a fundamental shift– accelerated by the Trump administration, but underway beforehand:

… in the 20th century free-market intellectual framework — which is the one in which most western professionals built their careers — it was generally assumed that rational economic self interest ruled the roost, not grubby politics. Politics seemed to be derivative of economics — not the other way around.

No longer. The trade war unleashed by US President Donald Trump has shocked many investors, since it seems so irrational by the standards of neoliberal economics. But “rational” or not, it reflects a shift to a world where economics has taken second place to political games, not just in America, but many other places too…

…this phenomenon is not simply about one man (Trump), but rather marks a much bigger turning point in the intellectual zeitgeist — of a sort we have seen a few times before.

One such shift occurred just over a century ago, when the globalist, Imperialist vision of capitalism that reigned before the first world war was displaced by nationalist, protectionist policies. Another came after the second world war, when Keynesian economics took hold. Then, in the 1980s, free-market neoliberal ideas displaced Keynesianism.

The fact that the intellectual pendulum is now swinging again, towards more nationalist protectionism (with a dose of military Keynesianism), thus fits a historical pattern — although few predicted that the swing would take quite this form…

… one important facet of this zeitgeist shift is that governments are no longer “just” focused on their country’s absolute wellbeing, but on their relative positions too. This distinction might sound subtle. But it matters deeply, as a paper co-authored by Aaditya Mattoo, a World Bank economist, along with Michele Ruta and Robert Staige, spells out.

That is because an “absolute welfare” mentality supports trade co-operation, but unravels “if rivalry eclipses any consideration of own- country wellbeing,” the authors say. Trump’s angry rhetoric about America being “ripped off” by competitors, in other words, reflects a bigger mental shift… an (obvious) factor behind this rivalry is that China is now challenging America’s incumbent dominance…

It’s worth reading Tett’s piece in full (gift link)– and noting that the real-world evidence supporting her thesis is clear. Here, let us look more closely at China. Adam Tooze offers a primer– all-too-appropriate to Tett’s argument– on how to see China’s historic development through the veil of macroeconomics…

In the global economic conjuncture there are few if any factors more important than the state and future prospects of China’s economy. In purchasing power parity terms, it is the largest economy in the world, with a 20 percent share of global GDP. Measured in terms of current exchange rates, China comes second to the US.

China impacts the world economy as a huge market for exports from other countries. China’s imports range from raw materials, to Europe’s luxury brands. The share price of LVMH, Europe’s largest company by stock market valuation, bobs up and down in response to the spending patterns of Chinese women, the world’s most rapidly growing segment of luxury consumers.

China’s exports are a huge part of global markets. And when China’s domestic demand is less buoyant, there is a surge of anxiety about “excess capacity”, the pressure of exports increases and we start talking about “China shocks”.

In the macroeconomic balance, as discussed in World Economy Now of May, China’s huge surplus is the counterpart to the huge deficit of the USA.

China’s currency is pegged against a basket of other world currencies. This is backed up by some of the more effective capital account regulation in the world economy today. Funds cannot easily be transferred out of China on a large scale. So, there is structural uncertainty about what the exchange rate of the RMB should be. The trade account would suggest stronger. The scenario of mass capital flight in the event of a loosening of capital controls would suggest a much weaker currency, as happened during the crisis episode of 2015. A sudden adjustment in the Chinese exchange rate has the potential to destabilize the world economy as severely as Trump’s trade wars.

For all of these reasons, China is at the heart of global macroeconomics.

And there are a lot of news to be concerned about…

[Tooze reviews the decline in China’s growth rate…]

… But as useful as it is, this macroeconomic approach also minimizes the drama of history and qualitative transformation. China’s economy is huge because it encompasses the material destiny of one sixth of humanity. In the 1970s, China’s national income per head was less than that of Sudan and Zambia. It was not just the most populous country in the world but also one of the poorest. China’s ascent during the age of globalization is not just one economic story amongst many. It is the single most dramatic development in world economic history, bar none…

… Today, with a per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms of $24,569, China is officially classed as an “upper middle-income” economy. It has far outstripped India (which in 1990 was still ahead of China). It has overtaken Indonesia. It has surpassed Brazil and caught up with Mexico. China is now on the cusp of being promoted to the ranks of the “high-income” countries…

… So here we have two images of China: One, as a big part of global macroeconomics, the other as a world historic development story. The trick is not to play these two accounts against each other, but to figure out how they interrelate and condition each other.

If we can sensibly discuss China today as just another big economy, rather than a country struggling with basic development issues, it is because it has actually undergone something truly exceptional, namely, utterly radical economic development in the space of less than two generations.

Pause for a second to consider this twist.

Dialectics offers us a way of imagining the process through which quantitative change turns into qualitative transformation. And there is plenty of that going on in the Chinese case. For example, it is one thing to be a big player in electric vehicles, it is quite another to entirely dominate every facet of the global supply chain. At that point market share measured in percentage points, a quantitative metric, turns into power, a statement of qualitative distinction.

But China also spectacularly illustrates the opposite process, through which qualitative change on a huge scale – “opening up” and “market reform” – transform a society’s entire mode of being so much that it becomes discussable as “just another really big piece of the world economy”, no different in macroeconomic terms than the Eurozone or the US economy. A history of radical qualitative change gives way to bland quantitative metrication.

Social theorists and market practitioners both use the same word to capture this dialectic of quality into quantity – commodification. When your distinctive, branded product with its specific qualities and associated narrative becomes commoditized, it widens the market, but also erases distinctions. In intellectual terms, rendering China’s utterly radical, world-changing development story as a question of “global growth”, is something akin to “commodification”.

Of course, quantitative comparison enabled by commodification has many uses. No less than commoditized goods. But both accept as a cost the erasure of specific qualities. In narrative terms, it involves a kind of blindness to history – how we got here – but also to the wider social and political meaning of current trends and the network of social, political, cultural and material forces that may drive future development. We do macroeconomics no injustice, if we call it heuristic and algorithmic in its approach. Its metier is not the in-depth search for historical meaning.

If we are to have both we need to learn to shuttle back and forth in our economic analysis from quality to quantity to quality to quantity etc.

Of course, you might object that all I am describing in rather highfalutin terms, are the methods of any good economic journalist. A good economics story weaves back and forth between the particular and the general, the experiential and the GDP numbers. That is true. It is a familiar narrative style. But there is a difference between an anecdote that merely serves as a “hook” and the effort to actually find a keyhole or opening that allows us to enter into the complexity of historical reality. As Stuart Hall once put it, the challenge is to find ways of “breaking in” to the historical conjuncture we are trying to decipher…

… How does the quality-quantity dialectic help us to better understand China’s economic situation and its relationship to the world economy in the summer of 2025?…

[Tooze uses that dialectic to unpack four key issues for China: real estate/urbanization, youth unemployment/generational shock, trade surplus/manufacturing power, and deflation (the “accumulation regime”)…]

… This essay had been a forced march, the aim of which is to connect four points of common concern about China’s macroeconomic situation – real estate, youth unemployment, the trade balance and deflation – with broader questions of China’s recent history and development. Doing justice to any of these themes would require far more space and far more expertise than I have my disposal. My aim here is simply to demonstrate the value of this kind of approach. My aim is to alert us to the moments when quality flattens into quantity – when “world-changing hundred-millionfold urbanization” is recharacterized as nothing more than a real estate boom – and to suggest the possibility of different narratives. The aim is to allow us to see through the bare bones of the macroeconomic schema, to the more historically specific and ultimately more powerful forces that are at play.

I’m not original in suggesting this. This is just what good history and good critical social analysis ought to do when it wrestles with the limitations of familiar macroeconomic concepts. In this particular case I am indebted to the work of Lan Xiaohuan of Fudan university, whose book How China Works: An Introduction to China’s State-led Economic Development offers a fascinating developmentalist perspective on recent Chinese economic history.

But not the least attraction of this approach is that it actually allows us to hear – as in really hear – how the Chinese describe their own situation. China insists on referring to itself as “developing” and “development” as the key objective of policy. The phrase 发展 (fāzhǎn) recurs in the titles of the National Development and Reform Commission, the de facto center of Chinese planning, and the Development Research Council of the State Council.

All too often the question of whether China should be counted as a “developing economy” is treated as a matter of cheap gamesmanship. Western critics, allege that China shirks its responsibilities by insisting on its status as a developing country. But triviality aside, as I have argued here, the question is actually a fundamental one. China is a huge and complex society with a powerful regime undergoing the most dramatic process of socio-economic change in world history. To describe this ongoing process as one of development is, if anything, an understatement.

Indeed, the question is why we don’t learn from the Chinese. Would it not behoove Western advanced economies to consider themselves, as well, as “developing”. Or does the difficulty of doing so betoken a telling blindspot? Development as a conception of economic change embodies a notion of comprehensiveness, qualitative change and deliberate purpose that is a challenge to policy in rich countries. In the US the bold vision of the Green New Deal was reduced to the Inflation Reduction Act. Trump’s tariffs and Big Beautiful Bill are a parody of economic nationalism. The best that the EU could manage was NextGen EU in 2020.

As Wang Yiwei of the Academy of Xi Jinping Thought at Renmin University remarked to The Economist:

Development is a permanent “political identity” … The party’s legitimacy depends in part on the riches yet to come. “Once you are ‘advanced’,” says Mr Wang, “you are declining.

The frankness is disarming. But does the West really have an answer?

Eminently worth reading in full: “Whither China? – World Economy Now, June 2025 Edition” from @adamtooze.bsky.social‬.

Pair with: “The Two Chinas.”

And for context, “Structure and Interpretation of the Chinese Economy.”

(Image above: source)

* ancient Chinese adage

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As we synthesize, we might recall that it was on this date in 626 that  Li Shimin ambushed and killed his rival brothers Li Yuanji and Li Jiancheng in the Xuanwu Gate Incident. Li Shimin went on to become Emperor Taizong of Tang– the second emperor of the Tang dynasty of China, ruling from 626 to 649. He is traditionally regarded as a co-founder of the dynasty for his role in encouraging his father Li Yuan (Emperor Gaozu) to rebel against the Sui dynasty in 617. Taizong subsequently played a pivotal role in defeating several of the dynasty’s most dangerous opponents and solidifying its rule over China proper.

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